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Abstract 
 
In the age of big data, character becomes a newly foregrounded object 
– and product – of scrutiny. New credit scoring methods, which draw on big 
data analytics, claim to paint rich, nuanced pictures of prospective borrowers’ 
“true characters.” Micro-entrepreneurs, such as hosts on Airbnb, trade in 
reputation-images, seeking the best possible ratings and reviews in an online 
marketplace built on highly visible metrics. Surveillance apparatuses (both 
governmental and corporate) place ever more emphasis on propensity, 
analyzing not what a person has done so much as what she might do in 
future. In doing this, such apparatuses construct, enforce and enact new ways 
to hold people accountable for their represented, future selves – and to the 
characters understood to link their present selves to those futures. How might 
artists best respond to new social and economic pressures placed on 
character (as a concept governing representations of particularity and 
propensity) in the age of big data? What can be learned from contemporary 
art about the new economies of character, given art’s long-standing, 
privileged relationship to the production and circulation of its artists’ and 
subjects’ (perceived and represented) “characters”?  
Examining a wide range of artworks – including some recent works that 
respond directly to big data, but also many more that, more broadly, anticipate 
its perceptual politics – I argue that a significant response to such problems 
can be found in works that disturb the distinction between embedded, first 
person perspectives and so-called objective, external viewpoints on their 
subjects. Representations that trouble the distinction between shared and 
first-person perspectives enact the tension between privacy and sharing that 
has become increasingly vital to speculative market logics linking character to 
finance. The shared/private space of the disturbed first-person view lends 
perceptual logic to the personalization of prediction afforded by big data, and 
stages contemporary conflicts between privacy and sharing, quantities of data 
and qualitative perception.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 The initial impetus for this thesis came from a studio visit I received 
seven years ago from an extremely interesting writer, whilst on an artist 
residency in Canada. At the time, I had been making large-scale installations, 
composing nodes of sculptural activity comprised of hundreds of “micro-
sculptures” made from cheap everyday objects. These works had been 
heavily influenced by Sarah Sze, whose ability to marry material and flow in 
her work I greatly admired. In the years after I encountered her installations, I 
found myself trying to do works with “conceptual” material premises, but never 
finding these to be enough on their own; instead, I wanted to weave a tapestry 
of almost-concepts, like writing an abstract novel of affects using materials 
“embroidered” into spaces. My sculptural activities at this time were also, in 
part, experiments in presenting unabashedly sensuous, joyful work – 
wrangling ameliorative, even utopian, affects out of commodity forms through 
small enactments of the compulsion to commune with their materiality. It 
seemed to me that, especially in Vancouver (where I lived at the time), such 
desirous work was generally understood to be incredibly naïve and romantic. 
Yet on the other hand, I often felt strongly adverse to what struck me as a 
form of hermeneutic snobbery in the art world I encountered, which seemed, 
on some level, to favour didactically “critical” references in artworks. (How 
many exhibitions contained a direct reference to the visual cultures of May 
1968, but in doing so, seemed, in part, to reduce these to pawns in a strategic 
game of referencing?). In this art scene, with its deeply photoconceptualist 
history, referencing moments of resistance seemed, to me, favoured to the 
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point of discounting more troubled forms of complicit engagement with 
capitalist inflections of desire, disavowing any potential that might arise from 
enacting embodied, conflicted, yet ostensibly “naïvely” desirous affective 
dispositions concomitant with the lived experiences of consumerism. While I 
admired and appreciated the historical interest and insight of many Vancouver 
artists, what was missing in the tacit logic of the Vancouver art world, it 
seemed to me, was an acknowledgment of the role that its critical references 
played as currency. Enacting criticality, these references often (though 
certainly not always) elevated their artists “above” the terrain surveyed, which 
in turn elevated these artists’ status in an art world that trades in currencies of 
criticality. The Vancouver art world’s predilection for referencing seemed to 
reinforce the implied mastery of the artists who wielded them, and to tacitly 
exclude modes of address that stemmed from, and emphasized, the split-
ness of their subject position. To borrow from Lacan’s four discourses (without 
entering into a full discussion of these here), broadly speaking, many 
strategies of referencing moments of resistance, though these moments 
certainly represented egalitarian, anti-capitalist and anti-oppressive impulses, 
nonetheless seemed to reinforce a master’s discourse within an art world 
whose currency is criticality, accruing a quiet authority and becoming, simply, 
dominant strategies to be obeyed. The strategies of reference seemed, more 
often than not, to exclude what Lacan would have called the hysteric’s 
discourse, which begins from the position of a split subject who flies at the 
master, questioning forms of authority that rely on obedience. As Bruce Fink, 
in his excellent gloss on the four discourses, points out, the hysteric 
“maintains the primacy of subjective division, the contradiction between 
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conscious and unconscious, and thus the conflictual, or self-contradictory, 
nature of desire itself… knowledge is perhaps eroticized to a greater extent in 
the hysteric’s discourse than elsewhere” (Fink, 1995, p. 133).1 Without quite 
knowing it at the time, this is what I wanted that I could never quite find in 
Vancouver: a discourse (written, as it were, in and for materials, materials with 
voices, placed in choral formations in which they could “speak”) that worked 
with complicity, with split subjectivity, as modes of enquiry, as the basis for an 
eroticized swimming-in knowledge that, in a sense, crashed together an 
almost spiritualist desire to reconcile oneself with materials, with a sense of 
how split, how consumerist, that desire must be. 
I showed my studio visitor my installation shots. He said (and of 
course, I’m paraphrasing here): “well, the first thing I want to say when I see 
such complex work is the simplest thing possible: that you want to show me a 
world.” After identifying Sarah Sze as an influence, he remarked: “it’s a funny 
thing with her work. On the one hand, I feel like there’s so much going on that 
it all collapses back onto her, like all she’s really saying is: ‘hey, look at me, 
I’m being quite inventive, quite creative.’ But on the other hand, perhaps the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Lacan presents four mathemes, which describe each of the four discourses (the master’s 
discourse, the university discourse, the analyst’s discourse, and the hysteric’s discourse) as a 
particular relation between a master signifier (S1), knowledge (S2), the real (a) and a split 
subject (the crossed-out S). The generalized form of these relations is:  
 
For example, the matheme for the master’s discourse: 
 
describes the master (S1) asserting dominance over a slave or subsidiary (S2), producing 
object (a) as a product or loss, but repressing the truth of his own status as a split subject. 
(For instance, the capitalist presides over his workers, taking surplus value as a product, yet 
concealing his own weakness.) On the other hand, the matheme for the hysteric’s discourse:  
 
depicts the split subject flying at the master, calling his dominance into question, producing 
knowledge as a product, and with the real as the hidden force. (See Fink, 1995, p. 129-136.) 
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extreme specificity of the materials takes it beyond that.” I was quite intrigued 
by this comment, such a succinct expression of the collapsibility between the 
extreme materiality of an artwork and its expression of a self-centered world, 
a first-person character whose viewpoint and idiosyncrasies the work 
expresses. Yet this expression of collapsibility (and particularly, the 
association of a work collapsing into its author’s “me” as being implicitly 
problematic, narcissistic, or self-absorbed) must also be understood as an 
implicitly gendered one. Indeed, a year or so later, on another residency, I 
mentioned this conversation to a curator I was working with. “But don’t you 
think he was being sexist?” the curator asked. “I mean, that’s the kind of put-
down that women artists hear all the time.” Indeed, narcissism has been one 
of the most common criticisms of women’s art – particularly 1970s feminist 
performance art. Many feminist artists, historians and critics have questioned 
the misogynistic assumptions that often underlie such critiques, and have 
suggested that while, indeed, some cultural expressions of narcissism may be 
profoundly alienating and patriarchal, there might be other, radically feminist 
ways to perform narcissism, to use it as a driving force in one’s work. For 
instance, Amelia Jones, writing on Hannah Wilke’s work, remarks, 
“Paradoxically… Wilke suggested that her [narcissistic] self-love was built on 
self-knowledge – and thus subversive of the patriarchal construction of the 
feminine body as only a picture, only display” (2003). Narcissism that 
performs, as Jones puts it, “in a lacerating kind of way” (2003) has the 
potential to profoundly question the female body as patriarchal image, and to 
instead affirm its lived knowledge. My studio visit gave me a clear image of 
the problems associated with constructing a critique of narcissism (for 
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instance, in response to Sarah Sze’s work) as a certain kind of relation 
between materiality and enunciation: a view according to which engagements 
with extreme material specificity collapse into a set of gestures that simply call 
out: “hey! Look at me!” Yet this prompted me to read the collapsibility between 
materiality and subjectivity as a condition of possibility, rather than as a 
caveat. I became interested in the ways in which the qualitative particularities 
of these collapses might change over time, how they might be conceptualized, 
and what might be their future.  
Such questions coalesce around discussions of anthropomorphic 
presence in art; for just as an artwork can (perhaps narcissistically) affirm the 
artist’s presence – or even her “character” – so too can it produce an 
anthropomorphic presence seemingly, at least, all of its own. In 1967, Michael 
Fried famously denigrated minimalist art for its tendency to produce 
anthropomorphic presence, rather than presentness as such. Unlike the best 
modernist paintings, in Fried’s view, the anthropomorphic presence of 
minimalist sculptures was theatrical, drawing too much attention to the relation 
between the artwork and its environment, and giving way to a temporality 
which went on and on – much like life itself – thereby failing to afford the 
presentness that the best artworks could provide. Given those who had 
reread Michael Fried’s 1967 critique of anthropomorphic presence in 
minimalism (and of its concomitant senses of theatricality, of time that simply 
goes on and on, un-contracted into a kernel of “presentness”) as a positive 
condition of possibility, rather than a caveat, would it not make sense to say 
that the condition Fried identified had been expanded qualitatively since his 
time? Would it not make sense to say that, while “anthropomorphism” was a 
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rather unilateral pronouncement denigrating any and all “presence,” a strain of 
artists since have become more involved in more sharply distinguishing the 
character of these presences, pulling apart how, exactly, the materials’ 
“character” and the authorial personas from which they rhetorically arose 
might support or contradict each other, sculpting minute strings of qualities 
until they consolidate into characteristics of imagined subjects?  
Further, teasing out strings of qualities-cum-characteristics of 
presences or personas reveals two conflicting logics of “creating life” at stake 
in sculpture. On the one hand, Victor Burgin (1984), Amelia Jones (1998) and 
a slew of other thinkers influenced by Derrida have quite convincingly 
critiqued a “metaphysics of presence” at play within many artistic practices, 
which involve (as Jones would have it) invoking the veiled presence of an 
(implicitly male) artist – a phallogocentric effect that is, ultimately, in service of 
the market, of humanism, of patriarchy. On the other hand, is it possible that 
some animistic explorations of “presence” through art might be part and 
parcel of a feminist critique of the politics of being, and of giving, life – 
galvanized, perhaps, by the split subject of the hysteric’s discourse, who 
explores materiality and character from the point of view of a lived 
contradiction between being and signing, a lived contradiction between one’s 
conscious statements and actions and how those build up into habits, actions, 
tendencies, effects, character? Further, if artworks, and artists, were once 
privileged producers of “character,” experimenting with the intersections of 
qualitative particularities that produce personas, nowadays, via big data 
analytics, all citizens produce data-streams of material through which they can 
be characterized. Given this (could we call it a proletarianization of 
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character?), how can traditions of characterization inherited from art of the 
past century intervene? 
The formal structure of the above sense of collapsibility between 
materiality and subject position would resurface and reshape itself, years 
later, during what I would describe as Goldsmiths’ “speculative realist” 
moment from approximately 2012-2013. Quentin Meillassoux’s critique of 
correlationism – the assumption that philosophy could only deal with the 
correlation between human thought and the material world – struck a chord 
with many thinkers. Graham Harman’s rereading of Heidegger (which was 
cited earlier in this thesis) offered a fresh new perspective on objects, and 
Reza Negarestani’s sprawling theory-fiction was felt as a major tour-de-force. 
Yet intrigued though I was by the work of many thinkers in this camp, I was 
also instantly sceptical of their invocation of a “Copernican revolution.” Just as 
Copernicus had divested men of their lamentable pride in believing that they 
were the centre of the universe, so the story went, speculative realism could 
divest philosophy of its humanist bent, its predilection for continually, and 
tacitly, reaffirming the borders of human perceptions and perspectives on the 
cosmos. This pretence seemed to me highly suspect from a Lacanian 
perspective. In Seminar XX, his seminar on love, feminine sexuality and the 
limits of knowledge, Lacan remarks, in passing, that the Copernican revolution 
was not, in fact, a revolution. When one operates within the confines of a 
conceptual framework in which one entity (say, the sun) revolves around the 
other (the earth) in a circular orbit, flipping the centre and the periphery does 
not constitute a conceptual revolution. The revolution, Lacan claims, was 
Keplerian, not Copernican; Kepler, who refined the diagram, revised the terms 
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of the orbit from circular to elliptical, made a new concept of relation between 
the celestial bodies possible (Lacan, 1998, p. 42-43). To accuse post-
structuralist thought of being too “correlationist,” too human in its outlook, had 
potential to open up new lines of research,2 yet also harboured a tendency for 
this gesture to fall back on itself, giving way to a smug self-satisfaction that 
one has transcended humanist privilege. (And, to put it bluntly, who can better 
claim to have transcended a privileged, humanist subject position in 
philosophy, if not relatively privileged, mostly white, mostly male philosophers 
who, due to accidents of their birth, have not had to bear the burdens of being 
identified as raced, classed, and gendered beings, and thus purport to speak 
on behalf of “the human”?)  
To return these debates to questions surrounding the collapsibility 
between, let us say, extreme subjectivity and extreme objectivity in art: if 
oscillating back and forth between interpreting a work as extremely “object-
oriented” and extremely “subject-oriented” is analogous to following through 
with the (always partially collapsing) logic of the “Copernican revolution,” then 
what would a “Keplerian revolution” look like in this terrain? If a debate that 
oscillated back and forth between accusations of narcissism and fetishism on 
the one hand, and celebrations of subjectivity and engagement with materials 
on the other, would always be, in some sense, deadlocked, then what other 
spin could be placed on these relations?  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Among the most convincing of these, in my view (though it is not explicitly aligned with 
speculative realism) is Susan Schuppli’s research around what she calls the material witness: 
materials which bear the imprint of events and phenomena and, when carefully analyzed, can 
bear witness to those events. See Schuppli (2014).  
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It is the content of this question that informs the persona that my work 
plays out, and that, sometimes, I play within my work. The persona (which I 
sometimes name – erosamon, Hodecce – and often leave unnamed) 
assembles an aggregate of thoughts, concerns, priorities, aesthetics and 
concepts that are, somehow, the right size, texture and shape to carry such 
questions. The thoughts, concerns, priorities and sensibilities that inform my 
practice (a decidedly “femme” aesthetic; a deep sense of complicity balanced 
with a naïve glee; a concern for ethics, care and love; a slightly second-wave 
feminist tacit need to work through ritual, and to assume a privileged 
relationship to “creation;” a keen sense of doubt, uncertainty, and the desire to 
be able to say something of the future) are all, undoubtedly, uncomfortable. 
How can I speak of a “femme” aesthetic without dredging up the spectre of 
essentialism? What right does anyone concerned with truth, criticism or 
justice of any sort have to their complicit glee? What good can ethics do as a 
concept when, as Rancière convincingly argued (2009, p. 120-123), ethics, as 
a form of thought, systematically sidesteps the necessary work of politics in 
order to blandly (even dangerously) defer to “the human” as a conceptual 
category? What good is it to make work that refers to the labours of ethics and 
love, when those have been deployed for such broadly patriarchal and 
capitalist purposes over so many centuries? What good is it to privilege 
“creation” when markets thrive on controlling flows of creativity, on putting 
them to work? All of these lived conceptual and ethical tensions, I would 
argue, are questions of character; for they activate a sense of lived complicity 
– a sense of contradiction between one’s being and one’s doing – that point 
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precisely to the complex interiority that character, as a representational 
concept, governs.  
Studio Practice  
My ongoing studio project, Weathervane, is an attempt to produce what 
I term a hysteric’s divination discourse, which departs from precisely the 
complicity in the above questions. It navigates the uncomfortable grounds of 
humanism and character, ethics and essentialism – working from the conflicts 
each of these call forth between being and signing, egalitarianism and 
privilege, the power to represent a whole (humanity, women, one’s character, 
the future) and the inevitably problematic presuppositions on which this power 
is based. In an age of big data, claims on individuals’ futurity will be made 
increasingly automatically, and will be increasingly tailored, more delicately 
grafted onto each individual life. In this context, the hysteric’s divination 
discourse aims to preserve at least a small space for idiosyncratic divination 
practices, which might at least hold open the possibility for a critical response 
to the hegemonic forces of prediction. My art practice departs from the 
“stupid” desire of a conciliatory character, employed as a method through 
which to place analytic data-scapes – and their thick, compelling claims on the 
future – into question. The task is to both retain that wilful character’s naïve 
delight as method, and, on the other hand, to remain vigilant about the rapid 
changes in the expanded contexts to which such practices, even in – and in 
fact, through – their wilful ignorance, aim to speak.  
In an ongoing series of works, which combine and recombine in 
various forms to become installation components, this project responds to the 
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doubts and uncertainties involved in late capitalist decision-making, from the 
perspective of an idiosyncratic, indecisive character (the feminine persona of 
the works) who invents scores, salves and scaffolds for the decision-making 
process. I explore the oracular mode of address through object making, song, 
dialogues with objects, video and performance. In doing so, I examine the 
libidinal economies that underpin the desire to know the future, and to imprint 
uncertain worlds with "good" decisions.  
These works developed from a predominantly sculptural practice. One 
of the strains in this work was an exploration of sculptural forms that acted as 
distorted subjective diagrams, enacting some part of an abstract conception of 
subjectivity (for instance, Freud’s image of symptoms as containers, into 
which new sources of excitation could flow “like new wine into an old bottle”) 
(Freud, 1997, p. 46) within a material field. For instance, Model for a Screen 
(2012-13, Figure 1) was made from an intensive carving process. I layered 
and glued together several A4 multi-coloured children’s notebooks, and then 
carved a complex, rounded, perforated structure from them, with twelve holes, 
which resembled an odd, irregularly shaped and useless piece of furniture, 
like a dividing screen which would not partition a space particularly well. I then 
dipped half of this form first in tar, then in black aquarium pebbles, in a mock 
process designed to mimic the production of common shingling material found 
in North America (which consists of heavy paper coated in tar and covered 
with pebbles). Thus, the sculpture looked completely different from one side to 
the other: the “back” half was completely black and rough with pebbles, while 
the “front” side revealed the depth of its surfaces through the striations of 
layered colours of paper, like topographic lines on a map. On one side, a 
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protective “skin” was added, repellent to water and touch, which disguised the 
way the form itself had been carved; on the other side, the striated layers 
illustrated, for the eyes, the way the form had come to be, and translated its 
spatial logic into a “flat” one of colour and line. In this way, the piece seemed 
to speak to its own emergence, as if its holes – thrown together like a mutant 
Lacanian torus – were slowly, imperceptibly “speaking:” speaking a concept of 
subjective emergence, and speaking to a history of idiosyncratic styling, which 
bears witness to both the rise of individualistic consumption (for instance, 
concepts of dressing to match one’s “personality”) over the past century, and 
psychedelic design as form of expression both part of, and opposed to, such 
individualistic concepts of consumption. I was interested in creating objects 
that seemed to have a “voice” – and also to speak to the complexities of what 
such an idea carries with it in terms of individualism.  
One of the major tensions in my studio practice has been between the 
drive to produce stand-alone, individual works and to make installations and 
more open-ended components, which could be re-arranged to suit different 
exhibition environments. I always saw Model for a Screen as a prop to be put 
into contact with other objects or operations; thus, in its last iteration, it was 
coupled with a single vertical line from a laser level, which transformed it into 
a (quite inefficient) machine for creating a dotted line (as its presence 
interrupted the flow of the laser’s light onto the wall behind it). Of course, the 
laser level line “ignores” many of the object’s properties, “perceiving” it, as it 
were, as a mere obstruction – and speaking, thus, to the reduction of 
characters’ properties in relation – a parallel exploration to my writing, in 
Chapter 1, on character as a subtraction or “glimpse” of a more complex 
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whole. But what was the precise nature of the juxtaposition that such pieces 
sought?  
Model for a Screen was by far the most “decisive” of works made in 
what can only be described as a very awkward studio phase when I first 
arrived in London. My studio experiments, on the whole, felt wandering, 
uncertain; as a result, I began to make works that took this profound sense of 
indecision as their subject matter. My video Birth of a Decision Maker (2013, 
Figure 2) reflects on the libidinal economies of decision-making from the 
perspective of a profoundly indecisive subject, thereby focalizing a discussion 
of systemic decision-making concerns within an idiosyncratic, first-person 
perspective. It combines imagery culled from iPhone footage of my domestic 
space and screen recordings of online activities (for instance, scrolling 
through a Google image search, or using decision-making websites such as 
www.facade.com’s Yes/No Oracle pen, which allows users to type in a 
question and receive a yes or no answer). This wandering imagery serves as 
a backdrop for a simple, rhythmic narrative, reminiscent of children’s 
storybook writing, which describes an abstract character only known as “the 
decision maker:” “The decision maker wears trousers. They are blue, or they 
are brown. The decision maker knows which one.” The singsong, childlike 
narration speaks the perspective of a character closely observing the decision 
maker – his incisiveness, his intrigue – bemusedly, and perhaps lovingly – as 
if trying to understand from whence his decisiveness comes. 
In March 2014, I co-founded the collective School of the Event Horizon 
with Kate Pickering and Steven Levon Ounanian. For a group exhibition at 
Tenderpixel, London, we explored, and parodied, the world of predictive 
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technologies, for a work called Oracular Sponge (Version 003.1a) (2014, 
Figure 3). This work consisted of custom packaging for the Oracular Sponge 
(Version 003.1a), a fictitious divination product, whose packaging was 
reminiscent of Silicon Valley’s streamlined techno-fetishism. Alongside the 
packaging was a press release, printed on silver A4 paper, affixed to the wall, 
advertising a product launch for the Sponge. During a performance at the end 
of the exhibition, Pickering, Ounanian and I ritualistically removed the Sponge 
from its perch in the lower gallery, brought it into the performance space in 
Tenderbooks in a slow procession, and proceeded to introduce, pitch and un-
box the product for a demo. When I opened the packaging, it was empty; as 
the Sponge’s handler, I mimed the act of unfolding it (unfolding nothing), 
setting this nothing afloat mid-air, and operating it with gestures vaguely 
reminiscent of those used to operate iPads. Meanwhile, Ounanian invited the 
audience to ask the Sponge questions about the future. In response to the 
questions, I “operated” the Sponge while Pickering (who was “hooked up” to 
it) drew diagrams, recording its workings; Ounanian interpreted these verbally 
in real time. We were interested in producing a fictitious device that would 
“granulate” the future so finely, bring so many possible outcomes into focus at 
once, that it rendered itself completely useless.  
School of the Event Horizon’s first exhibition was for a Peer Sessions 
residency at ASC Gallery (5-11 April, 2014). For this show, we each headed a 
department at the fictitious School of the Event Horizon (perched on the edge 
of a black hole); mine was the Department of Objects to be Shrunk to a Single 
Point. Responding to the contingencies of the space and the collaborative 
process, I decided to cut holes out of the gallery wall, hide in a sealed-off area 
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behind it, and stick my arms out, performing various gestures and displaying 
an array of objects throughout the private view and at various points 
throughout the show. I called this piece Weathervane (2014, Figure 4). 
Likening my arm to an object or instrument, I repurposed the actions I 
performed (which included free-form dancing, giving coded signals such as a 
thumbs up, and displaying and demonstrating various objects, such as a die 
and pompoms) as signs in a cryptic meteorology, which seemed willfully 
purposive, divinatory – yet could not be readily interpreted. This mode of 
performance fed back into my solo work, leading to an ongoing series of 
open-ended reflections on divination practices and processes, which 
extended and re-imagined the premise of the signaling arm that, lacking an 
interpretive key, spoke mutely to both an unknown future, and to the desire to 
know that future. For instance, in and now I’m going to tell you a story, and it’s 
the story of the selection process (2014, Figure 5), I re-imagined the arm-and-
wall scenario as part of a portable, two-sided portable wall structure – blank 
and white on one side, and rough and equipped with shelves on the other. 
The shelves displayed various objects accompanied by mismatched labels 
(for instance, a ball of pink yarn labeled “SATELLITE”). I positioned this prop 
so that viewers were likely to see the blank side of the wall first, with my arm 
moving through it. Then, they could walk around the piece, and see all of the 
objects around me, displayed on shelves, waiting to be displayed on the other 
side of the wall by my arm. In, again, rather storybook fashion, this piece gave 
a sense of decision making as a subtractive process, in which actualities are 
selected from a range of available possibilities. Yet the precise logic of the 
objects’ selection remained inaccessible. Like a plainclothes oracle, I 
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immersed my motions in the object world, and aimed to give the sense that 
they were abstractly telling of futurity. This way of working came to permeate 
a series of fragments – of writing, sculptural “sketches” for devices, thick, 
chunky paintings incorporating everyday objects, and a capella recorded 
tracks – that spoke to the desire to know the future, or to construct an attitude 
through which one could forge a path to one’s own future. For instance, in A 
Way to Choose the Divination System (2014, Figure 6), I roughly constructed 
a wheel-like device in MDF, whose spokes housed a range of domestic 
objects (from pencil to hairbrush to toothbrush) that could be affixed to a wall 
and spun. This piece suggests that a random selection of one of the objects 
on the spokes could help one choose a particular interpretive key through 
which to divine the future, yet the content of any such divinations remains 
unknown.  
What, exactly, is at stake in referring to divination, but un-fixing the 
specificity of its prophesies? Is working with tropes of divination, while 
allowing these to remain “open,” enough of an intervention, given how 
hegemonic predictive practices have become? The hysteric’s divination 
discourse aims for more than just an “open-ended” form of divination; it 
departs from, and interrogates, the kernel of complicity at the heart of 
divination. If divination systems strive to reconcile the seeking subject with an 
image of the “right” path forward, then the seeking subject acts as a vehicle 
for that conciliatory desire. In my work on divination, I try to depart from this 
complicity in the split, seeking subject, seeing it as a tool for dismantling fixed 
(or hegemonic) forecasts. In the process, this work, perhaps, re-imagines the 
figure of the oracle (who, at times, becomes fused, or confused, with that of 
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the seeker) as a trickster, who designs pathways to the future in order to 
suture them to a set of attitudes that course through her.  
The Future-Oracular 
Broadly speaking, the cultural backdrop which informs this studio work 
is a newly-emerging predictive address that I call the future-oracular. This 
form of address was, perhaps, most powerfully encapsulated in 2007, when 
Google CEO Eric Schmidt described Google’s future ambitions as follows: “‘to 
enable Google users to be able to ask questions such as ‘What shall I do 
tomorrow?’ and ‘What job shall I take?’” (Palmås, 2011, p. 347). Palmås 
himself understands this quotation as yet another piece of evidence for the 
prevalence of predictive practices in contemporary business practices. 
However, I would contend that Schmidt’s comment describes a future-
oriented ambition that goes far beyond the predictive, and points toward 
another conception of futurity altogether. “Prediction” seems a good term to 
use when describing, say, Wal-Mart’s attempts to figure out its future sales – 
analytics that speculate on relatively simple consumer decisions, at a small 
scale with respect to the totality of the consumer’s life. “What job shall I take?” 
clearly exceeds such a scale; it speaks on a scale much closer to conceptions 
of that individual’s fate – where she might “end up” in life, what vocation might 
be best for her. The questions Schmidt poses are located much closer to self-
reflection and self-modulation through decision-making than the term 
“predictive” seems equipped to encompass; they also speak to the user’s 
desire to know something of herself. Here we have an image of the user 
herself coming to the platform, wondering about her own life. The term 
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“predictive” does not encapsulate this late capitalist subject, perhaps 
overwhelmed with decisions, in her inquisitiveness toward her own future.  
Schmidt’s comment speaks in the future-oracular. If Google manages 
and monetizes the point of contact between a specific user and an arsenal of 
amassed information, then the future-oracular address (“What job shall I 
take?”) produces a singular pathway between that user and its information.3 
The production of such pathways also reflects and presupposes a 
sophisticated claim to knowledge of the user (as in, for instance, Google’s 
analysis of email keywords to determine the user’s interests, which will be 
discussed in Chapter 4). It presupposes a significant level of doubt in the user 
about her future path, and a significant level of trust the user brings to her 
interactions with the interface. What better place to locate such an 
assemblage of affects and attitudes toward futurity than within the history of 
divination practices? 
What is an oracular form of address? On what conceptions of futurity 
does it thrive? What is the scope, the truth-value, the performative power, the 
preclusive power of the future-oracular (which I have named, as such, in 
hopes of likening it to a tense-structure, a “grammar of time,”4 a structuring 
principle for utterances)? Of course, oracular practices, such as those of the 
Oracle of Delphi, proliferated in the ancient world. As is widely known, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 I say “its”, here (even though I do not use this consistently throughout), because a user is 
not necessarily human, even though I am predominantly focusing on human users in this 
work. As Bratton (2014) points out, it is necessary to contend with the wide range of non-
human users, such as “sensors, cars and robots.” 
4 I borrow this term from Peter Rawlings’ essay “Grammars of Time in Late James” (2003), in 
which Rawlings addresses the “burgeoning anteriority” (p. 273) of both America in the post-
Civil War period, and of Henry James’ writing, the “classically American predicament that is 
pondering (prospectively and retrospectively) the foreclosure of choice, the ultimate 
unavailability of ubiquity, even for natives of the New World, and the evanescent dream of 
sustaining endless possibility, and the impossibility of doing so” (p. 278). 
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ancient site at Delphi was inscribed with the phrase “gnothi seauton,” which 
translates as “know thyself.” The first thing one must do, in order to correctly 
interpret the Oracle’s cryptic phrases, was to know oneself – for an incorrect 
interpretation of the Oracle’s message could bring disaster. The future-
oracular addresses its subject on his own terms, according to his own self-
understanding; the advice is only as good as the subject’s ability to interpret it.  
Yet we could also call this incitement to “know thyself” as an 
expression of differential power between prophet and seeker. The oracle, of 
course, can never be wrong in such a scenario; if her advice is wrongly 
interpreted, surely this must be the fault of the seeker’s flawed self-
understanding. Further, we could say that the priests at Delphi, who mediated 
between the oracles and the seekers, enacted a form of information politics. 
The excellent documentary The Oracle of Delphi: Secrets Revealed (2003), 
which chronicles archaeologist John R. Hale and geologist Jelle Zeilinga De 
Boer’s interdisciplinary work on the fault lines that ran underneath the temple 
at Delphi, speaks to the oracular as an enactment of information politics 
(though they, themselves, do not use this term). Hale and De Boer proved 
once and for all that the ancient Greek historians’ accounts of the oracles’ 
activities, which included descriptions of their inhaling intoxicating vapours 
coming through mountain fissures, were indeed accurate (contrary to modern-
day archaeology’s prior conclusions).5 Nonetheless, this does not explain why 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The oracles, Hale and De Boer conclude, inhaled ethylene gas before prophesying. This is 
the gas that, in modern times, was once widely used as an anaesthetic. Though highly 
effective in this regard, the gas also has the drawback of being extremely flammable. 
(Nowadays, ethylene is used to artificially ripen bananas after they have been shipped.) 
Previously, modern archaeology, unable to correctly interpret the geology in the area, had 
dismissed the Greek historians’ accounts as fabulations; Hale and De Boer’s work restored 
their word in the eyes of the archaeological community. It also pointed to the unique tensions 
between matriarchal and patriarchal religions that were played out at Delphi. The Oracles of 
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the oracles’ words were so widely taken to be truth. That they inhaled 
ethylene gas is a very significant fact for restoring the early historians’ 
credibility, and paints an intriguing picture of prophesy as a collaboration, of 
sorts, between voices: those of the oracle and those of the mountain. But why 
were the oracles seen as bearers of truth?  
As the documentary suggests, there might be two reasons. The first 
reason is not particularly surprising: the oracle’s cryptic phrases could be 
neither proven nor disproven, thereby making it quite difficult to definitively 
discredit their power. The second reason, however, uncannily reflects the 
conditions of contemporary information politics (in Tim Jordan’s sense of the 
term, 2015). As De Boer explains, because people travelled from all over 
ancient Greece to consult the oracle, the priests learned a great deal about 
the events of the day by listening to their questions. Thus, when someone 
came asking for advice as to, say, whether or not to go to battle with a 
neighbouring city-state, the priests could make use of the information they 
had gleaned from other seekers’ questions to provide a context for the offered 
answers. This distribution of informational power is not entirely dissimilar to 
Google as it operates today: as a major gateway connecting questions to 
information, and amassing yet more information in the process based on 
users’ questions and queries. (Of course, just as the oracles at Delphi were 
handsomely paid for their services by seekers bringing lavish gifts and tributes 
from the city-states, so Google compensates itself richly through selling user 
information to advertisers and, in turn, selling advertisers the chance to win at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Delphi were women; originally, they spoke on behalf of Gaia, the goddess of the earth. As 
time went on, the came to prophesy on behalf of Apollo, and priests mediated their actions; 
however, since it was the women who were intimately aware of how to work with the 
mountain’s gases, they remained in the unique position of speaking on behalf of a male god. 
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keywords auctions through its AdWords program.) The future-oracular is a 
grammar of time connecting a seeker of counsel with a multivalent body of 
information (whether this comes from the gods, a gas, an amassing other 
travellers’ questions, a computational framework, or a combination of these), 
which is then reflected back to the seeker as a prophesy about his future. Of 
course, this scenario consolidates the political power of the priests, the 
guardians of a centralized information-hub.6  
The future-oracular, as a mode of address, involves highly 
personalized, prophetic claims on particular subjects: claims to present not 
exactly – not entirely – what will happen to a given subject but, rather, what 
should happen, what is the best path forward, given an array of available 
possibilities and personal propensities. As such, it emblematizes something of 
the tensions between prediction and precarity, self-actualization and soft 
prohibition that surround neoliberal subjects and their decision-making 
processes. Since decisions act as gateways to habits – and, habits, in turn, 
shape character – the future-oracular is precisely an address to the 
(overwhelmed, precarious, indecisive or anxious) neoliberal subject’s 
character-in-formation – her forging a path to her future self, as it were.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Surely there is not a perfect analogy between Google’s servers and the idiosyncratic edges 
of the oracles’ utterances. Although  I lack the space to develop this thought fully here, it is 
worth briefly contrasting two ancient Greek devices for understanding futurity: the oracle, on 
the one hand, and the Antikythera mechanism, on the other. The Antikythera mechanism 
(which is thought to have been made between 150 and 100 BC, and is often described as the 
world’s first computer) was a complex, delicately calibrated, multi-geared device, used to 
predict planetary positions and other astronomical events. Yet while the Antikythera 
mechanism predicted planetary events that came “like clockwork,” as it were, with perfect 
regularity, the oracle’s predictions focused on human activities, contingent on unpredictable 
contexts, and tinged with an expression of what one “should” do – a claim to state what was 
best for the seeker in a given situation. Perhaps we could say that big data analytics fuse 
these two kinds of claims on the future together (or at least begin to merge them). 	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How does this image of soft persuasion – soft reconciliation between 
an available field of (consumer or cognitarian) action and the neoliberal 
subject’s future self, her future character – come to bear on contemporary art? 
The pluralistic, “anything goes” art world has been, one could argue, largely 
emptied of both opportunities and expectations for artists. Only very few will 
receive adequate funding, critical attention or market success. Yet on the 
flipside, many will have been trained to feel a great deal of freedom to choose 
medium and method, context and content, for their work (so long as they can 
find a way to keep producing in such prohibitive economic climates). In this 
context, perhaps the most persistent remaining expectation of artists is that 
they be, in some sense, good decision makers. Whatever their medium or 
method, their decisions should “add up” to something, produce a resonant 
gesture (unencumbered by anything extraneous) or deeply galvanize a 
particular context – maximizing experiential returns (be they perceptual or 
conceptual) on limited resources. (This is, perhaps, a suitably neoliberal 
“investment-image” of art production.) The meta-analysis of decision-making 
remains a stalwart of higher education in fine art. Critiques in studio-
classrooms scrutinize and sharpen artists’ choices, recalibrating the 
presuppositions that underpin decisions, or increasing these decisions’ 
suppleness in the face of recalcitrant materials or unpredictable audiences. 
How does this persistent meta-expectation of both contemporary art and its 
artists stack up against the predictive and precarious pressures on decision-
making faced by neoliberal subjects? My recent studio work departs from his 
question, inventing and examining divination rituals and predictive methods, 
while emptying these of specific prophetic content. Yet in a world in which the 
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future-oracular is, in itself, becoming normalized as a mode of address to 
neoliberal subjects, how must my own invocation of this tense structure, this 
address, differentiate itself from the hegemonic usages of the oracular? 
Tracing a short contextual history of my practice, I come to understand my 
work as an attempt to speak in the future-oracular from the perspective of the 
unknowing, precarious, overwhelmed subject; to speak as a bad decision-
maker, to produce a hysteric’s oracular discourse (in the Lacanian sense), 
which takes the complicit desire to know how to act – to align oneself with the 
world, to choose what is “right,” to fit into a pre-determined future – as the 
very method through which oracularity (with all its soft controls) might be held 
in question as the modality through which soft modulation operates.   
Analytic Futurities 
The contemporary future-oracular unfolds against a backdrop of ever-
more ubiquitous predictive and pre-emptive analytics. In “Predicting What 
You’ll Do Tomorrow: Panspectric Surveillance and the Contemporary 
Corporation” (2011), business sociologist Karl Palmås describes the gradual 
move toward future-oriented analytic practices by key corporations. In a 
postfordist economy, he argues, corporations rely less on disciplinary 
practices and enclosures, and more on panspectric forms of surveillance and 
control – that is, monitoring practices that draw from a broad range of 
sources, senses and analytics rather than predominantly visual cues, as in 
panopticonic surveillance (see also Deleuze 1992; De Landa 2006). 
Deterritorialized contemporary corporations, whose hierarchies are 
maintained “through increased capacities to control meaning, culture, 
subjectivities and effects” (p. 346), seek to monopolize by means of data 
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analysis, to analyze propensity, and predict the futures of their customers. 
Companies base their success, in part, on the ability to foresee intentions. For 
instance, Wal-Mart, the world’s largest corporation, is able to price out 
competitors, on the one hand, because it pioneered in the computational 
analysis of its entire supply chain (see Lanier, 2014). By modeling its supply 
chain, it was able to bargain each of its suppliers down to the last dollar, 
thereby massively reducing overhead costs and gaining a dominant position 
in the market. Meanwhile, on the other end of its operations, Wal-Mart 
succeeds due to its capacity to estimate future sales. Such estimations take 
into account even the effects of weather patterns on customer spending (for 
instance, Wal-Mart might rush order Kellogg’s strawberry pop tarts right 
before a hurricane, since statistics show that customers stock up on ready-to-
eat food before a disaster). Similarly, the American casino chain Harrah’s 
tracks individual customers’ gambling success through loyalty cards, and 
calculates each customer’s “pain point” – “the level of gambling losses that 
will send the visitor home, and possibly make them not come back for a while” 
(Palmås, 2011, p. 348). In response to these individually-calculated pain 
points, “luck ambassadors” approach gamblers to take them out for a steak 
dinner (if the data shows they love these) when they have had a bad day. 
Thus, Harrah’s “micromanage[s] the feelings of the consumer” (p. 348), so 
that their experiences are just enjoyable enough that they come back, while 
ensuring maximum profitability for the company.7 As Palmås points out, such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 It is worth considering how pain points differ from haggling practices – or even to think of 
pain points as a high-tech extension of haggling practices, but this time with the deck stacked 
against the customer. Both haggling and “pain points” revolve around a logic of maximum 
extraction and an awareness that one customer might be willing to part with more money than 
another for the same thing. Pain points, however, statistically optimize and homogenize such 
strategies; they give the shopper less agency, less of an arena for her skill at “walking away”, 
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analytic practices increase power differences between large and small 
corporations (the former of which are likely to better reap the rewards of 
sophisticated analytics).8 They also increase power differences between 
corporations and consumers. While the consumer only has access to his/her 
desires and the available products and prices he/she finds, corporations 
analyze ever-greater swaths of information through which they can pinpoint 
consumers’ habits.  
Corporations’ uses of data can be traced back to early decision support 
systems (DSS) and executive information systems (EIS), which emerged out 
of research conducted in the late 1950s and 1960s (Palmås, 2011, p. 349). 
More recently, however, Palmås points out, a technological threshold has 
been crossed, such that corporations can use data proactively, rather than 
reactively. Following Nigel Thrift, Palmås writes of such practices as part of 
the emergence of a new “capitalist meteorology” (p. 351), a new form of 
business intelligence based on a Tardean understanding of users in a highly 
networked environment, who are highly susceptible to “imitative rays” of 
behaviour and whose actions, thus, can be predicted (p. 352).  
What is the nature of such prediction – what is its claim to truth? Data 
analysis (including, though not limited to, predictive analysis) presents a 
fundamental epistemological problem, in that it inherently invites confusion 
between correlation and causation. An arch example of this is an article 
published in Nature by Google employees (Butler, 2008) – since disproven – 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
using the illusion of disinterestedness to advantage. With advanced analytics, no customer 
can hide behind the illusions he/she proffers. 
8 For more on the massive concentrations of wealth produced by having access to 
sophisticated computation, see also Lanier (2014). 
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which claimed that Google’s data could predict the spread of flu by analyzing 
distributions of searches for terms such as “winter flu.” The relationship 
between queries about the flu online (which are very easy for companies to 
track and analyze in real time) and the viral spread itself (which is far more 
difficult to track in real time) is fundamentally indeterminate, even if there 
might be some overlap between the spread of a virus and the expressions of 
online curiosity about it. It is precisely this kind of indeterminacy – this site of 
confusion between correlation and causation – that is woven into the 
predictive fabric of control societies, modulating people’s ranges of options 
and possibilities in a variety of situations. Character, a perceptual and 
conceptual logic of personhood that does not depend on causation, then 
retroactively apologizes for such confusions between correlation and 
causation: if a customer is deemed unreliable, it must have been in her 
character. As Annie McClanahan points out in her study of character and 
credit scoring, Amex customers in 2008 received letters stating that their 
credit scores had gone down because customers who shopped at similar 
establishments to those they had shopped at had shown a lesser propensity 
to pay back loans (2014, p. 38-39). Obviously, there is no reason why a new 
customer would fail to pay their credit card bill simply because they had spent 
at similar establishments to those who had not. However, this is precisely the 
correlative logic through which access to credit is differentially granted. As 
Deleuze (1992, p. 5) argues, control societies address dividual persons, not 
individuals as such.9 Whereas the concept of the individual connotes 
indivisibility, and is opposed to the masses, the control society dividual is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Deleuze coined the term “dividual,” which has since been taken up by several 
anthropologists, such as Nurit Bird-David, cited in Chapter 1.	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permeable, divisible, modulated and controlled by data-flows, trans-personal 
tendencies, and statistics. It is precisely the dividual subject who must pay a 
higher interest rate because he shopped at similar establishments to those 
who proved to be poor credit risks.  
In what Bernard Harcourt (2007) has called our actuarial age, 
predictions based on statistical analyses profoundly shape personal lives, 
deciding not only credit scores, but even juridical outcomes, such as who is 
granted parole, or whose car gets pulled over for an ostensibly random, 
routine check. Harcourt shows that statistical analyses have modeled – and 
actively shaped – inmates’ futures in criminal law since 1935, when the Illinois 
State Penitentiary hired its first-ever actuary to use the “Burgess Method” for 
determining the likelihood of an individual’s success or failure in parole based 
on group recidivism rates. Fast-forward several decades, and actuarial logic – 
the employment of statistical, rather than clinical, methods to determine risks 
of criminal behaviour or to administer justice – completely “permeates the field 
of criminal law and its enforcement” (Harcourt, 2007, p. 2). For some, the use 
of actuarial logic to, say, more “smartly” target tax audits or routine vehicle 
checks, is simply a necessary efficiency within an economic landscape in 
which legal resources are limited. For Harcourt, on the other hand, actuarial 
logic distorts the very concept of justice itself. It produces biases in the 
carceral population, and can even increase crime in certain instances, as 
when, for instance, white drivers in the US accurately perceive that they are 
unlikely to be targeted by police performing routine checks. In a data analytic 
society, predictions control financial markets, corporate practices, credit 
scores and juridical process. Access to the best predictive methods – granting 
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their users thick, compelling claims on the future – becomes a predominant 
technique of power. Yet what kinds – what concepts – of futurity do such 
predictive practices conjure up? Further, how do these practices, which seek 
to pin down the unknown through calculation, measure up against 
experiences of instability (political, environmental and financial), 
precariousness (of workers, students, the unemployed and the marginally 
employed), and the massive uncertainty that comes along with these?  
In what follows, I outline three major conceptions of futurity at play 
within the analytic landscapes outlined above: the probabilistic, the 
possibilistic and the pre-emptive. Each of these three species of futurity has 
already been identified within discussions on predictive analytics and their 
concomitant tactical concerns.  
The Probabilistic, the Possibilistic and the Pre-emptive 
Of course, many actuarial methods are based on the calculation of 
probabilities. The Burgess Method, used to predict recidivism, was based on 
just such probabilistic analysis based on group recidivism rates. Yet 
probabilistic methods, which focus on that which is most likely to happen, fall 
short in certain contexts – for it is, after all, highly unlikely that only highly 
likely events will occur. Counter-terrorist tactics and risk assessment for 
nuclear power plants require the analysis of extremely improbable events that 
– if they occur at all – are certainly not likely to be repeated, but nonetheless 
must be taken into account. For such analyses, possibilistic thought becomes 
a more valuable tool than probabilistic thought. Possibilistic thought (Clarke, 
2008) focuses on analyzing events that fall outside of probability’s range of 
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focus, and is sometimes blended with probabilistic modeling – for instance, in 
financial institutions’ Value at Risk calculations for the derivative market – in 
an attempt to give a fuller picture of the blend of continuity and contingency 
that characterizes a cultural conception of the future. As John Hogan Morris 
describes them, calculations such as Value at Risk, which blend the 
probabilistic and the possibilistic, act as “a way of governing future instability 
in the present” (2014).  
Yet the analysis of the extremely improbable is also implicated in a 
broader set of tactical shifts. As Brian Massumi describes it in his work on the 
U.S. military (2007), there has been a move from preventative to pre-emptive 
tactical logic since the cold war. (This will be described in greater detail in 
Chapter 4.) Whereas, say, a cold war nuclear arms race is founded on a logic 
(however flawed in practice) according to which future attacks might be 
prevented through matching (and hopefully exceeding) the enemy’s weapons 
arsenal, pre-emptive logic does away with any such notions of balance. Pre-
emption, for Massumi, is performative; in an era of uncertain enemies and 
improbable, ever-shifting forms of attack, enemies must first be smoked out of 
their holes, actively created through acts of aggression. This will invite 
retaliation along the lines on which the U.S. can then say their enemies 
always already would have done. The future, as it were, moves into the 
present: potential enemies are actualized, actively created, by performative 
acts and statements that will be retroactively proven “true” through combat. 
How does pre-emptive logic make its way into the broader landscape of both 
corporate and personal modes of rendering the future knowable? What is the 
difference, for instance, between probabilistic and possibilistic thinking, 
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preventative and pre-emptive measures, in medicine, in education? In his 
analysis of “technological solutionism” (Silicon Valley’s “there’s an app for 
that” attitude to tackling seemingly all social problems) Evgeny Morozov 
(2013) points to some interesting potential answers. As already mentioned 
above, app-based, individualistic solutions to everything from nutrition to 
medicine, exercise and environmentalism tend to encourage people to 
micromanage their own behaviour, but to pre-empt any discussions on a 
broader, systemic level. What is pre-empted, it seems to me, is an address to 
the commons, in favour of either atomized, individual self-management. In a 
world of great tactical uncertainty (be this on the level of personal, economic 
or military decision), probabilistic logic comes to be routinely blended with 
possibilistic logic. This blending of probability and possibility, in turn, partly 
underpins pre-emptive tactics, which manage massive uncertainty through 
performatively (and perhaps coercively) calling an opponent into agreement 
with one’s own view on that opponent. Yet these kinds of futurity also give 
way to the future-oracular, which is becoming increasingly palpable, 
particularly in online addresses to neoliberal subjects overwhelmed by 
precariousness, uncertainty or indecision due to an overabundance of choice. 
The cultural logic of pre-emption, in fact, acts as a precondition for the future-
oracular. (We could say that the future-oracular, itself, is a subsidiary address 
associated with pre-emptive logic applied to personal futures.) The future-
oracular performatively calls into being the subject’s character-to-be as a form 
of agreement with her economic landscape. Yet it also depends on a new set 
of technical preconditions through which the contemporary surveillance 
economy has been produced.  
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Deriving Suspicion from Innocent Lives: Character and Information Politics 
 
These new technical preconditions came dramatically into public 
consciousness in 2013. On 20 May of that year, Booz Allen Hamilton 
infrastructure analyst Edward Snowden, having taken a leave of absence from 
his work, quietly fled from Hawaii to Hong Kong. Shortly afterward, stories of 
the classified documents he leaked, which revealed the enormous extent of 
the National Security Agency’s global surveillance program, rippled through 
the world. Snowden’s chosen collaborators, journalist Glenn Greenwald and 
filmmaker Laura Poitras, held an interview in his hotel room, helped him tell 
his story – and, in doing so, wrapped the NSA revelations in images of 
personal motivation. Greenwald asked, “Why should people care about 
surveillance?” Snowden replied:  
…Even if you’re not doing anything wrong, you’re being watched and 
recorded, and the storage capability of these systems increases every 
year, consistently, by orders of magnitude. […] It’s getting to the point, 
you don’t have to have done anything wrong. You simply have to 
eventually fall under suspicion from somebody, even by a wrong call, 
and then they could use this system to go back in time and scrutinize 
every decision you’ve ever made, every friend you’ve ever discussed 
something with, and attack you on that basis, to sort of derive suspicion 
from an innocent life and paint anyone in the context [sic] of a 
wrongdoer. (Davidson, 2013; Greenwald et. al, 2013) 
 
 As Snowden states later, he leaked details about the NSA’s PRISM program 
in hopes that the public would exercise their powers to influence policy; for 
policy is “the only thing that restricts the activities of the surveillance state” 
(Greenwald et. al, 2013). Snowden’s biggest fear, he said, was that the public 
would do nothing with the information he had revealed – that they would 
become cognizant of the NSA’s overreach, but be unwilling “to take the risks 
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necessary to stand up and fight to change things, to force their 
representatives to actually take a stand in their interests” (ibid.). Snowden, 
here, ruminates over the fate of the activist subject, who, too cowed by 
threats, too depressed by the hopelessness of protest, or too wanly endowed 
with civic courage, cannot act.  
Yet seen another way – from the perspective of the political life of 
perception – Snowden’s statements read as harbingers of a new politics of 
character. Deriving suspicion from innocent lives: Snowden’s image aptly 
captures the sense in which characterization – the perceptual and conceptual 
acts involved in attributing character to someone, or something – emerges out 
of complex and interested acts of selection, speculation and attribution. Given 
vast amounts of dormant personal data to play with, characterization involves 
actively selecting palettes of facts and tendencies and painting with them, 
reconstructing representations of someone’s character out of swaths of 
information, attributors’ desires, perceptions, representational tropes, 
bureaucratic procedures, power relations, and computational capacities. To 
characterize an individual (be it a person or thing) is to extract a smaller set of 
qualities and propensities from its fuller complexity: economizing that 
complexity by rendering it recognizable, circulable, and actionable. So-called 
“big data” – a broad term referring to a state in which large quantities of 
available, storable information, which overwhelm traditional data processing 
capacities, come to be processed by a range of sophisticated new automated 
analytic methods – rewrites the relations between an individual’s “full 
complexity” and characterization, by enabling ever-greater quantities of 
tangible information to be retrieved and analyzed in the production of 
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characterizations. (Such analyses could include those carried out by human 
agents with privileged access to databases and analytic tools, or 
characterizations made automatically by a host of algorithmic witnesses.) 
Anyone can be painted as a wrongdoer – even if they have done nothing 
wrong – simply by virtue of the fact that the NSA and institutions like it could, 
in future, have entire lives’ worth of personal data to paint with.  
Though the NSA’s surveillance activities may be alarming, they are 
also, as yet, spectacularly ineffective as security tools. As Grégoire 
Chamayou notes, the NSA contributed nothing whatsoever to public safety 
throughout its entire telephone metadata collection program (2015, p. 8). Yet, 
as both Chamayou and Snowden point out, the NSA’s programs were never 
about public safety. They have always been about power (Chamayou, 2015, 
p. 8): and specifically, a form of biographical power. The ambition to 
automatically construct sleeper dossiers on each person, such that their 
personal information could be retroactively retrieved should they come to be 
“of interest” in the future, constitutes a form of “biographical power founded on 
the generalized informational capture of the micro-histories of individual lives,” 
as Chamayou puts it (2015, p. 7). This form of power seizes on the ability to 
selectively construct representations of character out of available information 
– to economize the image of a person’s being according to the political 
exigencies of a particular time. The ability to retroactively paint anyone 
according to the political demands of a given context, or, conversely (as we 
shall see in later chapters) to actively predict people’s future behaviours, 
constitutes a vast shift in the logic, functions and politics of represented 
personhood.  
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Two years after the Snowden revelations – in 2015 – it appears that 
the NSA’s powers are about to be severely limited. But is this really so? In 
May 2015, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the U.S.A. Freedom 
Act, which curbs the NSA’s ability to collect phone metadata in bulk. This bill 
seems to limit the NSA’s access to personal data, and thus its powers to 
characterize individuals. Yet, as Shane Harris points out, this bill has actually 
been viewed as a big win for the NSA within the intelligence community. The 
U.S.A. Freedom Act does not actually end the phone records program; it 
merely “requires that phone companies, not the NSA, hold onto the records” 
(Harris, 2015). With just “a little more trouble,” the NSA can still access all of 
the records, without having to shoulder the burden of maintaining the 
databases themselves – an extremely cumbersome and expensive task (Joel 
Brenner, former inspector general of the NSA, quoted in Harris, 2015). The 
bill, in effect, merely outsources the NSA’s data storage operations to the 
corporate sector.  
Rather than enacting a limitation on surveillance – and the 
predominantly biographical, characterizing powers it puts into practice – the 
U.S.A. Freedom Act indicates, if anything, an expansion of the logics of 
government surveillance throughout the corporate sector, a normalization of 
these corporate apparatuses’ enlistment in the political control of subjects. 
Myriad corporate surveillance apparatuses already track users’ online 
activities. As Benjamin Bratton quipped in 2014, with hindsight, the NSA might 
appear to be the least of the public’s worries in terms of surveillance – the 
“public option” in a sea of corporate captures entailing not even the slightest 
hope of public oversight. Online tracking and consumer identification – which, 
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ultimately, seek to calculate credit risk and maximize profit – enact new forms 
of governmentality (Foucault’s term for modifying citizens’ conduct in order to 
make them more governable), managing the link between consumers and the 
financial world’s interests. Not only do neoliberal subjects find themselves, as 
Lazzarato (2012) and Graeber (2011) have argued, controlled by debt and 
access to credit (which tether finance to morality); practices for determining 
creditworthiness increasingly borrow their techniques of judgment from big 
data analytics. The “fintech” industry boldly claims to understand prospective 
borrowers’ “true characters,” using algorithmic analyses (sometimes 
combined with psychometric testing) in their quest to underwrite the 
“underbanked” – those with a poor credit history or no credit history, who 
might yet still be trustworthy borrowers. Both government powers and 
governmental control (operating through finance) perform, produce, invest in, 
and shape “character.” On the one hand, these apparatuses claim to paint the 
“truth” about their subjects’ characters, while, on the other hand, they draw on 
the incredible malleability of that truth by choosing which qualities to subtract 
from a larger whole, which criteria to select and analyze, which conceptions of 
good consumer-citizenry will be the measure.  
Contemporary Art and Characterization 
This pervasive shift plays out as a relation between (human or 
mechanical) perception, information and new forms of mechanical insight (via 
algorithms’ analytic work). Given that art has a privileged relationship to the 
production of complex aggregates of qualities (what Deleuze would call 
percepts), artists have a role to play in questioning how newly economized – 
and financialized – practices of characterization come to bear on everyday 
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perceptual and political life. Given character’s increasing capture by sovereign 
and governmental forms of power alike (in spite of – even because of – its 
concomitant malleability), how can artworks question the limits of such forms 
of capture, theorize them, or intervene in their “soft” rigidity? While many 
artworks directly engage with algorithms, data-sets, informatic structures and 
online surveillance, my study focuses more broadly on works which stage a 
sustained encounter between a subjective, first-person viewpoint (whether 
performed, narrated or otherwise represented) and a complex array of 
information and/or objects. It was the early producers of readymades 
(Duchamp and, far less famously though no less credibly, the Baroness Elsa 
von Freytag-Loringhoven), who rethought mass-produced objects as playing 
fields, of sorts, through which fictitious authorial personas could practice 
fictitious “acts” of creation. In the age of big data, what is the status of such 
fictions? Do the readymade’s fictitious personas transform, or translate, into 
the data-constructed characters ubiquitous online today? Many artists, since 
Duchamp and the Baroness Elsa, have deemed “character” to be an artistic 
product of sorts: be it the artist’s fetishized persona veiled “behind” an 
abstract painting; a fictitious being produced through performance, as in 
works by Eleanor Antin and Lynn Hershman Leeson; or a conception of 
rarefied artistic subjectivity circulated in the press as “antics.” How might such 
artistic productions of “character” be newly redeployed in an era that 
pervasively produces and economizes character, and routinely characterizes 
all citizens (and not just artists or exceptional figures)?   
  This thesis is comprised of a series of experiments with such 
questions – each of which, I hope, will infuse the others in unexpected ways. 
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Throughout the thesis, I perform a set of leaps between various discourses 
pertaining, on the one hand, to concepts and constructions of “character”; and 
on the other hand, to the economy, in various senses (the contemporary 
surveillance economy, which capitalizes on personal information; the 
financialized context for contemporary art production; the Christological 
economy elaborated by Marie-José Mondzain). Each of these staged 
encounters between “character” and “economy” will produce an insight which 
might then be used as a springboard for subsequent chapters, thereby 
enabling me to produce an idiosyncratic, interdisciplinary theory of the political 
significance of “character” – as product of the surveillance economy – for 
contemporary art, and contemporary life more broadly.   
First, it will be necessary to construct a conceptual prehistory, of sorts, 
for character in the age of big data. (After all, the technical, economic and 
conceptual conditions that inflect character’s current political currency have 
been developing over centuries.) In Chapter 1, I outline a broad and 
necessarily interdisciplinary literature on character, and consider some of the 
problems and paradoxes that come along with its study – beginning with an 
analysis of how character mediates between subjective and objective 
positions – and between subjects and the object world. I give special attention 
to Deidre Shauna Lynch’s The Economy of Character: Novels, Market Culture 
and the Business of Inner Meaning (1998), which makes a compelling 
argument against the pervasive structuralist understanding of character as an 
inherently conservative, humanistic and ultimately illusory literary 
phenomenon. (Why, she wonders, take a reductive, moralistic stance toward 
such a rich and complex object of study, when so much can be learned from 
	   45	  
the inherent contradictions character performs?) Lynch argues that 
representations of complex, interior lives in eighteenth century British novels 
grappled with a newly internationalized commodity culture, helping readers 
learn how to render their strange new possessions truly private. Thus, in 
Lynch’s view, complex literary characters themselves are technologies for 
grappling with economic shifts felt through everyday interactions with objects. 
How does such thinking on character come to bear on the present? After 
tracing several lines of thought that expand on the pervasive links between 
character, objects and economies (which span art history, literary theory, 
theories of objects, business sociology and critical finance), I outline my own 
theory of character for the age of big data: character economizes personhood. 
Within a neoliberal context, to characterize someone – or to perform one’s 
“character” – is to come to be represented in what I call the speculative 
shared interior – a representational form that hinges on a paradoxical 
combination of futurity and presentness, an interior, “first-person” perspective 
and the fact that such a perspective, if it is to be shared, must always be 
speculative – and speculate on the relation between that person’s values and 
the valuations routinely performed within his/her economic context. To say 
that, in the neoliberal world of big data analytics, character economizes 
personhood is to speak to the ways in which character enacts a subtraction of 
significant qualities from a larger information set; but also to the ways in which 
character circulates those qualities as speculations on – or provisional 
guarantors of – value.  
My next chapter, “Economic Figuration,” also lays some 
representational groundwork, but in a different direction: tackling the 
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conceptual and perceptual relationships between character and economy as 
background conditions for the representational and governmental functions of 
character in contemporary art, and in contemporary life more broadly. Of 
course, one of the dominant ways in which the relationships between the 
economy and the qualitative particularities of contemporary art have been 
framed is through an analysis of the art market. Many accounts of art and 
financialization depict contemporary artworks (and their concomitant 
expression of inherently unstable, speculative value) as cogs in an 
increasingly abstract and powerful, financialized market, thereby subjecting 
the analysis of art entirely to the terms of finance. (Ultimately, this involves 
understanding contemporary art’s ideological role as its expression of the link 
between two different conceptions of value: rarefied personal and perceptual 
qualities, on the one hand, and highly unstable, and at times wildly large, 
financial quantities, on the other.) While such analyses of the art market are 
extremely important, they also tend to sweepingly subject art to financialized 
conceptions of value. Conversely, in this chapter I reverse the mode of 
analysis. Rather than beginning with the financialized art market as a base – 
and basis – upon which to build my analysis of art’s qualitative particularities 
(which could include both the artworks’ unique qualities, and the imagined 
qualities of the artists to whose lives these artworks point), I begin with 
character itself – seen, here, as a reflexive economic concept – as a 
representational base from which to build an analysis of economic value. 
“Character” itself – as expressed in art’s production of perceptual particularity 
– might reshape conceptions as to what constitutes the economy in the first 
place, revealing something of the qualitative dimensions of the economy itself 
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– the information, glory, and “animal spirits” (to borrow a term from Keynes) 
that, more and more, must be understood to have intrinsic economic value – 
even if some of these qualities are not routinely, directly monetized. I outline 
some economic theories that privilege such qualitative terms, thus allowing 
“character” (as qualitative particularity rendered speculatively as propensity) 
to be understood as, quite directly, economic. I outline examples of what I 
term “economic figuration”: acts of rendering the economy, itself, as a kind of 
perceiving, and perceived, figure in literature and art. Thomas Bridges’ The 
Adventures of a Banknote (1770), Mark Lombardi’s Narrative Structures 
(1990s) and Amir Chasson’s portraits (2008 –) outline a range of approaches 
to staging these perceptual relations between economy and character, which, 
in their work, is always mapped in relation to the contested terrain of the first-
person perspective.  
 In Chapter 3, “All Data is Credit Data,” I examine two newly developing 
practices for determining creditworthiness and character: new credit scoring 
methods in the “fintech” industry, which draw from big data analytics; and 
online ranking and rating apparatuses (such as customer reviews on Uber 
and Airbnb), which act as ever-present reminders of the emerging economies 
of reputation. With these recently developed business apparatuses, the 
conceptual links between character, morality and economy are being 
rewritten. Big data lends fintech companies heretofore unfathomable claims to 
“truth value” in their representation of prospective borrowers’ characters. The 
reputation economy encourages individuals to use their “character” as a form 
of capital. Ratings and reviews grant credibility to micro-entrepreneurs on 
online platforms, and outsource regulation to consumers. In light of the 
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increasingly regimented relations between character and finance that such 
apparatuses allow, what can be learned from histories of marginal, artistic 
explorations of minor economic thought – which, long before big data, already 
experimented with the relations between economies and character? The 
French Fluxus artist Robert Filliou (1926-1987), for instance, espoused and 
enacted Charles Fourier’s radical economic thought, and understood his work 
as a poetic economic practice. Filliou made a sharp distinction between the 
poetic economy enacted by the Eternal Network of artists and what he termed 
the “economics of prostitution” (which emphasized self-promotion, 
professional conduct and competitive behaviour). In the face of a pervasive 
economics of prostitution, Filliou believed that an artistic proposition’s value 
was equivalent to the amount of innocence, imagination and freedom it was 
worth. Arguably, recent years have witnessed a blurring of the lines between 
poetics and prostitution (in Filliou’s senses of these terms). The reputation 
economy quite happily incorporates the two, valuating “genuine” and 
“generous” behaviour – going that extra mile for the customer – alongside 
self-promotion in an era of job scarcity, precarity, and the commodification of 
emotional labour that has long been associated with the service economy 
(Hochschild, 2003). In light of these developments, Filliou might be 
considered an unwitting precursor to the reputation economy; but is it possible 
to understand his qualitative conception of the economy other than in this 
admittedly somewhat facile, melancholic narrative, which routinely paints 
images of radical political economies being incorporated into the neoliberal 
mainstream? To explore this, I compare Filliou and George Brecht’s joke shop 
in Villefranche-sur-Mer, France, La Cédille Qui Sourit (1965-8) and some sort 
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of contemporary counterpoint: my experience of this same town, almost fifty 
years later, through Airbnb (a platform that, arguably, inherits Fluxus’ interest 
in openness, sharing and contingency). Is it possible to use Filliou’s work as a 
means through which to analyze and understand the Airbnb experience, 
performing a financialised phenomenology of Airbnb? Conversely, is it 
possible to say that recent artworks that focus on the conflicts between 
qualities and quantities, economics and morality are more apt responses to 
the neoliberal normalization of “genuine” feeling and “good” character than 
anything Filliou’s economy of innocence, imagination and freedom might be 
equipped to recommend? Rather than either condemning Filliou’s practice as 
a romantic performance of the “genuine” economy, or nostalgically upholding 
his practice as an authentically radical economic expression, I attempt to 
suggest a third alternative: that Filliou’s work conceptualizes “goodness” – 
here, understood as both a moralistic character trait, and a reflexive economic 
concept – as creditworthiness, and creditworthiness, in turn, as an application. 
However, the question as to which institution one’s goodness might apply 
remains open.  
 In what sense might “goodness” – or any other character trait, for that 
matter – come to be considered measurable? Modern and contemporary 
philosophers, economists, artists and thinkers have, time and again, either 
passionately argued against the quantification of qualities tout court, or, on the 
other hand, strongly advocated for more rigorous methods for quantifying 
qualitative aspects of experience and exchange. What is at stake in this stark 
philosophical and methodological contrast? How can one conceptualize this 
contrast without either romantically dismissing all quantification, or falling into 
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a positivistic fetishism of quantity for quantity’s sake? In an interlude, I briefly 
contextualize these tensions between quantified and qualitative concepts of 
character, and examine the education policy advocacy group Character 
Counts as an exemplar of what I call strategic quantification: a way of 
provisionally making one’s claims visible – and actionable – within a given 
institutional context by quantifying them.  
 In Chapter 4, I shift to a closer examination of character and 
surveillance, within a future-oriented analytics context. As a future-oriented 
concept, character speaks to a host of emerging predictive apparatuses, 
through which ever greater analytic efforts are placed on propensity, and 
managing future risk. I examine artworks that respond to newly future-oriented 
surveillance practices, and reveal something of the pre-emptive logic at play 
within contemporary tracking and monitoring. Works by SWAMP, Hasan Elahi 
and Erica Scourti, I argue, posit a theory of surveillance as characterization: 
as actively selecting subjects’ qualities and speculating on their propensities.  
 Through precise attempts to render creditworthiness and reputation 
knowable, and techniques for determining propensity, character has been 
pervasively captured, produced, and rendered determinable – however 
provisionally or problematically – in the age of big data. It has come to 
express an oddly objectified speculation on personal value. The economies of 
character are in full swing; and indeed, many artworks have spoken to, 
pointed toward, or theorized these shifts. Yet, for all its increasing rigidness, 
character is also a relational, and immensely malleable concept – a shared 
and practiced fiction. As Peter Osborne argues (2013), the narrative turn in 
contemporary art is predicated, in part, on the fact that narrative acts as a 
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point of indifference between fact and fiction. Character is yet another point of 
indifference between fact and fiction. As well as purporting to carry a kernel of 
truth about its bearers, it also affords its attributors great licence to select and 
analyze relevant characteristics – and affords its bearers the possibility (at 
least on some level) to lie, to fake, to adopt guises, to become other: to play a 
character and not simply to be one. Is this flexibility grounds enough to claim 
an emancipatory dimension to character? Can character’s malleability protect 
citizens from their increasing over-determination in an age of big data (given, 
in particular, the latter’s interests in neurology and raw data, which place less 
and less emphasis on the exigencies of conscious self-presentation)? What 
other economies of character might be possible?  
One pervasive response to the 2013 NSA revelations, and to the 
emerging politics of big data that they have made visible, has been the call to 
protect the right to privacy. Yet, in analyzing recent artworks by Erica Scourti, 
Hasan Elahi and others, which have directly responded to contemporary 
surveillance practices, it becomes clear that advocating for privacy, though it 
may certainly have some limited uses, is not an adequate response to the 
emerging contours of information politics at play. Firstly, this is because, as 
works by these artists clearly show, in the age of big data, there is an 
uncomfortable alliance between privacy and privatization that renders privacy 
advocacy highly problematic. Further, to follow Michel Feher’s theory of 
neoliberalism, the very basis for both neoliberal economy and its forms of 
governmentality is that of sharing (as a social value and way of being), and of 
the share (as an economic form which foregrounds derivative, shared forms of 
investment) (2015). Hence, to champion privacy as a response to big data 
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(while it might have some important, limited applications) is to turn away from 
the very economic and subjective conditions of sharing to which one must, in 
this context, respond. For better or worse, sharing – for all its messy, uneven, 
and uncomfortable economic, affective, social and subjective dimensions – is 
a necessary, though obviously difficult, component of any analysis of this 
terrain. To characterize is to share – to share in producing an impression of 
someone, to share in the construction and attribution of her characteristics, to 
help form the representational basis through which her persona might 
circulate in a neoliberal economy as a producer and guarantor of value.  
Perhaps counter-intuitively, it is for precisely this reason that character, 
as both a theoretical concept and an object of concern in the artworks I look 
at, might help us. Although character, of course, has been pervasively 
associated with individuals and their particularity, this is only half the story. 
Character, as I am arguing throughout, is always relational, always shared: a 
complex meeting point between particularity and perception, which, upon 
representation, can be circulated, shared more widely. Character is a shared 
(or, at times, un-shared, contested) speculation, and, as such, governs the 
link between the individual and the share (in the multifaceted senses above, 
to which Feher draws attention). Deidre Shauna Lynch’s argument (which 
pertains to modern literature’s link to the rise of British liberalism) posits 
character as a means to understand the emerging problems of the private – to 
mentally and ideologically anchor the wild influx of newly available, 
international commodities within private life. What she downplays, however 
(which was anticipated in the liberal era, but which, by now, is central to 
character’s neoliberal alliances) is the fact that literary character not only 
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imagines privatisation as such. It also invents ways to share privacy: to 
dismantle privacy through privacy itself, to interweave two private acts (of 
writing, and of the fictitious internal acts of perception and reflection carried 
out by characters), and put these interwoven privacies into circulation. The 
paradox of shared privacy, anticipated in modern literature, pervades the 
sharing economies of today, which trade in online reputations, and mediate 
tensions between “personal” characteristics and shared metrics. This tension 
characterizes the very concept of character as it plays out in neoliberal 
contexts, as shared (or partly-shared, problematically shared) speculation 
pervasively linked to individuals. More fittingly than privacy, the artworks I 
examine posit a politics of character as the perceptual basis for analyzing the 
age of big data, and situate shared, fictitious acts of perception as contested 
grounds on which these conflicts unfold. It is precisely this first person 
perspective that is currently being colonized by big data analytics. Analyses of 
smartphone data and MAC (media access control) address activity trade in 
information on personal experience, rendered at eye- (and thumb-) level. This 
makes it all the more vital to construct, however provisionally or fleetingly, a 
theory and a politics of character in/as the paradox of the shared first person. 
This is the basis of character’s vastly important political and representational 
currency today. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Character Economizes Personhood 
 
  
 In 2010, Hito Steyerl provocatively advocated for the political and 
emancipatory potential of becoming an object. The vast majority of 
emancipatory practices, she notes (for instance, feminist, anti-racist, and 
queer activist positionalities) have been focused on the struggle to become a 
subject of history, rather than an object of someone else’s. Yet given the 
difficulties and contradictions involved in navigating a subject position – the 
sense in which this involves not only assuming a privileged position within a 
history, but also being subject to a distribution of power – she asks: “Why not 
try siding with the object for a change? … Why not be a thing? An object 
without a subject?” (2010, p. 3). The object who strives to be thing-like, 
“without subject” – like David Bowie’s much-reproduced, post-gender 1977 
“Heroes” single persona, a wildly proliferating image-life – might erode or 
evade the sharp divides often presupposed to exist between thing and image, 
subject and object, I and it. For Steyerl, these states are no longer sharply 
separable; the image is a thing as much as the things it depicts. As things, we 
are not pictured by images so much as we participate in them – in their 
autonomous lives, their circulations.  
Character itself is a kind of image: an image (whether visual or not) of 
selfhood; of qualitative particularity, singularity; of positionality or role (within, 
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say, a given plot, group or milieu); and of behavioural tendency, ethical 
makeup, grit. In the age of big data, myriad apparatuses (just a few of which I 
will discuss in this thesis) constantly turn people into characters, into images 
of themselves. Surveillance programs, news sites, online algorithmic 
identification, credit scoring, gaming avatars, reality television, self-
presentation on online platforms, ratings and reviews: contemporary life 
swarms with hosts of new characterizing mechanisms (not to mention much 
older ones, such as literature, or being known by a variety of people in various 
contexts, each of whom perceives and understands you, your motivations and 
your social roles differently). Willingly or unwillingly, knowingly or otherwise, 
contemporary citizens become characters, image-objects of themselves, with 
every act of self-representation, and every online click in the surveillance 
economy – an economy set up, as Jaron Lanier (2014) points out, to promote 
the “free” sharing of content, yet vastly favour players who make use of 
sophisticated computation in order to track their supply chain, their customers, 
or both: to come know their customers better than the competition, in order to 
maximize profits.  
 What does it mean to truly become an object without subject? Given 
the surveillance economy’s myriad characterizing apparatuses, which always, 
already make characters out of us – in a sense, making us subject to the 
surveillance economy by making us into image-objects – is it really possible to 
become an object without also being subject? What conditions would have to 
be recognized in order to make this possible, to find the emancipatory 
potential in object-ness? Whether or not one agrees that such a pursuit is 
imaginable, or likely to be gainful, within a surveillance economy, the 
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contradictions involved in actualizing Steyerl’s pronouncement offer a useful 
starting point for a chapter outlining a brief theoretical history, and theory, of 
character for the surveillance economy. Steyerl’s compelling description of 
how one participates in object-ness, in image-ness, rather than simply being 
represented by images, usefully describes something of the lived experience 
of being intertwined with the fate of one’s represented being – one’s character 
– as it circulates autonomously from platform to platform, person to person, 
server to server.  
Circa 500 B.C. Heraclitus, in a famous aphorism, described character 
as destiny – as if one’s fate were inscribed in the fabric of one’s being from 
the beginning. In the age of big data, character is perhaps better seen as a 
destiny-producing, or destiny-inflecting device: credit scores, reputation and 
audience measurement are derived from complex encounters between a 
person’s behaviour and its analysis; but they then precede and out-circulate 
their human counterparts, like magnets for future potential, galvanizing their 
present conditions. (Characterizations can easily be self-fulfilling: for instance, 
those deemed creditworthy borrowers will receive better interest rates and 
thus be better able to act in a creditworthy fashion.) To become a character is 
to be object-ified, transformed into an image – to take on propensities as 
image, to feel oneself participate in, and become tethered to, one’s object-
ness, one’s image-ness. In this chapter, I depart from Steyerl’s description of 
becoming-object as I develop a theory of contemporary character. Yet, unlike 
Steyerl, who strives to imagine an object without subject, what would it be to 
find a way through this terrain that sticks with the difficult tensions between 
objects and subjects – that sees, in fact, any characterization as a circulating 
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image-object expressing the relation between perceiver and perceived? How 
can one make sense of this strange image-like status of character – and of 
the strange ways in which its characteristics are shared, and rendered 
shareable? Further, in an economy that frequently relies on character as an 
image or guarantor of one’s value, what theory of character best describes 
these functions, and their genealogy? Navigating a broad, interdisciplinary 
literature on character – as well as some related concepts, which help to fill 
out its fragmented history – I argue that it is insufficient, for my study, to 
simply theorize character as a guarantor of economic value, or an 
epiphenomenal element within the surveillance economy. Rather, character 
itself is an economic concept, which speaks to the attributions, speculations 
and exchanges of traits between various actors. Put another way, character 
economizes personhood, if by personhood, we mean the sense of familiarity 
with another person or thing that accrues over time (or through analytic acts, 
including acts of perception or computation), and if we understand 
“economize” to denote both a sense that one’s traits have been pared down 
from a greater complexity, and rendering those traits circulable, actionable, 
and subject to speculation.  
The first requirement for such a theory of character is a basis through 
which to think through the paradox of the shared characteristic, which 
ostensibly represents a person’s qualitative particularity, but is, of course, 
inflected with their perceivers’ views, interests and judgments – and thus, acts 
as a form of currency uniting perceiver and perceived. Sara Ahmed’s theory of 
character (2011) provides just this. Ahmed describes the tensions between 
the traits others want to see in the people they perceive and how those people 
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actually act. She describes character as a “technology of attribution” (p. 233), 
a way of navigating, and regulating, this difference – the difference between 
the expectation and perception of tendencies and traits. Ahmed’s theorization 
compellingly paints characterization as a relation between perceivers and 
perceived. Yet there is, perhaps, an even more basic sense in which this is 
so: for we could also say that a character (for instance, as represented in a 
literary character) is an invitation to inhabit a subject position – or an object 
position – imaginatively, to share in the thought experiment of seeing the 
world as another (real or fictitious) entity sees, and experience the difference 
between the two subjectivities (one lived, the other imagined, represented). 
Canadian artist Geoffrey Farmer regularly explores the spatial dimensions of 
such acts of subjective sharing. For his piece Ghost Face, for instance (shown 
as part of his 2008 solo exhibition at the Musée d’Art Contemporain de 
Montréal), Farmer constructed a column very similar to, but slightly out of line 
with, the columns already in the museum (Figure 7). Farmer’s column was 
hollow on one side, and contained a stepping stool placed as if to aid 
someone in peering out of two eyeholes, which were cut out of the front of the 
column. With this piece, Farmer invited visitors to imagine, on the one hand, 
“wearing” a column, disguising oneself within it – becoming, with the column, 
one hybrid fictitious character. On the other hand, this piece enacted an 
invitation to “see” the world as a column would – and to inhabit all the 
contradictions that come along with this. How does one become an object, 
anyway – when such an empathetic act is likely to end in an act of 
anthropomorphism? Farmer’s work acts as an invitation to enter into a relation 
between several viewpoints on the same scene, as “seen” from the 
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perspective of the column (which can only be imagined by humans, and 
rendered subject to a certain base-line anthropomorphism): a relation 
between the column; the person inhabiting the column, wearing it like clothing 
or like a disguise; and any onlookers, who might imagine an amalgamation of 
the two – or who, conversely, might see simply a hollowing-out of the column 
form, a subtractive act (two holes and a side cut out) that disguises the 
column as a disguise.  
Farmer frequently plays with this overlapping of subject positions within 
the same object. This is particularly clear in his 2004 work I thought that I 
could make a machine that would pierce the fabric of reality, in your world it 
appears as a 16th century sign (Figure 8). A hanging shop sign depicts a 
photograph of an explosion on water, perhaps a high-impact crash site: a 
hyperbolic image of the interaction between two entities, which stands in for 
the perceptual conflict between the “I” and “you” of the work’s title. A later 
version of this piece multiplies the relations; a cut-out of the sign-form, painted 
green-screen green, faces an image of the crash-site sign on a television 
screen. If we take it that Farmer is punningly making the hanging shop-sign 
into a sign of signs (in the broader, semiotic sense of the term, meaning a 
relation between signifier and signified), then the piece layers two different 
models of relational encounter in the sign: the depicted crash and the clash 
between signifier and signified. The work’s title, then, navigates a further layer 
of encounter, asking viewers to consider the distances between the object “in 
itself”, the object as the “I” of the title sees it (implicitly the artist’s persona), 
and the object as the “you” of the title sees it (implicitly the viewer). Objects, in 
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Farmer’s work, mediate between various subjective viewpoints – bear the 
differences between fictitious world-views inhabited by various characters.  
An object’s “character” changes depending on its context and the 
subjective lives of its perceivers. Louise Erdrich's novel The Antelope Wife 
(1988) features just such a subjective transformation of an object, staged as a 
narration of a wedding cake’s changing character. The groom in the story 
happens to be a baker – and his wedding cake follows a special recipe he has 
been working out from memory for his entire life, ever since, as a child, he 
tasted an exquisite cake made by a German prisoner of war as a plea bargain 
for his freedom. The wedding guests gaze at the cake with great anticipation 
throughout the reception – until the unstable ex-husband of the bride shows 
up, and drunkenly declares that he has poisoned it. All of a sudden, its 
character changes. It becomes ominous and menacing; everyone looks at it 
with terror. When the ex-husband is finally removed from the premises, the 
groom assures everyone that he is not such a fool as would leave his own 
wedding cake out where it could be poisoned. Afraid but still eager, the crowd 
begins to eat. The cake is divine; and the baker realizes that the missing 
ingredient in the recipe – the elusive element he had been seeking for so 
many years – was fear.  
Works such as Erdrich’s and Farmer’s are arguably comprised of many 
competing (and even contradictory) character-spaces. Character-space is a 
term I adapt from Alex Woloch’s work on nineteenth-century novels. Woloch 
defines the character-space as “the intersection of an implied human 
personality… with the definitively circumscribed form of a narrative” (2003, p. 
13). His development of character-space as an analytical method for literature 
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is particularly attuned to the tensions that arise from the demand for an 
implied human life to be adequately represented, and the narrative pressure 
that curtails some characters’ roles and expounds on others’. While Woloch’s 
study is attuned to human characters in novels, mine will adapt the concept of 
a character-space to a different purpose: studying the roles of character-
spaces in artworks, on the way to an economic theory of character. 
Character-spaces, in my study, can include not only the limiting pressures of 
narrative on the demand for equality on represented personhood; more 
broadly, they can also include sets of perceptual, conceptual and contextual 
cues that produce implied “characters” through, or in relation to, objects in an 
artwork. These could include implied, fictitious authors (for instance, 
Duchamp’s fictitious personas); fictitious subjects connoted by a scene (for 
instance, Mark Manders’ ongoing project Self-portrait as a Building (1986-), 
which uses arrangements of objects and architectural spaces to imply a 
fictitious author “Mark Manders”); implied figures made out of objects (for 
instance, the compound human/column “subject” in Farmer’s Ghost/Face); 
and implied subjective viewpoints (for instance, that of Farmer’s column, or 
the implied subjects viewing his 16th century sign).  
 Such artworks, I argue, are responding to a phase of semiocapitalism 
in which character itself, as an image-object of essence, becomes a kind of 
exchange value, circulating between media platforms, jpegs, and textual 
descriptions. (We could say that, from the perspective of such circulations, 
character – as an image-object that seems to represent subjectivity, and 
towards which both “subjects” and “objects” tend – has in some sense 
replaced subjectivity as a primary object of interest for a number of artists.) By 
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experimenting with the relationships between objects, images and 
“characters,” inanimate materiality and the first person, the artworks I study 
both mobilize and dismantle the assemblages from which character’s 
circulations depart. In doing so, they draw attention to the heterogeneous 
nature of the combination of matter and the first-person status attributed to it, 
creating “characters” that reveal the very problem of character – as an 
expression of “interior” particularity that must be perceived from the outside, of 
private experience that, paradoxically, must be shared in order to be 
understood as private.  
Why Character? 
 Analysis of phenomena similar to some of those I have described 
above has come under a number of banners: for instance, commodity 
fetishism, totemism and charisma in economic and anthropological thought; 
personification, prosopopoeia and persona in literature; and 
anthropomorphism, animism, theatricality and author-function in art history. 
Much in these discussions is highly relevant to what I am studying, but the 
term character – though necessarily broad – most precisely describes the 
tensions between ascribed essence and circulation, object and person, actor 
and narrative. That said, since I am studying a plurality of “character-
functions”, I will draw from several of the aforementioned discourses, paying 
particular attention to the ways in which the concept of character comes up in 
each. I hope that my broad study of the literary histories, art-historical 
trajectories and current philosophical uses of character (and related terms) 
will begin to flesh out a rich and conflicted field, which will galvanize my 
discussion of the many contradictory character-functions in the artworks I 
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study. Since the word “character” has so many meanings, my first task is to 
focalize these, identifying a conceptual locus within the term's semantic range, 
without necessarily obliterating the possibility that other senses of the term 
could come into play in my argument as well.  
In our time, the most common uses of the term character tend to be 
thoroughly entrenched within a human frame of reference. By character, we 
often mean fictitious personages in stories, books and films. In another sense, 
character might mean the mental and ethical makeup of a person – as in, for 
instance, a “character-building” exercise, or the demand that a politician be of 
“good character.” Yet in etymological terms, these are amongst the later 
senses of the word; it was not until the mid-seventeenth century, for instance, 
that the term connoted a fictitious personage. One of the first propositions of 
my study is that we de-familiarize the term, shift the focus to some of 
character’s earlier etymological senses: as a graphic mark or engraved 
symbol, and, somewhat later (by metaphorical extension), as defining quality. 
In these earlier senses, character cuts through readymade distinctions 
between subjects and objects, people and things. Whether of a surface that 
has accrued scratches, stains and other signs of use over the years, or of a 
person who has developed a set of habits over decades, character speaks to 
an intuitive sense – often felt in a split second – of the singularity of an object 
or person’s “lifespan:” its essence, its sense of having been formed, its 
propensities. In a similar way, objects bear the imprint of their having been 
made or formed, their use over time, and their potential activity in the future. 
Their “character” is bound up with the perception and intimation of the 
particularity and potential they bear. 
	   64	  
For things as for humans, the ongoing process of acquiring “character” 
often involves playing a role, being useful within a given milieu. Nietzsche 
(1974, p. 302) remarks that when someone has worked the same job for 
several years, he in effect becomes the character he once merely played. 
What began as the performance of a typified role (which could be turned on or 
off at will) has become permanence; a worldview inscribed in the individual 
according to his/her role within an economy of labour. William James’ writing 
on habit contains a similar expression of the processes through which workers 
become “set” in their ways through repeated acts of work. By the age of thirty, 
he declares, professional mannerisms set like plaster into the very being of 
their bearers: doctors think and act like doctors, salesmen take on the 
outlooks, skills and prejudices of salesmen, and so on (2001, p. 10-11). Yet in 
the current economic climate – in which permanent jobs are much harder to 
come by – the narrative economy of characterization through work becomes, 
perhaps, even more palpable, due to its absence or dysfunction. In his critique 
of the increase in short-term, contract-based employment of an increasingly 
mobile work force in the 1990s, The Corrosion of Character (1998), Richard 
Sennett argues that precarious working conditions deprive employees both of 
benefits such as health coverage, and of a means to narrate their lives 
effectively to others. The constantly mobile worker finds herself with no solid 
basis through which she might convey her identity to those around her.10 
Inclusion within (or exclusion from) a labour economy (and a social milieu 
largely understood in relation to labour) involves complex processes of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Sennett's book was written before online social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter 
and Linked In took off, perhaps more than making up for this deficit in self-narration. 
Nonetheless, in light of Sennett’s work, we might think of these more recent developments in 
social media – which palpably circulate “character” – as responses to a crisis of self-narration. 
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characterization: both internalizing a limited worldview and set of habits, and 
becoming legible to others within a given economy.  
 Character, as I am describing it here, cannot exist as character on its 
own. It is an image of identity – an essence that can only ever be 
conceptualized in relation to existing epistemic frameworks, and that must be 
observed at a distance from its bearer, accruing according to an ever-shifting 
assemblage of signs (actions, gestures, sounds, feelings, a sense of attitude 
or disposition, moral stances, various visual cues) observed in a moment or 
over a period of time. Like the graphic symbol engraved in a surface, 
character is “read,” interpreted by someone (or possibly something) else in a 
complex – but sometimes deceptively quick – act of perception. Such acts of 
perception are, of course, rife with preconceptions. Indeed, the role of such 
preconceptions – largely attached to visual cues – is an important aspect of 
the study racism, sexism and classism.11 The perception of “character” can all 
too easily act as the naturalized locus for racism, classism, sexism, 
homophobia and transphobia. Thus, while these more “classic” forms of 
identity-based prejudice and bias are only part of the story of identity in the 
age of big data (when minute and increasingly particular measurements of 
one’s individual “character” can be made and put to use, alongside reified 
identificatory categories), they remain stubbornly present, as we will see in 
later chapters. (For instance, as Annie McClanahan [2014] argues, FICO® 
credit scores aim to quantify concepts of “creditworthiness” as a character 
trait, and thus to eliminate racist, sexist and ageist lending practices. Instead, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For a more detailed discussion of the significance of this point for recent art, see Jennifer A. 
Gonzalez’ discussion of the epidermalization of race (a concept she gleans from Frantz 
Fanon) as it relates to the work of contemporary installation artists interrogating the formation 
of race in the United States. (2008)  
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however, they tend to merely launder these biases; for instance, people of 
colour and the elderly routinely receive lower credit scores than their similarly 
qualified white, non-elderly counterparts.) Given these complexities, it is 
important to de-naturalize character-spaces, de-familiarize them – unpick their 
relational complexities and stretch them to the point of collapse.  
As Graham Harman (2007, p. 135) notes, it is very difficult for people to 
perceive themselves as characters, since each person experiences the 
surplus of their own subjectivity over that of all other beings. We experience 
the vast indeterminacy of our own interior lives, the extent of our inner 
freedom, far more fully than we do others' – although we entertain the 
empathetic sense that the interior lives of other people, animals, and even 
objects could be just as complex as our own.12 When we perceive someone 
as “such a character,” Harman notes, we are more attuned to the mechanism 
in her being than to this unbridled, first-person feeling of inner freedom (2007, 
p. 130). We perceive the way in which habit has crept in, perhaps 
unbeknownst to its bearer, reducing the scope of her actions and expressions 
to a smaller palette of possibilities.13 To be perceived as having “character” in 
the sense emphasized above, then, is to be perceived from the outside as 
being less than this primordial interior complexity. Yet at the same time, it is to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Harman refrains from subjecting such observations to historical or epistemic analysis; he 
also tends to construct his discourse from a universal (and arguably, implicitly white and 
male) perspective. Of course, Harman’s interest is ontological, and not epistemological; and 
he aims to go against what he views as the post-structuralist over-emphasis on the correlation 
between ontology and human perception.  
13 William James also wrote compellingly on habit in materialist terms in his Psychology: The 
Briefer Course (2001). As he points out, just like a piece of paper that has already been 
folded will fold more easily a second time along the same crease, so habit economizes 
activity, creating a neural shortcut. As we age, according to James, it becomes harder and 
harder to change such habits. In a literary sense, Harman’s observation of the reductiveness 
of character (as compared with a more expansive sense of interior indeterminacy) 
corresponds with Alex Woloch’s observation that character navigates the dual demands of 
internal complexity and narrative economy in The One vs. the Many: Minor Characters and 
the Space of the Protagonist in the Novel (2003).  
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be perceived such that the observer has a sense that there is a greater 
interior life – a greater indeterminacy – than can be comprehended from the 
very outside from which the perception of character must be staged. In this 
sense, character indicates a zone of indeterminacy in perceiving objects and 
people – a sense in which an observer both reduces an object to the signs of 
its singularity, and senses the limitations of that very reduction.14 A character 
is, in short, the concept of interiority, paradoxically, perceived from an outside 
– an outside from which it can never actually be experienced.15  
Character, as I am describing it, must bring together an object and at 
least one perceiving subject. Ironically, we could say that the subject of 
character is in fact the person or entity perceiving another’s character – not 
the person or object perceived. The object of character, conversely, would be 
the entity to which character is attributed. We could even say that character is 
an objective property. In their book Objectivity (2007), American historians of 
science Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison show that when the terms 
“objective” and “subjective” emerged in English from the Latin 
obiectivus/subiectivus in the fourteenth century, they had exactly the opposite 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 While it may seem more intuitive to think of the first person in terms of people and other 
animals, it is by no means unknown to the history of philosophy to imagine such first-person 
experiences of interior complexity such that it cuts across the distinctions between subjects 
and objects, people and things. (For instance, in the early 1890s, Charles Sanders Peirce 
wrote: “Viewing a thing from the outside, considering its relations of action and reaction with 
other things, it appears as matter. Viewing it from the inside, looking at its immediate 
character as feeling, it appears as consciousness” (2000, p. 353). 
15 I should briefly note that, until recently, and particularly in poststructuralist thought, a 
reliance on the distinction between interiority and exteriority was often considered rather 
backward and/or conservative. For instance, in their introduction to A Thousand Plateaus 
(2004, p. 10), Deleuze and Guattari associate a novelistic concern with the interiority of 
subjects and substances with both romanticism and the State apparatus. However, I would 
argue that among the tendencies that characterize some important developments in recent 
thought (via the work of Graham Harman, Robin MacKay and Reza Negarestani, among 
others) is one that would reinstate the importance of the interior/exterior divide. For instance, 
MacKay’s writings on geotrauma (2012) make extensive use of the interior/exterior divide, by 
emphasizing how entities are formed through being cut off from others – as in the core of the 
earth’s burning immanence with the sun.  
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meanings from the ones they hold today: “'Objective' referred to things as they 
are presented to consciousness, whereas 'subjective' referred to things in 
themselves” (2007, p. 29). The terms fell into disuse in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. By means of a reinterpretation by Kant and those 
influenced by him (including Fichte, Schelling and Coleridge), by 1850 the 
terms had shifted 180 degrees to encapsulate the meanings they now hold 
(2007, p. 30-31). According to the older sense of the term “objective” (which 
much more astutely speaks to the dynamics of character as I am framing 
them here), character is an inherently objective property that tenuously unites 
two subjective entities: that of the perceiver and that of the perceived object. 
The image, which Daston and Galison’s work affords, of an objective property 
uniting two subjective entities complements the object oriented ontology 
outlined above. The concept of character speaks to the glimpse at an unseen 
“truth” about a subject – her “real” personhood, which can never be fully 
known. Yet in spite of this sense of glimpsing a truth, character traits – as 
when, for instance, we perceive someone as “such a character” – are in fact 
objective not because they directly refer to a “real” truth about a person, but 
because they instantiate a conceptual and perceptual meeting point between 
two subjective stances.   
Of course, if I use the terms “subject” and “object”, there are two kinds 
of distinctions that seem likely to be confused: that between those who act 
and those who are acted upon (in the grammatical sense), and that between 
human subjects and things. When I describe characters as “objects,” I 
emphatically wish to stress the first kind of distinction and not the second. 
Character is an object, primarily, of perception and conceptualization – 
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whether by a human, another entity, or a computational mechanism, such as 
an online algorithm that attributes identity to users. As Graham Harman 
(2012) points out, a perceiving subject need not necessarily be human. Just 
as a patient becomes a medical object of examination for a doctor (thus being 
reduced to a certain set of qualities relevant for their interaction), so sunlight 
drastically reduces the newspaper it shines through, only taking stock of the 
qualities relevant for the interaction at hand. (In one of the relatively few art 
practices to invoke non-human perception without deferring to a globalized 
conception of a “cosmic address”, the American art/research/design collective 
spurse grew bacterial cultures derived from swabs taken from all over the 
Indianapolis Museum of Art, as part of a thought experiment designed to 
consider the museum outside of a human perceptual purview. What would it 
mean, this piece asks, to consider the museum from the perspective of its 
resident bacteria? What could the concept of a museum be to them?16) Of 
course, the situation might be, in some ways, more complex with a human 
perceiving subject, who will be influenced by various epistemic imprints, 
discursive frames and sign systems – though these may not be entirely 
foreign to other organisms, as the field of biosemiotics attests. Yet the 
difference between the sun as a “perceiving subject” and a human perceiving 
subject, in Harman’s view, is ultimately one of degree, not of kind. That said, 
the mechanisms I am describing work somewhat differently on human and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 spurse, “Sub-Mergings”, 2006. For this eight-month project, spurse analyzed the 
Indianapolis Museum of Art and its grounds from a microbiological perspective. They describe 
their rationale for the project as follows: “Sub-Mergings began with a simple observation: 
human beings are over 90% bacteria. What does it mean then to think of ourselves as “self-
reliant” individuals? Our non-human composition would suggest that we are not individuals 
but ecosystems of many differing creatures and logics” (2006). 
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thingly objects. To help define these more clearly, I will differentiate between 
two different poles on two different axes of object-character. 
 The first axis encompasses the distinction between what, following 
Vivian Sobchack, we could call subjective objects and objective subjects. 
Sobchack (2004, p. 288-290) uses these terms to describe the sense in which 
the same entity can move through both object and subject status, as it 
experiences different degrees of agency in various situations. First Nations 
American artist James Luna, lying motionless in a glass vitrine in his piece 
The Artifact Piece (1987, Figure 9), becomes a subjective object, a focal point 
for a museological gaze who is still, nonetheless, imbued with a complex 
range of subjective feelings and sensations. Likewise, an object can easily 
become subjectivized, as when, for instance, Geoffrey Farmer displays 
everyday objects emitting audio-recorded voices on a large, low plinth (2005-
2008). Sobchack grounds her investigation of these terms within a Merleau-
Pontian vocabulary of the flesh, for which I do not wish to stake a claim here. 
(Like Merleau-Ponty, Sobchack retains the somewhat anthropocentric 
perspective of much phenomenology.) Nonetheless, her distinction is useful 
for my study in that it helps me articulate an important, common sense 
distinction between human and thingly object-characters. While human object-
characters tend to seem reduced in their qualities and in their level of agency 
within a given situation, for thingly object-characters the situation is somewhat 
more complex. There is still this sense of reduction – for I may not know, say, 
a tool or toy outside of my ability to use it, or a sign beyond my ability to read 
it. However, when, say, Thomas the Tank Engine smiles at me, this reduction 
is layered with animation: an often anthropocentric upgrading of the object 
	   71	  
toward an (often anthropomorphized) subject status. (That said, the 
relationships between this ostensible “upgrading” and anthropomorphism are 
complex indeed – I will say more on this in my section on animism below.) 
With thingly object-characters, animation and reduction are often complexly 
intertwined. 
 Sobchack’s uses of the concept “subjective object” calls into mind 
another recent – and perhaps more extreme – discourse, which I will call a 
discourse of becoming object. Hito Steyerl (whose work I described above) 
draws from Mario Perniola’s book The Sex Appeal of the Inorganic (2004), in 
which he describes a kind of sexuality that entirely leaves behind the organic 
cycles of birth and death, climax and release – one becomes an object, 
becomes clothing.17 Sobchack’s objective subjects are often described as 
victims, their agency reduced (often horrifically) by another subject or event; 
despite depicting a crossover between “objective” and “subjective” states of 
experience, she writes from the assumption that subjectivity holds some 
emancipatory potential. Steyerl and Perniola, on the other hand, envision a 
thing-like state (in images as in sexuality) entirely removed from the rhythms 
and struggles of subjecthood.18  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 This is the kind of sexuality Perniola sees in Burroughs’ writings (in which the use of drugs 
initiates a move away from organic, bodily cycles), or in Kant’s treatise on marriage. Kant 
distinguishes between the noumenal sense of a person’s being a thing “in itself” and the 
phenomenal sense of its appearing as an object for others. What is striking, for Perniola, is 
that Kant’s moral imperative is based at the noumenal and not the phenomenal level; it is fully 
based on the “thingness” of the body for itself, and not on a subject or an object. (2004, p. 37-
38). 
18 Though I do not have space to develop it fully here, another fascinating description of the 
complex relationships between “I” and “it” comes from Leo Bersani. Bersani (2006, p. 212) 
points out that many misunderstandings of Freudian psychoanalysis would be avoided if the 
name of the id (which is James Strachey’s Latinized translation of what Freud wrote of as 
“das Es,” which means “the It” in German) were simply translated into English as “the It”. This 
term, he argues would give a far more adequate sense of what Freud meant to depict: the 
unconscious as something thing-like, before characterization and before consciousness, filled 
with sexual desires but also with vast reservoirs of possibility.  
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 If the first axis of distinctions I pointed out was that between objective 
subjects and subjective objects (even though I leave open the possibility that 
some objects could be without subject, in Steyerl and Perniola’s sense), the 
second axis encompasses the distinction between the perception of interiority-
for-itself and interiority for something or someone else. If I observe, say, a 
lava lamp, I might perceive its “character”, an “attitude” or style of expression 
it exudes. If I display the lamp prominently in my flat along with several other 
knickknacks, together they might convey something of my interiority, my self-
expression and tastes. Further, if the lamp is placed on a shelf as part of a 
sculpture, such as Haim Steinbach's Ultra-Red no. 2 (1986), it becomes part 
of a complex expression, which reflexively evokes these tropes of self-
expression as economic (self-)expressions through the objects available to be 
bought or made in a given milieu of circulation and exchange (this is part of 
the conceptual legacy of still-life painting). These latter senses are, of course, 
inextricably intertwined with the rise of commodity culture over the past 
several centuries, from the increasingly personalized use of interior décor in 
the eighteenth century to the increased promotion of products as personal 
expressions of the “liberated” individual in the 1960s (Curtis, 2002). A 
narrative and/or artistic milieu might provoke a complex interaction between 
an object’s “own” character, and a mobilization of the object as a sign of 
someone/something else's, against a backdrop of economic valuation. An 
object-character can bear the use-value of “interior” expression for another, 
even as its character is an economic value in and of itself – an expression of 
the very circulation of traits and characteristics.    
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 While character in the sense I am using it has a great deal to do with 
narrative, since I am emphasizing the earlier etymological senses of the term 
over the later ones, it is not so fully caught up with narration as others' uses of 
the term might be. In fact, we could say that an intimation of interiority-in-itself, 
or, to use Graham Harman's phraseology yet again, a sense of the object as 
that which withdraws from all relation, is, paradoxically, the profoundly anti-
narrative kernel around which narrativity organizes itself. It extends itself in 
the medium of narration but also seems to subsist in spite of narration. 
Object-characters mediate between narrative time and a temporality that 
resists narration, and exceeds the plots within which it resides.  
 
Literary Histories of Object-Characters 
 Even within literary theory and criticism, character is only recently 
returning to favour as an object of study, after having been equated both with 
realist stylistic biases and with humanist ideology for several decades. As Rita 
Felski notes in her introduction to New Literary History’s 2011 special issue on 
character (its first devoted to the topic since 1974), there has been a 
revitalization of character as an object of study over the last decade. While 
contributors to the 1974 NLH issue seemed convinced that character was an 
anachronistic concept which could do little to produce new thought (as in 
Cixous’ “The Character of Character,” 1974), the 2011 contributors shared a 
conviction that character could disclose, and not merely disguise, subtle 
nuances of historical changes in personhood (Felski, 2011, p. v). Indeed, 
while certain concepts of character might house moralistic assumptions or 
conservative expectations of consistent behaviour, to study character is often 
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to find breaking points, inconsistencies in such expectations – ways in which 
character breaks “out of character”. Sara Ahmed’s contribution to the recent 
NLH issue on character (cited above) epitomizes this new, more nuanced 
(and perhaps more ambivalent) approach. “An idea of character,” she writes, 
“is an idea of consistency” (2011, p. 231). Such expectations of consistency 
can easily generate their own object, as when a person’s behaviour doesn’t 
quite match, say, a friend’s previous experiences of him, and is thus 
dismissed as “out of character.” The distinction between a person’s “in 
character” and “out-of-character” behaviour might have more to do with an 
observer’s preconceptions and desires than it has to do with the person 
whose “character” is being judged. A character, for Ahmed, is only ever 
experienced in profile (profile being Husserl’s term for that which we can 
perceive of an object from a particular viewpoint). This does not mean that we 
perceive profiles of characters; rather, “profile is what characters are 
composed of” (2011, p. 233). Character itself, for Ahmed, is a “system for 
creating distinctions between things,” for creating truth about them (p. 232). 
Ahmed examines “problem characters” in George Eliot novels, arguing that 
willfulness – a particularly problematic character trait for many child-rearing 
pedagogies – acts as both a character trait and a trait that breaks “out of 
character,” reclaiming non-normative modes of living and “perform[ing] a 
disagreement with the very judgment of being wilful… a disagreement that will 
not be visible to the one who judges… Willfulness thus resists the system of 
characterization even when it appears to fulfil its dreams” (p. 250).19 Ahmed’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 In a similar vein, Omri Moses’ study of the works of T.S. Eliot, Henry James and Gertrude 
Stein (2005) examines the ways in which these authors call into question the prevalent 
presupposition that a character’s moral integrity must be coupled with consistency of 
behaviour.  
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approach highlights the performative aspects of character – the ways in which 
attributions of character can create the very normative understandings and 
expectations of consistency to which they refer. Paradoxically, she also, 
arguably, slightly over-systematizes character. Her description of “character” 
itself as a system seems to imply a generalized attribution of ideological force 
lurking “behind” a field of specific performative acts and discursive histories, 
rather than a fragmented and frayed terrain of negotiations between objects 
and their various perceivers’ preconceptions. Her work combines the 
suspicion of the ideological functions of character that prevailed in 1970s 
literary studies with an interest in examining just how such ideological moulds 
can be made to break out of their bounds.  
Since my use of the term character does not align perfectly with the 
most common-sense literary use of the term (as fictitious personage), I am 
particularly interested in some recent literary scholarship that explicitly 
theorizes the relationships between characters and their economic 
underpinnings – topics that, though they may begin in literary terms, tend 
toward the economic. In her renowned 1998 book The Economy of Character: 
Novels, Market Culture, and the Business of Inner Meaning (1998), Deidre 
Shauna Lynch provides a social constructionist account of the rise of the 
character – understood in the now-familiar sense of a represented human, 
interior life – in eighteenth century British literature. She points out that the 
common criteria through which we tend to evaluate fictional characters now – 
as “round” or “flat” – are not nearly so natural as they may seem to 
contemporary readers; in fact, they were not instated as criteria for 
understanding character until the last two decades of the eighteenth century. 
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While it is something of a truism in literary studies to associate the rise of 
highly particularized, unpredictable, interior characters with the “rise of 
individualism,” in Lynch’s view, this is a tautological construction which does 
little to explain how eighteenth century readers actually used the characters 
they spent so much time with. She sidelines the popular conception of 
characters as representations, in order to look at the oft-overlooked sense of 
characters as things in the world – things to which readers ascribe use. To 
emphasize these aspects of the rise of character, for Lynch, is to draw 
attention to the sense in which characters are subject to a “political economy 
of truth” (1998, p. 3) in the Foucauldian sense of an ever-changing set of 
techniques and procedures for navigating that which can be considered true 
in a given place and time, and the cultural practices set in place for ascribing 
truth to certain things and not others.   
 One of Lynch’s targets is a certain ahistorical conception of character, 
exemplified by the literary critic Ian Watt and his followers. Watt’s 1957 book 
Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding helped to 
establish a narrative of characterization according to which it evolved only 
with respect to the development of its own internal logic. According to this 
critical narrative, characterization develops through a dialectical conflict 
between the internal and external demands of character, which were finally 
resolved in Jane Austen. For Lynch, this account falsely suggests that the 
development of characterization was somehow sealed off from the material 
contingencies of the societies in which it occurred. Thus, she explores the 
complex, often material and emphatically trans-media history of character as it 
relates to the rapid rise of commodity culture. She argues that “people used 
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characters… to renegotiate social relations in their changed, commercialized 
world, to derive new kinds of pleasure from the changes, to render their 
property truly private, to cope with the embarrassment of riches. A new ‘world 
of moving objects’ was one in which new forms for imagining and enforcing 
social division were requisite” (1998, p. 4-5). In an era of such massive 
changes to the material practices prevalent in British culture – when imports 
increased exponentially, interior spaces became vastly more “personalized” 
with knickknacks and trinkets, and practices of reading and writing themselves 
became commodified, readers, Lynch argues, used characters as a kind of 
social technology, a means through which to learn both how to personalize 
themselves within a newly commodified culture, and through which to 
navigate the ironies of enacting self-actualization within a market culture 
which introduced the unprecedented regularity of exchange value into social 
life.  
 Lynch seeks to de-familiarize and historicize many realist assumptions 
about character, by attesting to the many and varied ways in which characters 
were understood at various points in the eighteenth century. In the first half of 
the century, there was practically no talk of the individualization or interior 
lives of characters; in fact, literary “characters” referred to letters and 
typefaces as much as they did to fictitious persons in books. Mid-century 
books such as Thomas Bridges' 1770 The Adventures of a Bank Note 
demonstrate that objects such as bank notes could serve as protagonists, 
their easy travels from one locale to another paralleling those of the 
“characterless” gentleman of stories from the same period, whose person was 
devoid of particularity precisely because he was so well-travelled. In the late 
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Georgian and Regency periods, a new romantic conception of character 
began to take shape, and the character's inner life took on a new importance. 
Finally, after 1770, characterization's meaning became cemented as the 
representation of subjectivity. Not only did social constructions of character 
radically change throughout the century; the aesthetic criteria through which 
they were evaluated also evolved. In the middle of the century, a character 
was not so much round or flat as he was subject to a “discursive economy” 
(1998, p. 10), wrought in as few descriptive strokes as were required for him 
to fulfil his narrative function. (An overly individuated character was 
considered grotesque.) Lynch aims to account for the historicity of the 
personal without recourse to the modern concept of identification, which in her 
view blurs important distinctions between a reader's empathy with what a 
character is and what he or she does.  
 If one of Lynch’s targets is the ahistorical criticism of Ian Watt and his 
followers, which tends to radically disassociate character from material 
contingency, history and function, another of her targets is structuralist 
criticism, which denigrated the ostensibly humanist underpinnings of the 
realist character as a “presence” that seemed to exceed, surpass or underlie 
a text. By dismissing character's seeming underlying presence – its sense of 
being – as a humanist illusion, the structuralists missed opportunities to 
explore what, in fact, that sense of presence actually did for readers (for 
instance, throughout the mid-eighteenth century, Lynch argues, it became 
more and more apparent that characters' sense of being could “train the 
reader in sympathizing and so in participating in a social world that was being 
reconceived as a transactional space, as a space that held together through 
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the circulation of fellow feeling”) (1998, p. 89). Much as it tried to attack the 
ideological underpinnings of the notion that character exceeded its textual 
representations, structuralism failed to come up with terms specific enough to 
carry out this criticism effectively, tending to rely on general concepts such as 
“capitalism,” “the novel,” and “the subject.” Thus the targets of their critique 
tended to be insufficiently situated, seeming to emanate from a generalized 
unconscious. Without intending to, many structuralist critics performed the 
very essentialism and ahistoricism that they meant to critique. They also 
tended to glamorize unconventional texts that seemed to radically subvert the 
generic conventions of character, rather than doing the much harder work of 
understanding how a text might negotiate existing conventions. In this way, in 
Lynch’s view, they reinforced the very individualism that they meant to 
critique.20  
 Lynch consistently emphasizes the thing-like status of characters, “their 
quality of being at once 'out there' and 'other-than-us,' the way that, like the 
commodities in Capital, they seem more autonomous, memorable, and real 
than their makers” (1998, p. 18). (This comes is extremely close to what I am 
calling the character as image-object in our contemporary moment.) It is this 
convergence between character and thingly qualities, I argue, which both 
points to the relevance of literary studies of character for art-historical studies 
of sculpture and other object-based contemporary art, and isolates an 
important socio-economic problem in that, within the current episteme at least, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 While Lynch might be quite right to criticize the structuralists for their reliance on 
generalized critical terms such as “capitalism,” she too seems to come into some difficulty 
here: for there appears to be a tension in her work between a more generalized argument 
about how characters relate to an economic base (the rise of market culture), and a far more 
specific account of how particular commodities and cultural practices of reading relate to 
characters (which, as she rightly points out, do not have an autonomous history).  
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we cannot help but “characterize” objects, developing complex, sensory 
relationships to their surplus value.21 
Like Lynch and others, Alex Woloch (2003) addresses the aversion 
with which many structuralist literary theorists have responded to character 
over the years; but he also addresses the counter-criticisms of this “anti-
humanist” stance. Woloch compares these two positions: a formalist one that 
declares character to be an ideological, illusory, or even bourgeois construct; 
and a referential one that questions the simple conflation of narrative 
constructs with social categories and argues, instead, for the validity of 
implied persons in literature. He finds them equally convincing, but also too 
co-dependent, each vehemently opposing a caricaturized version of the other. 
This critical impasse arises because these two positions, together, represent 
the dialectical tension between formalism and referentiality that characterizes 
the literary process itself. Thus, Woloch’s groundbreaking study The One vs. 
The Many: Minor Characters and the Space of the Protagonist in the Novel 
aims to recast this theoretical impasse as a literary process (2003, p. 17). 
According to his view, minor characters, as implied persons who are given 
very little share of narrative attention, bring into focus the inherent tensions 
between the demands of (implied) personhood and the uneven attentions 
administered by narrative space. Characters must compete for space within 
narratives; they are subject to a “flux of attention and neglect” (p. 2). Given 
that narratives are full of uneven matches and inequalities – the narrative form 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Another writer who has studied the importance of objects in literature is Bill Brown, who has 
been widely read for his work in “thing theory”. His book A Sense of Things: the Object Matter 
of American Literature (2004), examines the ways in which turn-of-the-century American 
writers questioned the roles that things played in shaping national culture, and organizing 
their users’ anxieties and affections.  
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amplifies the proportions of analogous real-life disparities (p. 8) – Woloch 
claims that “minor characters are the proletariat of the novel” (p. 27). The 
realist novel, so intensely class-conscious, explores class disparities through 
the narrative tensions between minor and major characters. To develop an 
analytical method that accounts for the competition of major and minor 
characters – and the tensions between implied personhood and textual space 
– Woloch analyzes nineteenth-century novels in relation to character-space 
(“the intersection of an implied human personality… with the definitively 
circumscribed form of a narrative”) (p. 13) and character-systems (“the 
arrangement of multiple and differentiate character-spaces… into a unified 
narrative structure”) (p. 14). He examines the “distributional pressures” (p. 13) 
that inform various scene, and identifies two kinds of minorness in the novel 
(p. 25): that of the worker (who is reduced to a functional use within the 
narrative), and that of the eccentric (who is reduced to a fragmentary, 
oppositional role). In the realist novel, whose achievements include both 
depth psychology and social expansiveness (p. 19), a study of the interplay 
and overlap of character-spaces can powerfully lend voice to the tensions 
between the achievement of individual depth (an ideal of humanism) and its 
uneven distribution in both social space and narrative space (viewed as a 
character-system). These uneven distributions lend voice to the irony that any 
humanist subject “could” be fully rendered – could become the main character 
– but few, in fact, are. Woloch, arguably, focuses too exclusively on human 
characters in his study, rather than allowing a wider range of actors, including 
objects, to come into his analysis.22 Nonetheless, could his methods be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Woloch’s extreme focalization on human characters becomes particularly clear in his 
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extended to include the distribution of various descriptions of objects 
throughout a novel’s narrative, or even the character-spaces of data analytic 
surveillance apparatuses? In future chapters, I attempt to account for images 
of the economy in art and literature, as well as conceptions of 
“creditworthiness” in the surveillant scenarios of contemporary finance, along 
just these lines, pointing to the uneven distributions of attribution in 
contemporary characterization spaces.  
While the term “character” has played its most prominent (though often 
contested) roles in literary theory, the term comes into play in several other 
contemporary discourses, many of which are quite helpful in conceptualizing 
the relationship between character and object-ness. Although my summation 
of these will necessarily be quite incomplete, a brief look at recent scholarship 
in Actor-Network Theory, Speculative Realism, and animism will demonstrate 
the significance of “character” in conceptualizing recent theoretical, 
philosophical, political approaches to objects.  
Actor-Network Theory and Speculative Realism 
In some senses, the term “actor”, as Bruno Latour’s Actor-Network 
Theory (ANT) uses it, functions similarly to the ways in which I use the term 
“character”. By actor, Latour means both human and non-human actants 
(technologies, animals, countries, trousers, etc.) that, together, form a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
reading of Roland Barthes’ “Reality Effect” (1986). Barthes argues that it is impossible to 
know when to curtail particularity in a text – whether to stop describing a scene “here” or 
“there”, since every scene is inexhaustible to discourse. Woloch reinterprets this point, 
arguing that “the realist novel is structurally destabilized not by too many details or colours or 
corners, but by too many people” (2003, p. 19). By writing colours and corners “out of the 
scene” of his character-spaces, Woloch misses opportunities to examine the material world 
depicted in novels. He does this for a number of reasons: to close the parameters of his study 
around accepted boundaries, to focus on class, and because of an investment his study 
maintains in the tensions between an abstracted notion of human right and particular social 
disparities. 
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relational network, according to which they take their shape. In Reassembling 
the Social (2005), Latour lays out the fundamental principles of ANT – a mode 
of sociological thought that seeks to undo many of the fundamental 
assumptions of what he describes as the “sociology of the social.” The latter is 
a “mainstream” sociology – epitomized by the work of Emile Durkheim – that 
propagates the assumption that “the social” is a sort of “substance” that binds 
people together, that “social ties” are somehow different in kind from the 
myriad relations between actors, that “social factors” operate “behind” the 
facades of everyday interactions, that said social factors “cause” phenomena 
such as the domination of one group of people over another, and that “social” 
life is comprised of human-to-human relations and does not need to take 
objects or technologies into account. He argues for a more arduous route that 
meticulously follows the networks through which the actors themselves (both 
human and non-human) produce associations.23 Latour argues that both large 
and small “agents” require figuration – so that the depiction of a specific 
individual and that of a country both are abstract renderings of a sort. (In the 
next chapter, we will explore the complexities of figuration in more detail.) 
If individual agents of all kinds are abstractions, then it is no great 
stretch to use fiction as a tool for understanding how such abstractions are 
deployed. Latour does just that in his partially fictionalized account of the 
development of an alternative form of public transportation in Aramis, or the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Such a sociology (or associology as Latour quips he would have liked to call it) (2005, p. 9) 
involves increasing the relative share of mediators (which “transform, translate, distort, and 
modify the meaning of the elements they are supposed to carry”) (p. 39) over intermediaries 
(which simply transport meaning or force without changing it); taking into account the fact that 
action is overtaken – or “other-taken” – shared between a node of actors – without jumping to 
the conclusion that such “other-taken-ness” can be construed as a generalized social force (p. 
45); and dealing with the complexities through which agency comes to be figuratively 
rendered. 
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Love of Technology (1996). This book presents an exhaustively detailed 
account of the conception, research, development, and eventual demise of 
the Aramis train system, which was intended to provide passengers with 
point-to-point transportation in Paris with no stops in between. The system 
would have used small vehicles that were programmed by a central control 
system and grouped together with immaterial couplings programmed by the 
control system. Through conversations between fictitious characters 
(Professor Norbert H. and his intern, a young engineering student who 
narrates the story), interview excerpts with various people involved in Aramis’ 
research and development, short theoretical and philosophical interludes, 
official documents, prosopopoeial passages, and quotations from Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein, Latour painstakingly maps the tenuous relations 
between actors that create the shared, speculative, as-yet unrealized 
technological object.24 Aramis aims to restore the subject of technology to 
fiction; it also comments on the necessity of developing forms of thought 
supported by fiction, and even of thinking of technological innovation as 
fiction. “By definition,” he writes, “a technological project is a fiction, since at 
the outset it does not exist, and there is no way it can exist yet because it is in 
the project phase. This tautology frees the analysis of technologies from the 
burden that weighs on analysis of the sciences” (1996, p. 23). Following 
Latour, it will be useful to consider character as a tenuously shared fiction, 
while also, unlike Latour, drawing attention to some of the ways in which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 When it comes to producing a new technology, such shared fictions, Latour notes, are 
highly tenuous. If the actors agree on how Aramis performs, he notes, the project lives; if they 
disagree, it dies; and if they agree on a misunderstanding (as is often the case with Aramis), 
then the situation is very complex indeed. Eventually, the sociologist and his intern conclude 
that the project died because it wasn’t loved enough; in other words, no one was willing to 
make the changes necessary for the project to become viable. 
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character does not act, retaining some separateness from its narrative milieu, 
from its circulations.  
This emphasis on a state of non-interaction between objects brings my 
study somewhat closer to the Object-Oriented Ontology of Graham Harman. 
Harman, who was highly influenced by Latour, nonetheless criticizes the latter 
for tending to reduce objects to their relations, privileging their interactions 
with other actors over their being, which exceeds any interaction. (This is a 
tendency that Latour inherits largely from Nietzsche.) An object, for Harman, 
cannot be described merely in terms of its relations; in fact, the object 
withdraws from all relation, exceeds relation.25 Robin MacKay (2012) and 
Reza Negarestani (2011) (thinkers who have been loosely associated with the 
speculative realist movement, though they would not describe themselves as 
speculative realists) offer yet another way to think of character as a profoundly 
non-human phenomenon (though they do not use the term “character” as 
such). Perhaps one of the most ostensibly “human” mechanisms through 
which the formation of “character” has come to be conceptualized – trauma – 
could be seen, in their terms, as mere instances of a broader phenomenon: 
the origin of any object in its having been cut off from another body of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 As a movement, Speculative Realism is particularly concerned with asserting the 
independence of objects from any human perception of them. This concern largely takes the 
form of a critique of correlationism: Quentin Meillassoux’s term for the belief that philosophy 
can only address that which falls within the correlation between objects and (human) 
perceptions of them. Meillassoux’s account of correlationism explicitly critiques many of the 
tendencies of poststructuralist thought, which, broadly speaking, tends to overlook that which 
exists beyond human perception (2007). Although making ontological claims is beyond both 
the scope and the interest of my study, it is nonetheless interesting to note that the distinction 
between an object “in itself” and its correlation with (human) perception closely matches the 
twofold sense of character I emphasize – as a speculative, shared interiority, but one 
perceived from an outside. It is thus no surprise that Harman uses character to illustrate some 
of his arguments. (As I mentioned earlier in the chapter, in Guerilla Metaphysics, Graham 
Harman discusses humour in terms of character.) He has also used literary character to 
analogically describe his philosophy of objects, remarking that just as a good literary 
character seems to exceed any actions it carries out in a given plot, so an object exceeds any 
given use to which it is put (Harman and Geoghegan, 2012). 
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material. According to this way of thinking, the earth itself – whose molten 
core holds record of its burning immanence with the sun – is a traumatic 
structure, in which the evidence of its having been cut from the sun burrows 
deep into its interior, rising to the surface only occasionally in the form of 
volcanic eruption. From the perspective of geotrauma, such an eruption is no 
different in kind from a momentary breakdown in a person who has 
experienced a traumatic event. There are several potential problems with 
such an account;26 nonetheless, it provides a compelling depiction of 
“character structure” as a property of many objects, including humans.27  
It has often been observed that speculative realism proper, thus far, 
lacks an adequate account of subjectivity (Bryant, Srnicek and Harman, 
2011).28 However, in the work of Harman at least (in part due to Latour’s 
influence), it does not lack a concept of character; character, perhaps, is more 
useful to speculative realism in articulating a meeting point of sorts between 
subjectivity and objects. Yet both Harman and Latour seem to have a rather 
ahistorical, “common-sense” conception of literary character, rather than a 
historically grounded one. (This is not at all surprising, since neither are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Elsewhere, I argue that speculative realist geophilosophy is subject to a Rancièrean 
critique, because one of the unintended effects of its description of the earth as a traumatic 
structure is to retroactively construct “the human” as a stable, all-inclusive category to which 
the earth is opposed. As Rancière’s work shows, it is impossible to evoke such a broad 
category – such a widely applicable “we” – without glossing over several exclusions, since 
politics must always deal with the fact that not everyone has equal access to the powers of 
speech within any given “we.” Ironically, then, it is possible for geophilosophy to reinforce, 
rather than counteract, certain humanist assumptions (of equality, equal agency, etc.) rather 
than disrupting them.   
27 MacKay and Negarestani’s account is based on a conception of a universal continuum of 
matter – one that Harman does not share. 
28 In their summary of unresolved issues for speculative realist thought, Bryant, Srnicek and 
Harman (2011, p. 17) ask: “What ontological status should be granted to our everyday 
experience? Is there such a thing as a ‘subject’ to whom phenomena appear? Do the objects 
that populate phenomenal experience have an ontological role or are they merely 
epiphenomenal products of our particular neural circuitry?”  
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literary scholars, and since character, in itself, is not an object of their 
studies). One can learn from these thinkers’ use of the term character (and 
related concepts, such as actor and geotrauma) to discus objects as 
mediators between a withdrawal from all relation and correlative overlapping 
of perceptions and “essences” – while at the same time placing their insights 
within the more sharply focused historical contexts that literary studies can 
provide.  
Animisms 
In his study of American literature, Alan Bourassa (2009) describes a 
(modern) literary character’s interiority as a delay of sorts between stimulus 
and response, a means through which authors introduce an aperture of 
unpredictability in their works in the spaces between action and reaction. 
Whereas a rock will react predictably when kicked, a person might react in 
any number of ways, according to a far broader spectrum of potential 
responses (2009, p. 6-7). Yet, while human literary characters indeed bring a 
measure of indeterminacy to texts, a rock, too, could be a “character,” given a 
discursive economy in which its actions and “motivations” were rendered with 
a degree of indeterminacy. Jimmie Durham’s work for the Sydney Biennale, 
Still Life with Stone and Car (2004, Figure 10), provides a rock with just such 
a discursive economy. In this piece, a boulder with a pleasant, docile face 
childishly painted on its side happily crushes a red convertible. As it does so, 
it assumes some of the implied complexities of character as an animistic 
relationship with objects, navigating the distances between the dead weight of 
objects and the agency ascribed to them, between physical action and 
perceived motivation, between interiority and attribution.  
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The term animism captures something of the perceived complexities 
that unite object-ness and agency, dead matter and its seeming aliveness in 
circulation. As Nurit Bird-David has argued, the very concept of animism, as it 
was elaborated by E. B. Tylor in 1871, is deeply problematic, as it was 
“developed… within a positivistic, spiritual/materialist dichotomy of 19th-
century design in direct opposition to materialist science, in the belief (and as 
part of an effort to prove this belief) that only science yielded ‘true’ knowledge 
of the world” (1999, p. S68). Nonetheless, in her view, animisms should be re-
conceptualized as relational, and not failed, epistemologies – as authoritative 
epistemologies (not somehow “lesser” to Western scientific belief) meant to 
attune the attention to “relatedness, from a related point of view, within the 
shifting horizons of the related viewer” (1999, p. S69).29 Revising the Tylorian 
concept of animism, for Bird-David, involves expanding notions of 
personhood. In this vein, she draws on the work of Irving Hallowell, who notes 
that in Ojibwa ontology, personhood is not seen as a subcategory of the 
human. Rather, personhood is the overarching concept, and it includes 
“human person”, “animal person”, “wind person” and “stone person” amongst 
its subcategories (Bird-David, 1999, p. S71; Hallowell, 1960).30 The Indian 
Nayaka tribe’s devaru (or spirits attached to certain things or places – for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  As Bird-David (1999, p. S67) quips, it is rather remarkable how consistently recognized and 
broadly accepted the term “animism” has been across the disciplines of anthropology, 
ethnology, religious studies and developmental psychology, in much the same form as it 
assumed in E.B. Tylor’s initial development of the concept in 1871. This persistence is 
especially puzzling given how problematic many of Tylor’s assumptions were. He relied on 
second-hand accounts of so-called “primitive” peoples, which he characterized, quite 
problematically, as childish. He relied on modern, positivistic conceptions of “nature,” “life,” 
and “personhood”, which caused him to “prejudge the attribution of ‘personhood’ to natural 
objects as empirically unfounded” (1999, p. S68). Bird-David posits that the term animism 
should indeed be revisited and updated, in order to avoid a problem in which, as various 
discourses leave the term in more or less its original form, they collectively reaffirm Tylor’s 
assumptions as “real”, thus perpetuating a derogatory gloss on supposedly “primitive” beliefs.	  
30 Bird-David builds on Hallowell’s observation, arguing that “the idea of ‘person’ as a ‘mental 
representation’ applied to the world in pursuit of knowledge is modernist” (1999, p. S73). 
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instance, a hill devaru), are not individual persons (in the Western, modernist 
sense) but dividual persons, persons “constitutive of relationships” (1999, p. 
S72); they objectify the Nayaka relationship with a given hill or stone.31 My 
use of the term character is closely related to Bird-David’s view of dividual 
personhood, in that it is attributed to things and people alike, and distributes 
relational properties across persons.32 Character is a perceptual technology 
for attributing “personhood” (in Hallowell and Bird-David’s expanded sense) to 
familiar things and people. As such, it cannot be merely a medium for the 
conservative, and even coercive experiences of attribution to which Sara 
Ahmed refers – even though, in the age of big data, such coercive attributions 
of personhood often come to the fore. Yet taken more broadly, the ability to 
attribute character to people and things might, in certain circumstances, 
enable a collective representation of relatedness and continually re-composed 
assemblages of agency binding subjects and objects, people and things.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Bird-David’s observations and theorizations of dividual personhood are, of course, rendered 
such that they are specific to the Nayaka tribe that she studies. That said, they are not entirely 
dissimilar to certain minor conceptions of selfhood in modern thought (for instance, William 
James’ radical empiricist view of the Me, in which possessions literally constitute part of the 
self). James (2001, p. 44) writes, “In its widest possible sense... a man’s Me is the sum total 
of all that he can call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his 
house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands 
and horses, and yacht and bank account.” James’ radical empiricism seems to bear some 
resemblance to Bird-David’s account of the Nayaka’s relational epistemology. That said, what 
obviously differs in these two accounts is that the devaru are of the objects/people to which 
the Nayaka relate; James’ objects, on the other hand, are incorporated into the Me. 
32 Relational epistemology has, arguably, become increasingly urgently needed in the so-
called “West” of late. Bruno Latour (2010) embarks on a similar defense of animism but 
expands Bird-David’s claim, arguing for the urgent importance of “animistic” thinking for 
contemporary scientific and political debates – and particularly environmentalist ones. While 
many environmentalists have been crippled by accusations of anthropomorphism if they 
attribute any form of agency to plants, animals, carbon dioxide, the ecosystem or (worst of all) 
Gaia (as in James Lovelock’s oft-ridiculed Gaia hypothesis), what should seem far more 
striking, for Latour, is the invention of an inanimate materialism. Inanimism – the belief that 
somehow material actors can possess no agency of their own, can merely take an initial 
cause one step further – is the strange invention. Although it has been the more “animistic” 
thinkers (such as Lovelock) who have been accused of anthropocentrism, inanimism is in fact 
the most anthropocentric world view of all: for it imagines a world in which human agency 
goes unchecked by the agency of other materials and things (Latour, 2010, p. 481-483). 
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How can one reconsider the histories of attributing consciousness to 
objects in art and modern society, without merely replicating the ethnocentric 
biases of previous generations of anthropologists? Isabelle Stengers’ essay 
for e-flux (2012) powerfully articulates this problem as a potential: animism’s 
potential to profoundly question how one positions oneself (as an academic, 
artist, or scientist) in relation to the knowledge and beliefs one conveys. How, 
she asks, can we speak of animism without either reducing it to another 
academic field over which we can claim a transcendent authority, or simply 
upholding it as a more “correct” or “interesting” belief, thereby reinforcing the 
dichotomy between rationality and irrationality but merely valuing the latter 
over the former? 
To tackle these questions, Stengers invokes the Deleuzian call to “think 
by the milieu” – to refuse to consider a phenomenon apart from its milieu. 
(According to this call, for instance, one would not analyze the Virgin Mary 
according to scientific criteria, since the figure of the Virgin Mary works for 
worshippers according to a very different milieu from those which propagate 
scientific thought.) However, even this move is not enough – for to 
acknowledge the situated-ness of, say, the Virgin Mary within a specific milieu 
is still to leave dichotomies between, say, nature and the supernatural 
completely intact.33 In order to address this problem, Stengers proposes 
viewing writing – and other forms of agency – as animistic, in that writing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Stengers remarks that even André Breton’s attempt to take magnetism out of the hands of 
scientists and physicians, proposing that it should be understood according to automatistic 
trances in the milieu of art, was more an appropriative gesture than a transformative one, as 
he simply proposed that art, rather than science, was supreme. 
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transforms the writer.34 However, even this move could reassure us too 
readily – for it is easy enough to cite a philosopher’s concept, to view the 
assemblage as simply an idea among others – one that does not profoundly 
question the position from which one speaks. Stengers suggests reclaiming 
animism as a specific, heterogeneous practice rather than a general one – a 
word that helps us to become situated within specific assemblages.35  
Indeed, there is an “animistic” sensibility seeping into various art 
historical discourses; for instance, W.J.T. Mitchell’s book What do Pictures 
Want? The Lives and Loves of Images (2005) freely attributes desire to 
pictures, images and sculptures. He refers to images as surplus value, but 
also as species, with pictures as their organisms. He argues that, although art 
history has long since been uncomfortable with such attributions of agency to 
images (since they vastly diminish the scope of the artist’s agency, making 
the latter merely a host), it is common sense to attribute agency, vitality and 
even fertility to images. Even a phrase often used in the advertising industry – 
“does it have legs?” – intimates that the images produced, if they are good 
enough, will have a life of their own. Mitchell’s writing, along with Stengers’, 
expresses a pressing need to re-examine the means through which objects’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  This, again, follows the Deleuze-Guattarian idea of the assemblage, positing that agency is 
not an attribute of a subject, but rather of an assembly of heterogeneous elements, which 
transform and animate the subject.	  
35 Elsewhere, Anselm Franke (2009) makes a similar argument to Stengers, noting the 
conceptual difficulties that the traversal of territorial, epistemological and conceptual borders 
(a precondition for any discussion of animism) poses for thought. In particular, he notes, such 
traversals are often framed through dialectic thinking, through which exceptions tend to 
reinforce the very logic to which they appear to be opposed. Further the “‘modulated’ 
boundaries of a ‘society of control’” (p. 3) incorporate plurality and transgression quite 
effectively. How, then, is it possible to think counter to modern “rational” thought, without 
nonetheless strengthening the “rationalist veil,” the sleight of hand which invokes a reader’s 
complicity in reinforcing the assumptions of the rationalist/anti-rationalist split in the first 
place? Unlike Stengers, Franke does not call for a recourse to magic or a Deleuzian 
assemblage; he advocates for close attention to the “economies of projection” operant in 
zones of colonial contact (p. 8), and invokes Michael Taussig’s demand that we think-through-
terror, from the assumption that the world is already upside-down (p. 9).  
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agency can be understood. If characters, in the age of big data, are pervasive 
image-objects – speculative, shared, represented interiors, circulated on 
platforms and plinths – then surely these image-objects also have lives of 
their own, punctuating data flows and organizing the potentials available to 
their subjects. 
Toward an Art-Historical Discourse on Narrative and Character 
  
“In sculpture it’s almost as if one can never actually make an object at all, only 
the fiction that surrounds it.”  -­‐ Katrina Palmer (2010, p. 108) 
 
While the term “character” is not widely used in art history thus far, it 
will become, I think, increasingly relevant as a discursive frame, both for 
works that literally depict or construct fictitious characters and, more broadly, 
for works that have hybrid sculptural and narrative sensibilities. Indeed, for 
some contemporary artists it seems that these modes of thought are 
inextricably linked. To get a sense of why this might be the case, we can 
begin with two discourses quite central to twentieth century developments in 
art history: those around authorship and presence. As is well known, in the 
late 1960s poststructuralist thinkers (notably Foucault and Barthes) sought to 
divest artwork and texts of the “author function” by making clear the latter’s 
role as a limitation on the potential meanings of a work. Since then, 
“expressionistic” works such as Jackson Pollock’s have often been thought to 
uphold the myth of the author (in this case, a tragic/alcoholic, Byronic genius-
hero) as organizer of the meaning of the work, whereas “cooler” pieces such 
as the conceptual works of Michael Asher or Sol LeWitt have aimed to 
transcend the rhetorical role of the author as the origin and source of an 
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artwork. I suggest that in our contemporary moment, this dichotomy is 
complicated by the fact that the “author function” has been greatly 
complexified. Indeed, I argue that it has been largely superseded by a broader 
phenomenon that I call “character function” – an artwork’s evoked fictitious 
persona, personality, attitude and/or presence, which complicates the 
relationship between artwork and author. In a sense, character-function in 
contemporary art erodes the artist-artwork dichotomy. In many modern and 
postmodern artworks, the artist and the artwork were extremely rhetorically 
separable from each other. The most extreme case of this kind of rhetorical 
separation is to be found in the readymade. As is widely known, many of 
Marcel Duchamp’s works consisted of the combination of a readymade object 
and a fictitious artist who “created” the work (for instance, R. Mutt – the “artist” 
behind Fountain, 191736, and Rrose Sélavy, who “authored” Anemic Cinema, 
1926 and Fresh Widow, 1920). Often, these works have been thought to 
enact a purely democratizing gesture, as if they simply declare that anything 
can be art. However, as more nuanced readings of Duchamp (DeDuve, 2001, 
Jones, 1995) have shown, the situation is not so simple. In another sense, the 
readymades’ very medium could be considered to be authorship itself. Thierry 
DeDuve has argued that, contrary to appearances, the Duchampian 
readymade was a thoroughly aristocratic gesture, a vaccine strategy against 
the democratization of art (2001, p. 27). The simple conjunction of object, 
fictitious author and institutional context can produce two diametrically 
opposed readings (as democratic or aristocratic gesture) based on whether 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 While Fountain is most often attributed to Duchamp, it is important to note that several 
historians have credibly argued that the piece could have been produced by the Baroness 
Elsa von Freytag-Loringhoven, and not Duchamp. (The latter only claimed the piece as part of 
his oeuvre much later.) See, for instance, Jones (2004) and Gammel (2002).  
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one interprets the work from the perspective of the commonplace object 
“winning” a place in the gallery on behalf of all objects, or from the perspective 
of authorship increasing the scope of its dominion.  
I would argue that, while this extremely dichotomous conjunction of 
object and authorship might still be with us today in an eroded (or perhaps 
vestigial) form, it can no longer function as it did for Duchamp or his early 
admirers in the nineteen-forties and ’fifties (in part because the readymade 
has become a cliché). Instead, what has emerged is a character-function that 
is, in some sense, independent of the artist and, to an extent, even 
independent of the artwork/object itself. There have been a great many 
fictitious artist-personas in artworks over the last four decades or so (Lynn 
Hershman-Leeson performance as Roberta Breitmore from 1974-1978; 
Eleanor Antin’s fictitious author-identities such as Recollections of My Life 
with Diaghilev, 1919–1929 by Eleanora Antinova (1981), Matthew Barney’s 
Cremaster cycle (1994-2002), Mark Manders’ Self-Portrait as a Building 
(1988-), Patrick Keiller’s fictitious autodidact named Robinson, Olivier 
Castell’s imaginary lives of artists. Yet some of these later projects do not 
begin from a rigid distinction between the rhetorical roles of authorship and 
object. They begin, I think, from an understanding of expression not as self-
expression, but as a rhetorical category all its own, a phenomenon of 
circulation which might provisionally create its own points of “origin” or even 
merely “touch down” occasionally as authorship, origin and ownership.  
 Characterization also arises from dialogues surrounding presence in 
sculptural work. The American critic Michael Fried (1967) famously 
condemned minimalist art for evoking a subtle, vaguely anthropomorphic 
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presence, which he deemed to be theatrical.37 Since then, many artists (who 
did not share in Fried’s derisory attitude towards these phenomena) have 
explored the conditions through which such theatrical presence can function 
(especially in sculpture, performance, and video). It is possible to see 
characterization in recent sculpture as a direct development from Fried’s 
articulation of the anthropomorphic presence of sculptural works; but whereas 
he described only an indistinct anthropomorphism, artists such as Rachel 
Harrison (who, for instance, sculpted a large, multicoloured, blobby cement 
shape with a thermostat on the front and named it Al Gore, 2007) develop 
further distinctions by invoking a broad range of different kinds of presences 
(attitudes, “personalities,” etc.) – indeed, we might simply call these 
“characters.” Seen in this way, characterization could be considered to be a 
central development of sculptural effects since minimalism.  
Of course, though sculptures – or any objects – can exude a sense of 
being character-like by virtue of an anthropomorphic presence extended in 
time, this is only one of the ways in which they can do so. Indeed, since Fried, 
many artists have explored a broad range of relationships between such 
(potentially anthropomorphic) presence and narrative; we could even speak of 
a “narrative turn” in contemporary art. Perhaps one of the most striking and 
original accounts of this turn comes from Boris Groys. In his essay “Art in the 
Age of Biopolitics” from Art Power (2008) Groys argues that in recent years, 
there has been a widespread turn away from presenting artwork, and toward 
presenting art documentation in galleries and other sites of artistic display. Of 
course, this can be explained in terms of a generic shift; as performance, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Fried may have been wrong to think that all such “presence” was necessarily 
anthropomorphic.  
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intervention, site-specific work, earth works, experiments in everyday living, 
and political actions arise as artistic “media,” there corresponds an increase in 
situations in which an “original” art event or context cannot be directly 
presented in, say, a gallery exhibition; it can only be referred to indirectly (and 
by no means transparently or unproblematically) through a document. 
However, overarching this media shift, for Groys, is a more general cultural 
shift away from an interest in artworks (which are, after all, end products of life 
which, in being produced, discard the category of life itself as a “mere” 
process) and toward the idea of life itself – “pure duration” - as an art.38 As 
part of this shift, “Art becomes a life form, whereas the artwork becomes non-
art, a mere documentation of this life form” (2008, p. 53). This reflects a shift 
into an age of biopolitics, in which the lifespan itself becomes manipulable (via 
medicine, cloning, etc.), and thus political. With the widespread acceptance of 
the fact that life spans are artificially fashioned comes an increasing difficulty 
in differentiating “natural” from “artificial” life; for where is the line between, 
say, a life artificially begun and “naturally” continued, or the between the 
biological and the mechanical (as these poles of identity become increasingly 
intertwined in, for instance, the figure of the cyborg)? Given the widespread 
erosion of such distinctions, the difference between the living and the artificial, 
according to Groys, becomes “exclusively a narrative difference” (2008, p. 
56). Whereas it cannot be observed, it can be told, as the narrative form 
“evokes the unrepeatability of living time” (p. 56). Thus “The artificial can... be 
made living, made natural, by means of art documentation, by narrating the 
history of its origin, its 'making.' Art documentation is thus the art of making 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 We can hear in this section a strong accord with Giorgio Agamben's call for a politics of 
means in “Means Without Ends” (2000).  
	   97	  
living things out of artificial ones, a living activity out of technical practice” (p. 
56).  
 To describe in more detail how the document can be shown in a space 
(say, a gallery) without perverting its nature as a document (as opposed to 
art), Groys turns to Walter Benjamin's account of the aura in his 1936 essay 
“The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” (1969). Groys points 
out that the aura – which is precisely that which distinguishes between the 
“living” artwork and its technical substitute, the context-less copy – is not 
simply “lost” in modernity (as a cursory reading of Benjamin might suggest). 
The aura – the subtle, imperceptible sense of a work's relationship with the 
site in which it is found – comes to be an aura only because the possibility of 
perfect technical reproduction renders moot any direct sensory evidence of 
the link between a work and its origin (Groys, 2008, p. 61). Technical 
reproduction, ironically, produces the aura in the very act of its 
disappearance. A careful reading of Benjamin reveals that originality is not 
lost in modernity; it merely becomes variable. Originals may be 
deterritorialized as copies, which in turn might be reterritorialized as originals. 
We can see this latter motion – the profane illumination, in which the copy's 
“loss of aura” is reversed – enacted in the figure of the flâneur, that modern 
figure-in-motion who comes to the copy, sites the copy. The installation, for 
Groys, turns the viewer into a flâneur – into one who goes to the (reproduced) 
object, inscribing it within a living space. Groys concludes: “To be an original 
and possess an aura means the same thing as to be alive. But life is not 
something that the living being has ‘in itself.’ Rather, it is the inscription of a 
certain being into a life context – into a lifespan and into a living space” (2008, 
	   98	  
p. 63). This point, Groys believes, links the artistic and biopolitical realms; for 
in an era where there is increasing concern about the emergence of a 
siteless, artificially reproduced life (exemplified by cloning), documentation 
and installation-based practices develop strategies for resisting sitelessness, 
for making the artificial living and the repetitive unique.   
 Groys' essay is remarkable, though by no means airtight; he would do 
well to distinguish more clearly between biological and narrative definitions of 
life (he only discusses the latter, and thus seems to conflate the distinction 
between life and death with the distinction between “natural” and “artificial” 
life). As part and parcel of this problem, he also seems to conflate the 
narrated “liveliness” of auratic art objects and of living entities themselves. 
(That said, it is precisely this conflation that, for W.J.T. Mitchell, is 
fundamental for sculptural practice.)  
 Groys’ account helps me to articulate the range of contemporary 
artwork that I will examine. While I was tempted to use the term 
“contemporary sculpture” to define the parameters of my study when I began 
it (and this term still fits much of the work I discuss), I quickly diverged to 
include videos, performances, performance-installations and textual practices 
under the broader term “object-based art”. Indeed, in a historical moment 
often described as “post-medium” (Krauss, 1999; Manovich, 2001), a term 
such as sculpture might be too simple – or at least require clarification. To a 
certain extent, Joanna Burton’s work on the “collapsed field” of contemporary 
sculpture is helpful here (2006, p. 10-16). Burton argues that, whereas 
Rosalind Krauss described an expanded field of sculpture in her famous 
essay “Sculpture in the Expanded Field” (1979), over the last few decades 
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this expanded field has “collapsed.” This is not because of any reduction of 
sculptural possibilities; much to the contrary, in recent decades just about 
anything can be counted as part of the category of sculpture. It is, rather, 
because the negations around which Krauss’ argument was based (for 
instance, her definition of sculpture as “not landscape” and “not architecture”) 
no longer hold up. The double negations collapse into a state of total 
affirmation: a bland, comfortable field of “yeses” in which “anything goes,” 
usually referred to as installation. Burton’s argument is astute and complex in 
its account of the unexpected ways in which expansion can turn into collapse. 
In fact, this collapse of distinction (which might even extend to encompass the 
distinction between object and artist) is an important precondition for 
characterization. Characters accrue all kinds of inconsistent marks, house all 
manner of contradictory beliefs and values. The perception of character 
requires that one be well attuned to contradiction, complexity and collapse. 
(We could even say that character trains recognition toward contradiction and 
complexity.) Burton’s argument starts and ends with the attempt to define 
sculpture; working as she does within these rather formalistic limits, she 
appears to view installation as a rather conservative “jumble” of tendencies, in 
which ostensibly vast differences collapse into sameness. Groys, on the other 
hand, (whose argument is more ambitious but less precise than Burton’s) 
views installation as a strategy for re-siting the document, and thus affords 
installation direct biopolitical significance. Underlying a trans-media approach 
to object-based work (made by and/or about object-characters) is an 
understanding that an object does not simply appear in and of itself but must 
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always be presented, perceived, contextualized, and extended in time 
according to narrative milieu.  
Patrick Keiller’s London 
 Patrick Keiller’s 1994 film London (British Film Institute) navigates just 
such tensions and extensions between characters, contexts and perceptual 
purviews. Shot in 1992, the film consists of documentary footage of London – 
pubs, gate posts, crowds, parks, markets, bomb sites, financial districts, 
suburbs, the Thames – captured silently on 35mm film. These shots have 
been layered with ambient sound and an off-camera, unnamed narrator 
(voiced by Paul Scofield). The narrator, who, we are told, has just returned to 
London after working as a photographer on a cruise ship, describes his friend 
and erstwhile lover Robinson’s studies of the city. Robinson is a marginally 
employed autodidact who observes landscapes and cityscapes in order to 
uncover the molecular constitution of history, and in this way discover the 
future. Robinson has an extremely bleak view of the city (then in one of its 
bleakest times) and re-imagines it as a monument to various French poets 
(for instance, Canary Wharf becomes a monument to Rimbaud). Throughout, 
the narrator most often gives voice to Robinson’s thoughts and impressions, 
and not his own; but the opening description of London is ambiguous. It floats 
between signifying Robinson’s perspective, the narrator’s perspective, an 
impersonal attitude, and a truth statement about London itself:  
Dirty old Blighty. Undereducated, economically backward, 
bizarre – a catalogue of modern miseries. With its fake traditions, 
its Irish war, its militarism and secrecy, its silly old judges, its 
hatred of intellectuals, its ill health and bad food, its sexual 
repression, its hypocrisy and racism, and its indolence. It’s so 
exotic – so… homemade. (London, 1994) 
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The film, we could say, consists of three main character-spaces: that of the 
narrator, that of Robinson, and that of London itself. Robinson’s idiosyncratic 
perceptual and conceptual purview allows the film to present a critical attitude 
toward London – and its recent politics – not as a transcendental claim but as 
a particular intersection of London’s and Robinson’s attitudes. In doing this, 
the film explores a feedback loop between the production of the city and the 
production of its subjections. It examines the lines between a critique’s doing 
something and its becoming part of a worldview, attitude, or habituated 
thought pattern. It both posits that London’s “character” is a relational 
phenomenon, and refuses to reduce London to this characterization, drawing 
attention to the way in which the filmic images of the city exceed Robinson’s 
descriptions. The footage’s hypnotic, durational gaze seems to move in and 
out of line with Robinson’s observations and depicted attitudes. As it does 
this, it asks viewers both to be seduced by the pull of Robinson’s attitudes, 
and to recognize the city itself (the city that is suggested by, but also 
supercedes, its cinematic representation) as irreducible to this 
characterization. The camera comes to represent London itself as an 
inorganic witness, which produces, absorbs, and exceeds Robinson’s attitude. 
The film explores the crippling effects of an overarchingly negative 
characterization; but it also draws reflexive attention to the political 
dimensions of the processes involved in characterizing objects, and posits 
that characters – and artworks – can “store” critiques as attitudes, which may 
allow them to have effects beyond those they may be capable of exciting in 
their current milieu. As Keiller remarks in his essay “Architectural 
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Cinematography” (2002, p. 1) (adapting an observation of Henri LeFebvre’s), 
in certain films the cinematic gaze becomes the precondition for another life.  
 For an object to act as a character, it must evoke some sense of its 
capacity to have its own interiority and outlook. Yet to be perceived as a 
character, it must also be reduced from this interior complexity, seen and 
“characterized” from the outside. Thus, character is a profoundly “objective” 
property in the original, disused sense of the term “objective:” an object’s 
properties as they appear to consciousness. It is precisely this status as an 
objective property that situates character at the crux of a number of interests 
in recent art, philosophy and theory. The interdisciplinary pre-history of 
character for the age of big data that I have sketched above lays the 
groundwork for an economic concept of character, according to which 
character economizes personhood, navigating between concepts of “essence” 
and circulation, relation and withdrawal, objecthood and agency, internal 
complexity and the reduction and attribution of characteristics. 
Character effects (such as anthropomorphism in advertising, and the 
circulation of artists’ antics and “personalities” in the press) have been 
exploited long before the age of big data, the latter of which adds yet another 
level of characterization to citizens’ everyday lives and online actions. Yet 
works by Geoffrey Farmer, Patrick Keiller and many others détourne such 
ingrained practices of recognition, drawing attention to the ways in which 
recognition must always economize, reduce, and intermingle with 
misrecognition. These artworks are a means through which contemporary 
artists question the social roles of aesthetics as perceptual training in an 
increasingly image-based economy. Through character, aesthetics questions 
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itself, finds itself poised at a precipice between a proliferation of fictions and 
deference to an inaccessible “truth” about objects. Following Isabelle 
Stengers, in subsequent chapters I seek methods for studying character, as 
an economic concept, that do not merely reinforce a preconceived line 
between fiction and truth, but experiment with ways to think at the borderlines 
of this dichotomy. Perhaps this requires that one accept the invitation – 
extended by several of the artworks I study – to think like an object – and, in 
doing so, to embody the economy.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Economic Figuration 
 
With multinational capitalism, Frederic Jameson notes, comes a 
fundamental representational problem of unprecedented magnitude: “to think 
a system so vast that it cannot be encompassed by the natural and historically 
developed categories of perception with which human beings normally orient 
themselves” (Jameson, 1995, p. 2). The inability of perception – or even most 
detailed research, for that matter – to encompass the complexities of 
globalized financial networks gives rise to an urgent problem concerning 
access to information on finance. As the Bank of England’s Director of 
Financial Stability, Andrew Haldane, quips, financial innovations such as 
structured credit (designed to diversify investment and thereby minimize risk) 
result in a situation in which end investors are “no more likely to know the 
name of the companies in their portfolios than the name of the cow or pig in 
their exotic hot dog” (Haldane, 2009, p. 16). Certain forms of structured credit, 
such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), would require over one billion 
pages of research in order for an investor to understand precisely where his 
or her money had gone (Haldane, 2009, p. 17). And Haldane, here, is 
speaking only of a necessary, even structural ignorance within the investing 
class – the death of due diligence among investors. This is to say nothing of 
the much broader lack of knowledge, and lack of access to financial network 
information, among citizens more generally. The London-based non-profit 
organization Positive Money notes that most people – even those who have 
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studied economics at the university level – do not know how money is 
currently circulated and produced. This is in part due to a lack of readily 
available teaching material for the general public, and in part due to vastly out 
of date teaching methods in university economics courses. Whereas in the 
UK, for instance, most people assume that the Bank of England creates 
money, while high street banks gather their customers’ savings in order to 
give loans, in fact the Bank of England only creates 3% of money in the UK. 
The rest is invented electronically when a high street bank approves a 
mortgage or loan; when giving a loan, the bank will simply create the money 
that they are loaning out (Positive Money). Speaking from vastly different 
positions, both Haldane and Positive Money affirm the need for a 
democratization of access to network information. For Haldane, “network 
information is a classic public good” (Haldane, 2009, p. 23), as increased 
access to such information can help to increase financial stability. Positive 
Money seeks not only to democratize network information, but to democratize 
practices of money creation themselves: to educate the public in order to 
change financial law, to take the power to create money out of the hands of 
the very financial giants who caused the 2008 financial crisis in the first place 
(Positive Money). Democratization requires the effective dissemination of 
information, which in turn depends, to some degree, on its narrativization. 
Both Haldane and activist organizations such as Positive Money and 
the New Economics Foundation (a UK-based think tank seeking economic, 
social and environmental justice), in fact, draw attention to the importance of 
narrative strategies in disseminating information on financial networks in a 
variety of ways. Haldane remarks on the immense performative power of 
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popular narratives on the financial crisis of 2008 via communications: “As woe 
became the popular narrative, depressed expectations may have become 
self-fulfilling” (Haldane, 2009, p. 23). Haldane applies various “network 
disciplines” (including ecology, epidemiology and engineering) to financial 
networks in order to explain how relatively modest triggering events (such as 
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy in 2008) can sweep through systems, causing 
fear to seize them, blocking circulation as panic narratives circulate wildly 
(Haldane, 2009, p. 3). Similarly, the New Economics Foundation’s website 
notes that part of their mission is to counter the British Coalition government’s 
powerful “austerity” narrative (which involves the dissemination of well-worn 
assertions such as “Britain is broke”, “austerity is a necessary evil”, and 
“welfare is a drug”) (New Economics Foundation, 2013). One of the problems 
that challengers to this widely-accepted economic narrative face, they argue, 
is on the level of storytelling: “none of the challengers tell good stories with 
simple ideas and powerful images, [sic] they are more likely to rely on 
academic language” (New Economics Foundation, 2013). In an era of 
academic over-specialization, scholars in various fields can lose sight of the 
general public; an increased awareness of narrative techniques for 
disseminating such specialized information becomes increasingly important.39 
As financial networks become more and more complex, narratives’ ability to 
simplify, democratize and disseminate network information takes on greater 
urgency and will merit further study. Yet often (and quite understandably), 
existing accounts of the relationships between financial networks and their 
narratives (promulgated by Haldane, Positive Money, the New Economics 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 For instance, in medicine the sub-field of narrative medicine emerged in response to the 
over-professionalization of medical practices, and the need for more detailed accounts of the 
narrative complexities of the relations between patients, doctors, colleagues and the public. 
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Foundation and others) tend to rely on rather simplistic accounts of how 
narratives affect the public’s understanding, and/or quite realist strategies for 
narrating economic information. They assert that certain hegemonic narratives 
affect the public’s perception of networked capitalism; but these assertions, 
too often, seem to rather simplistically script the narrative (and its epidemic 
spread) as the “cause” for a distortional “effect” in the public’s perception, as if 
to assume that an unmediated, unconstructed, or transparent understanding 
of networks could be possible in the first place. The impossibility of such a 
basis for a network epistemology (and perhaps, more broadly, for any 
epistemology) demands a more complex account of the relations between 
narrative, economy and representation. Similarly, activist organizations often 
use familiar realist and/or advertising-based narrative modes to re-cast 
financial networks. This may well increase the public’s receptivity to these 
new narratives; however, it might also preclude possibilities for more nuanced 
modes of understanding how narrative might perform economic 
understanding in the first place. In light of these problems, I will examine 
literary and artistic works that explore complex strategies for understanding 
the relation between economic networks and their figuration within a narrative 
and/or pictorial milieu: Thomas Bridges’ novel The Adventures of a Bank Note 
(1771), in which a bank note observes various human interactions as it is 
passed from pocket to pocket; Mark Lombardi’s drawings presenting detailed 
research on international financial scandals; and London-based painter Amir 
Chasson’s diptychs of abject, slightly disproportioned portraits of 
businessmen paired with abstract statistical diagrams (2009-10). What can be 
learned from past works that navigate such complexities? What can 
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comparisons between such instances across eras reveal about changes in 
the economy, and the changing economy’s relation to representation? 
In order to explore these questions, it is first necessary to expand the 
list of modalities through which economic complexities meet with narrative 
and/or pictorial disseminating mechanisms – means through which they might 
become, in something like the sense Jameson describes, perceptible or 
knowable. These (potentially) democratizing mechanisms are not only 
narrative, but also performative and figurative – and the relationships between 
narrative, performance and figuration that they entail are often complex. I use 
the term performative, here, in two overlapping senses. First, there is the 
sense in which representations of financial networks interpellate “the 
economy”, produce it as a real fiction, actively affect not only how it might 
perform (to which Haldane’s account of the “woe” narrative’s power attests) 
but also, in a sense, what it is.40 Secondly (and this will be developed further 
in subsequent chapters), there is the sense in which “the economy” becomes 
a real abstraction, something that individual actors (such as humans and 
commodities) perform by adopting certain attitudes, dispositions or qualities. 
(For instance, this sense of the performative would include Arlie Hochschild’s 
account of the commodification of emotion in flight attendants’ professional 
performances, which demand that they represent the “genuine” caring 
disposition of the companies they work for – that they both play to, and go 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
It is tempting to argue, here (though I have yet to encounter another author that has done so), 
that Jackson Pollock’s paintings are an important historical precedent to Lombardi’s use of 
pictorial space. As they must move from non-existence to existence through a series of 
complex technical and design procedures, they can be thought of as fictions that become 
real. In a similar move, but one with a reverse causality to Latour’s, I argue that the economy 
is a real fiction, in the sense that it is so complex that it must be abstracted, reduced by 
description in order to be brought down to the size of an actant.  
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beyond, the expectation that they act professionally, perform courteously – 
and, as such, perform something of the disposition of the service economy 
itself [2009].) By figurative, I mean that in order for “the economy” to become 
representable as an agent within a given narrative milieu, it must be 
concretized in order to take on the form of a character, a subject, a figure. 
This concretization of the economy as a figure is quite clear in some of the 
works I study, such as Bridges’ The Adventures of a Bank Note. However, in 
a broader sense, figuration is inherent to any narrative milieu in which the 
economy might appear as an agent. For instance, it is possible to read a 
sociological text such as Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello’s The New Spirit of 
Capitalism (2005) as in part a figurative exercise, in that it transforms 
“capitalism” into a recognizable agent by giving it a subject position within a 
narrative context.41 This is not to say that figures such as “capitalism” or “the 
economy” are necessarily more abstract than any other kind of actor. 
Nietzsche remarks that any linguistic agent is a fiction, an abstraction 
promulgated by language; even to say, for instance, that lightning strikes is to 
invent an imaginary subject, “lightning”, which “strikes” – when in fact there is 
nothing but the build-up and release of a relational charge. According to this 
view, agency is, properly speaking, a property of relation, and not of a subject 
(Nietzsche, 1967, p. 45; Massumi, 2002, p. xxiv).42 As Bruno Latour argues, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 This point comes to the fore in several instances in Boltanski and Chiapello’s phrasing; 
arguably, their book is, among other things, an exercise in personifying “capitalism,” 
transforming it into a narrative agent. To cite just one example, a sentence such as “In the 
postwar years, capitalism was compelled to transform itself to respond to the anxiety and 
insistent demands of generations of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, whose 
expectations of upward social mobility… or of preserving the advantages they had acquired, 
had been disappointed” (2005, p. xliii) is typical of what I would call a “personifying spirit” at 
the heart of Boltanski and Chiapello’s conceptual procedures. What sort of agent is 
“capitalism,” exactly, which could be “compelled” to reinvent itself as the authors describe? 
42 Of course, this view is not without its criticisms. Graham Harman accuses Nietzsche, 
Deleuze, and Latour of “overmining” the object – in other words, of reducing objects too much 
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disciplines such as sociology require a much broader and more rigorous 
account of figuration; for figuration is required to render any agent, give it 
features, no matter how “concrete” or “abstract” that agent might seem:  
Individual agencies, too, need abstract figurations… no one knows how 
many people are simultaneously at work in any given individual; 
conversely, no one knows how much individuality there can be in a 
cloud of statistical data points. Figuration endows them with a shape 
but not necessarily in the manner of a smooth portrait by a figurative 
painter. To do their job, sociologists need as much variety in ‘drawing’ 
actors as there are debates about figuration in modern and 
contemporary art (2005, p. 54).  
In Latour’s view, an actant such as “my neighbour Joe” is every bit as abstract 
a figure as “the economy”; the magnitude of the economy merely brings the 
necessity for abstraction in all figuration to the fore.  
Going back, then, to Jameson’s assertion that globalized market 
capitalism presents a problem of unprecedented magnitude, and infusing it 
with Latour’s insights on the problems of abstract figuration more generally, 
we can say that there are at least two (and arguably, three) dimensions to this 
problem. There is, first of all, a general epistemological problem concerning 
the need for any actor to be abstractly figured. There is, compounding this first 
problem, a problem of both the scale and accessibility of the information that 
would make it possible to render an actor so large as “the economy” in any 
significant detail. This we might describe as a problem on the level of an 
economy of attention: as Haldane and others have made clear, in many 
instances the amount of research required to understand a given financial 
milieu vastly exceeds the amount of time that a given participant would have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to relations. (Harman invents this term as an opposite to the philosophical tendency to 
undermine objects, by assuming that they can be described by reducing them to component 
parts, such as elements or atoms.) However, Harman’s own object-oriented ontology runs 
into difficulties in describing how objects change that are, in fact, avoided by relational 
ontologies such as Nietzsche’s. 
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to investigate it.43 There is a third problem, which could be called a problem of 
immersion or incorporation. According to this problem, the effects of, say, 
advanced capitalism are so omnipresent, so immersive, as to make it difficult 
to extricate signs of their workings from a general field of phenomena and 
effects. This is a problem that is inextricably intertwined with a broader 
intellectual problem in theorizing capitalism. As Stewart Martin observes 
(2012), accounts of the economy with a Hegelian, teleological bent (from Marx 
to Boltanski and Chiapello) tend to understand capitalism through tropes of 
incorporation; they imagine capitalism as an entity that will swallow everything 
up, incorporate all worldly things, all ostensible “outsides” (activism, dissent, 
artistic critique) “within” itself.  
Let us call these three problems, problems concerning the correlation 
of thought to perception. In other words, all three present planes on which it is 
necessary to grapple with the difficulty of rendering concepts perceptible – 
and comprehensible through their perceptibility – from the vantage point of an 
individual actor or observer within the field. Embedded in this assertion, that 
the dimensions of the problem I outline have to do with locating a meeting 
point between thought and perception, is another presupposition: that such 
points of contact, which determine the means through which thought about 
the economy might come into contact with perception, are sites which 
determine the politics of the economy’s representation. In other words, there 
is a presumed political agency ascribed to these sites; if, for instance (as the 
New Economics Foundation would have it), better access to more nuanced 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 For more on the attention economy more broadly, see Davenport and Beck (2001), who 
argue that “in postindustrial societies, attention has become more a valuable currency than 
the kind you store in bank accounts” (p. 3). 
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economic narratives amongst a general population might change the outcome 
of an election, then there is a democratizing, pedagogical potential in such 
figurations. Conversely, attempts to render the economy perceptible and 
understandable through simple imagery can be mobilized for conservative 
ends, as in Margaret Thatcher’s frequent characterization of her economic 
regime through tropes of “housewife economics” – since, as a woman (so the 
narrative went), she was aware of the prices in the shops and knew firsthand 
about the effects of economics on daily life. John Campbell (2013) describes 
this rhetorical strategy as “a brilliant way of making the harsh and theoretical 
doctrine of monetarism politically acceptable”. In addition to this, I would add 
that Thatcher’s housewife persona achieved this through a gendered claim to 
perception; the figure of the housewife, which Thatcher performed 
strategically and intermittently, has a privileged access to economic truths, in 
the both quotidian and archaic sense of economy as oikos (or the 
management of the household), through acts of shopping and budgeting. 
Whether deployed for hegemonic or counter-hegemonic purposes, such 
characterizations of the economy can have palpable political effects.  
How might the economy be rendered perceptible, figurative, and even 
provisionally “inhabitable” as a subject position? What I call economic 
figuration – instances in which the economy becomes represented as a 
character within a given narrative context – perform the economy, produce the 
economy, translate its machinations from imperceptible to perceptible within a 
set of narrative constraints. In doing so, they produce a particular relationship 
between economy, representation and embodied experience. Bridges’ novel 
imagines that the economy itself (characterized by the bank note) possesses 
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perception, and focalizes human interactions within the bank note’s “sensory” 
range. Lombardi’s drawings construct an aggregate, “omniscient” perspective 
on multinational capital (in Nitzan and Bichler’s sense of capital as power, 
2009). Chasson’s diptychs invite comparisons between the perceptual 
technologies of facial recognition and diagram reading; in doing so, they 
question the very sensory architecture underlying any attempt to render the 
economy perceptible. These works encompass some of the perceptual, 
performative and representational complexities pertaining to the economies of 
their respective times. Analysis of such complexities could generate criteria as 
to what might count as a “critical”, “democratizing” or “truthful” form of 
economic figuration; it could also generate new figural strategies for those 
seeking to democratize network information.  
 It might be protested that my approach ascribes too much agency to 
acts of economic figuration within literary and artistic works. As a friend 
quipped during a discussion of a draft of this chapter, wouldn’t this approach 
be like engaging in a discussion of the features of a specific dishwasher with 
respect to the meta-issues of commodity pricing? (I laughed and responded, 
“Is that filed right next to rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic?”) Though 
the theoretical approach taken by many scholars examining such issues 
would, indeed, separate the microcosmic level of a specific cultural artefact’s 
semiotic/sensory procedures from the macrocosmic level of their activities 
within broader systems of production and exchange – would even consider 
the former irrelevant with respect to the latter – my approach emphatically 
counters such a separation. I follow Latour et. al’s assertion that “the whole is 
always smaller than its parts” (2012, p. 591). Latour develops Gabriel Tarde’s 
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use of the Liebnitzian monad as a sociological trope, and posits that there is 
more complexity in the actor than in the network – for the actor is the 
“envelope” that contains the network as attributes (2012, p. 593). While it was 
quite difficult for sociology, in Tarde’s time, to grapple with such a mode of 
thinking, in the digital age, such thought has become far more intuitive; for 
instance, one searches for the CV of an academic one does not know, and 
sees in the CV a network, which is also, at the same time, that academic’s 
professional qualifications, her relevant personal attributes. The authors are 
careful to claim only that this monadological principle will obtain while 
searching through data sets, for instance, online; they refrain from making any 
claims as to how these data sets might relate to “real life” personal attributes 
more broadly. Despite this, I would claim that their argument is extensible, at 
least in theory, to perceptual data more broadly. In fact, it might be argued 
that one of the major contested frontiers in the exercise of power in our time is 
precisely at the shifting epistemological distinction between perception and 
data.44 (2012, p. 599). Within search engines, it is easy to see actors and 
networks on one level playing field; reciprocally, the actor delineates a 
network, and the network defines its actors. According to this view – if I am 
permitted to make a leap from data, in Latour et. al’s argument, to perceptual 
data, more broadly, in mine – an actor such as a dishwasher or an artwork is 
a whole larger than its entire network, in that the network (in this case, let us 
call it the economy) might be viewed through the artwork’s (or dishwasher’s) 
qualities, which, in turn, taken together with the qualities of many other objects 
rendered from some unimaginably global perspective, comprise the economy. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Current developments in facial recognition technology aim to make data sets (such as 
uploaded photographs) recognizable, identifiable without recourse to human perception. This 
will make processes such as identifying protesters in Instagram photos far more efficient.  
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Such an assertion, in this context, might sound rather like Barthes’ famous 
dictum that “a little formalism turns one away from History, but a lot brings one 
back to it” (1993, p. 96-7). But beyond this, the dishwasher or artwork, viewed 
in this Latourian way, is also a viewpoint on the network. Extrapolating slightly 
from Latour’s language, and infusing it with an even more overt animism, we 
might say that the actor (the artwork, the dishwasher, the text) perceives the 
economy, presents “the economy” (to those who view it carefully) through an 
act of its perception – perception which is, in fact, the only way that such an 
abstract figure as “the economy” could come into being in the first place. 
On Image and Economy 
Before discussing examples of economic figuration directly, it is 
necessary to further analyze the concept of the economy itself, as it relates to 
images (and hence, to perception). For the economy, in addition to being (in a 
Latourian sense) yet another abstract figurative image, also has a privileged 
relationship to figuration, through its historical link to the very concept of the 
image. Further, a neoliberal context in which political discourse is routinely 
reduced to economic terms (in which politicians are more likely to garner 
votes by appealing to a quantitative, financialized conception of the good in 
service of an image of “the economy”, rather than any qualitative conceptions 
of public good that might be proffered by various forms of public service, 
environmentalism, welfare, educational reform, cultural activities, social ties, 
etc.) increases the political urgency of understanding how “the economy” 
circulates as an image. The widespread reduction of politics to economic 
terms increases the urgency of unpacking the ways in which “the economy” 
can function in itself as an image within the discursive economies of politics, 
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when it is also a concept that speaks to, or perhaps even governs, the very 
idea of imagistic circulation in the first place. This leads to a double situation 
in which, on the one hand, various images tend to be reduced to economic 
terms and, on the other, a figurative image of the economy performs a both 
contradictory and reflexive role, as the very image of the circulation it 
describes (which might be rendered “critically”, such that, in some sense, they 
run counter to those very circulations).  
If one of art’s functions is to produce figurative images of actors (in 
Latour’s expanded sense of figuration that includes any and all renderings of 
actors, whether in idiomorphic or anthropomorphic form) – and often critical 
figurative images of such – then a good place to start our analysis is with 
contemporary art’s relationship to the economy via the image. Contemporary 
art has been conceptualized both as a site of production for (possibly critical) 
figurative images of the economy, and as the very image of neoliberal 
economy itself. How can one unpack this seemingly reciprocal 
representational relation between art and economy, via the image, wherein 
contemporary art plays the contradictory roles of producing a (critical) image 
of the economy, and of being, in itself, the very image of that economy? 
Several recent texts have presented a critical view of contemporary 
art’s relationship to financialization and neoliberal economics; such texts often 
proffer what are fundamentally figurative claims about art’s relationship to 
economy. To cite one example: Noah Horowitz claims that the art investment 
fund “is not only emblematic of the enterprising new ways in which 
contemporary art is sold and experienced…; it is modern global finance 
embodied” (Horowitz, 2011, p. 145; Malik and Phillips, 2012, p. 211). What is 
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the significance of these sorts of figurative claims in recent attempts to 
address art’s relationship to economy?  
Sotirios Bahtsetzis (2012) discusses the significance for art of the 
switch from the art market (as it was formed in the nineteenth century) to art 
business as it emerged in the 1980s. Countering the popular narrative of art’s 
relationship to money as one of heroic struggle against commodification, he 
argues (following Peter Osborne, 2006) that in a newly affirmative culture, 
art’s autonomy has been entirely functionalized. For autonomy is precisely 
that which produces an illusion (or might we call it an image?) of autonomy: 
the very sort of illusion that becomes the moral justification for post-
democratic hyper-capitalism, which autonomizes and aestheticizes “both 
commercial pragmatism and political functionality” (p. 3). Under the terms of 
the current political-economic regime, autonomy, once a cornerstone of avant-
garde modernist thought, can only function as an “alibi”; for “art does not 
expose its uselessness for its own sake, but rather reflects the uselessness of 
neoliberal administration and, by extension, of a post-capitalist market” (p. 3). 
Accordingly, art’s ostensible autonomy functions as nothing other than “the 
second fetish character of art” (p. 5). If the commodity fetish conceals 
exchange value, then art, as intensified fetish, “conceals not only the 
exchange value of the product, but, most significantly, the generic fetish 
character of commodities or capital in general” (p. 5). “Autonomous” art, as 
intensified fetish, conceals the economy’s need for an alibi in the image of 
autonomy; and a particular reading of this situation (offered by Bahtsetzis and 
others) reveals that this autonomous alibi is a very image of the neoliberal 
economy. Bahtsetzis adapts the term acheiropoieton (meaning not 
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handmade), used to account for the divine origins of icons during the 
Byzantine empire, to describe the way that, within the current economy of 
images (which does not make the divine visible, but, rather, makes the visible 
divine), art creates an illusion of autonomy, and thus “the illusion of a non-
alienated social-being, although it is in fact located at the very heart of 
neoliberal speculation” (p. 6). According to this logic, auction houses, for 
instance, actually degrade art objects, robbing them of their status as 
intensified fetishes; for the most important fetish character of art is in its 
ostensible ability to resist commodification. In spite of his rather bleak view of 
the functionalization of autonomy, Bahtsetzis is not entirely pessimistic. He 
argues for a reciprocal understanding of the relationship between art and 
markets: “Andy Warhol’s conflation of art and business attacks the culture 
industry by adopting its rules. On the other hand, this same culture industry 
attacks Warhol’s subjective literalism by adopting his artfulness” (p. 3). He 
also asserts that “art’s double nature, which intervenes both in cycles of 
financial speculation and in the actual productive economy of affective time, 
still offers options for working within structures of managerial, economic, and 
political control… the marketability of art should not be seen as its handicap, 
but as its safeguarding screen – a trompe-l’oeil until a universal economy of 
the artwork can be established” (p. 11).  
In spite of the many important insights that Bahtsetzis develops 
(particularly around the insight that autonomy has been functionalized), one 
cannot help but sense some fundamental slippages in his argument. There is 
something that remains undefined in the claim that art’s uselessness now 
reflects the uselessness of neoliberal capitalism. What, exactly, is the status 
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of that reflection? Is neoliberal capitalism “the real” that produces art’s 
reflection? Or, does the “reflection” somehow predate, or emerge 
independently alongside, that which it reflects? The problem with this 
formulation is that it seems to, in part, take on (or even smuggle in) the classic 
form of a base-superstructure argument, according to which an economic 
‘base’ determines a cultural ‘superstructure’.  Would not a flatter ontology be 
more appropriate to describe the relationship between art and economy – one 
that assumed that these were both equally abstractly rendered agents? 
Further, is it really valid to claim that ostensibly autonomous art produces an 
image of non-alienated social being? This may well have been the case in the 
1950s, but in an era of rapid over-consumption of art images via tablets and 
smartphones, it strikes me as highly unlikely that the subjective mechanisms 
involved in art reception have changed so little as to leave such a vestige of 
non-alienation intact. Doesn’t art (much like Bahtsetzis’s essay itself) also 
produce images of alienation? I say this not, of course, to return to a simplistic 
affirmation of art’s “criticality” vis à vis its ability to analyze alienation, but 
rather to say that Bahtsetzis and others like him miss an opportunity to 
explore the hinge linking contemporary art’s modes of being and representing 
the economy. Or rather, it seems that this relationship is assumed to be one 
of repression: the artwork egotistically desires to produce a critical image of 
the economy, but in fact is unconsciously complicit with its machinations. In 
seeming to disavow (though somewhat ambivalently) art’s ability to produce 
aberrant images of the economy, Bahtsetzis seems bent on ignoring the 
possibility that (albeit, a very few) artworks might imagine the economy such 
that they are (whether by accident or by design) not recuperated by neoliberal 
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capital – or, further, that their specific enunciative effects might defy the 
generic explanations that a recuperative account of artistic critique could 
proffer. In seeming to deny such possibilities, Bahtsetzis falls into the trap of 
reserving for himself (as critic) the sole position capable of revealing the 
economic truth hidden “behind” the ideological smokescreen of contemporary 
art. On a reflexive level (in addressing his own role as a producer of 
epistemology), his critique fails to address the complicity of critique within an 
information economy that can easily recuperate it. On the flipside of this, in 
art, it also fails to see any redistributive potential in the sensible beyond a 
recuperative model that presumes a rather simplistic, dialectical interaction 
between art and economy.  
In a similar vein to Bahtsetzis – but with some important theoretical 
differences – Andrea Phillips and Suhail Malik (2012) analyze the complex 
relationships between art and financialization. Expanding on Horowitz’ claim 
cited above, they argue that “art does indeed embody the truth of finance, and 
it does so precisely in its failure or limitation as a kind of free-market 
investment… it also reconfigures the significance of what is frequently 
heralded as the condition and satisfaction of its collectors: their love of art” (p. 
212). Whereas art objects have often been understood as dysfunctional with 
respect to the market, priced unreliably and subject to the unpredictable 
passions of collectors, Malik and Phillips argue that it is this ostensible 
dysfunctionality which makes art the very paradigm of financiality, or price-
setting’s autonomy from “production, use-value, consumption, or other bases 
external to finance” (p. 221). Just as Bahtsetzis argued that art’s autonomy 
has become a mere alibi for the autonomy of neoliberal capital, for Malik and 
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Phillips, the collector’s love of art (as well as that of art viewers, artists and art 
professionals) functions as an alibi for a privatized political economy in which 
care, as a concept inherent to public good, has been upbraided by love, an 
inherently privatized concept. According to the concept of sabotage, or the 
necessary unproductivity of business capital, which concentrates and 
privatizes power at the expense of industry, the art object’s ostensible 
“dysfunctionality” in the marketplace can no longer be seen as exceptional, or 
“outside” of the market. Further, any schema that presumes a separation 
between financialized capital and cultural capital (à la Bordieu), that presumes 
that cultural or social capital is of a different kind than financial capital, is no 
longer valid; for, “as art clearly instantiates, prices are correlated at once and 
necessarily with cultural or symbolic institutionalization” (p. 225). Art’s 
capitalization, qua sabotage, also no longer has much, if anything, to do with 
commodification; the question of commodification has “no traction on its 
financiality” (p. 226). Within the art qua sabotage model, “the artist acts a 
compensatory fable for the continued sabotage art’s institutional capitalization 
inflicts on general production” (p. 226). Further, any argument that posits that 
art is an “outside” to capital – familiar Adornian, Brechtian and Bataillean 
arguments that laud the failure or non-productivity of art – complement art’s 
financiality, and even perform a “remoralization… of institutional sabotage” (p. 
227).  
 Malik and Phillips’ argument covers similar terrain to Bahtsetzis, but 
with a far more convincing breadth and focus of financial research. Their 
claims around sabotage, and the irrelevance of commodification to new forms 
of art’s financiality are groundbreaking; and in their strong argument (which 
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draws, in part, from Nitzan and Bichler, 2009) against the presumed 
Bordieuian separation between “cultural” and financial capital brings them 
much closer to the flat art-economy ontology that Bahtsetzis, arguably, fails to 
achieve. But is their ontology really as flat as it seems to claim? While they 
have no doubt eroded the separation between cultural and financial capital, 
they have, arguably, done so unidirectionally: by “reducing” art to finance, 
without sufficiently accounting for a reciprocal aestheticization of finance by 
art. The concept of art as “alibi” for financialized sabotage is couched in the 
tropes of ideological – or proto-ideological, as they like to call it – critique. Yet, 
if the concept of an alibi seems to envision the physical and perceptual forms 
of artworks – and the love which these might inspire – as covers for 
financialized sabotage. But what more can be said about the reverse 
scenario: finance’s aestheticization?  
Malik and Phillips’ argument is inspired by a desire to remove the 
“proto-ideological support for the decontamination of power through art’s 
ethos” (p. 218). It calls out a situation of widespread doublespeak in the art 
world, according to which art’s “critical” capacity is sought after, and various 
“critical” gestures are shipped around the world without enacting or effecting 
even a modicum of their supposedly critical claims in any way. Their essay is 
a pointed – and much-needed – attack on the distance between what the art 
world says it does and what it does. As incredibly pertinent as such critiques 
are, is it also possible to claim that there could be some, dare I say, “critical” 
potential in certain artworks that maintain a purposive distance between their 
“doing” and “saying”, their performative and constative functions with respect 
to economics? There are a number of compelling arguments which could offer 
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such a perspective. Norman Bryson, for instance, elegantly counters the 
assumption that an artwork must not be “hypocritical” in this respect in his 
study of seventeenth-century Dutch still-life painting (1990). He argues that 
vanitas still-life paintings, as rhetorical devices, seem unconvincing to modern 
eyes, in that they both act as warnings against overindulgence in luxury, and 
are, in themselves, the very epitome of the luxurious object. This split 
between the performative and constative functions of the vanitas paintings, for 
Bryson, is not so much a point to critique as it is an opportunity to explore 
various philosophies of reading. Bryson traces this performative/constative 
split to a thirteenth-century debate about how to read Christian texts. On the 
one side of the debate, readers were meant to empathize with every 
expression of pain, with every sentiment portrayed in texts on the suffering of 
the saints. On the other side of the debate, such textual depictions of suffering 
were meant to demonstrate to readers their inability to empathize with saintly 
suffering; this side of the debate promoted a more detached style of 
readership, which encouraged an attentiveness to the necessary failures of 
the text to embody experience. In a similar vein, but in a different context, 
Franco (Bifo) Berardi (2012) advocates for the importance of the ironic kind of 
reading proposed by poetry (if we understand irony as a conception of the 
distance between a sign and its meanings, rather than as cynicism) in light of 
the recent financial crisis. Whereas avant-garde modernist poetry, he argues, 
presaged many of the financialized developments of late capitalism, poetry 
can still teach us a way of viewing the world – a kind of built-in distantiation 
between signs and their given political-economic contexts – that might yet 
produce some potential for social movements of the future. Berardi’s claims 
	   124	  
around poetry tend to be quite general; he is rather romantic about poetry at 
large, and fails to provide a convincing account as to how, exactly, ironic 
reading might produce political potential. Arguably, adopting a Berardian (or 
Brysonian) account of the importance of ironic distantiation too simplistically 
would either merely reinstate an obsolete division between financial and 
cultural capital, on the one hand, or act too broadly as an apology for any and 
all hypocrisy within art, on the other. (Assuredly, there are some forms of 
irony/hypocrisy that might point to quite interesting philosophies of reading 
within certain contexts, whereas, in other forms, irony/hypocrisy might be 
entirely unthinking and opportunistic.) And yet these arguments point to a 
potential that, arguably, Bahtsetzis, Malik and Phillips underemphasize.  
How would it be possible to give a place for Berardi and Bryson’s 
conceptions of ironic distance without reinstating a division between cultural 
and financial capital? I argue that the answer to this problem may lie in 
adopting a temporal, rather than “oppositional” or “critical” understanding of 
distance. According to this understanding, irony allows for a temporal gap 
between perceiving signs and producing meaning. Arguably, such a temporal 
gap is entirely economic, but economic in an entirely different sense to the 
one understood by Bahtsetzis, Malik and Phillips. For the economy is itself a 
conception of historical time. The concept of economy deserves to be 
rendered with a qualitative, conceptual polysemy that is more adequate to its 
broad range of semantic senses (including one which is temporal, which I will 
expand below), and which, as such, resists being subsumed by discourses on 
financialization that describe only the current, hegemonic economic conditions 
within a neoliberal milieu.  
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  The economy (as I will demonstrate below) is, quite directly, a 
conception of temporality and also a conception of the circulation of images; 
so I will restate the above summary (which was developed along the axis of 
temporality) in terms of images and representation. As I have tried to 
demonstrate, in arguments that aim to erode the perceived “oppostional 
distance” between neoliberal art and economy (art’s much-mythologized 
“critical” or “oppositional” stance with respect to the economy) by reading 
contemporary art (reductively, and necessarily so) as the very image, the very 
figuration of the economy itself, there tends to be a conflation of a 
representation of politics with a politics of representation. In other words, on 
some level these arguments see in contemporary art nothing more than a 
representation of politics: the very image of neoliberal economy rendered in 
the medium (or on the recording surface?) of the “contemporary art world” as 
(in a Latourian sense) abstract figure. They miss, in another sense, art’s 
ability to be a politics of representation: to enact – singularly, for each work – 
an address to the future. Such an address is also inherently economic, but not 
in the financialized sense of the term. I am proposing that art’s “politics”, in the 
phrase “politics of representation”, might be understood as its capacity to act 
as part of a history in the future. In other words, it is precisely in the ways in 
which an artwork is not currently being understood, in its potential to act 
differently than it does in its current political-economic milieu, that we might 
seek art’s politicality beyond a base instrumentality to current political and 
economic conditions (the latter of which Bahtsetzis, Malik and Phillips quite 
astutely describe), but also without presuming that this politicality is somehow 
“outside” of, or opposed to, the economy.  
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 To further understand the complex relationships between financialized 
economy and temporality, and between representations of politics and politics 
of representation, demands an expansion of the semantic qualities of 
economy, along the lines explored by Marie-José Mondzain in her study of the 
Byzantine origins of the contemporary imaginary (2005). Mondzain analyzes 
the arguments that surrounded the Byzantine iconoclastic crisis – a crisis 
during which the question of the political was fundamentally a question of 
images. Further, the defence of images during the iconoclastic debate 
elaborated a fundamentally economic conception of the image. Mondzain 
argues that “the question of the economy cannot be separated from the 
question of the image itself. ‘Whoever rejects the icon rejects the totality of the 
economy’” (p.3) In administering the unconscious of their subjects, in 
regulating their belief and obedience through a philosophy of the image (p. 
15-16), the church fathers founded a conception of the image that is, 
Mondzain argues, still very much the face of humanism today (p. 4). At each 
major turning point in political and religious thought, the question of the 
legitimacy of the image gets raised (p. 5); politics, in Mondzain’s analysis, 
plays out on the level of iconicity. Thus, her study takes place precisely on the 
level of a politics of representation, in the sense I alluded to above.   
To understand the linkage between image and economy in all its 
richness requires a close analysis of the term “economy” that may be 
counterintuitive for contemporary readers. Mondzain takes stock of the many 
meanings that the term oikonomia held in Byzantium, including a living linkage 
between the invisible image and the visible icon (p. 3); “prudent adaptation to 
circumstances” and “realist relativism” (p. 7); “opportune” and “well thought 
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out” (p. 7); a system of thought that takes into account both the historical 
specificity of the persons who enact it, and the living character of the word (p. 
12); a “science of effects” played out on the “moving ground of everyday 
reality” (p. 12); “enlightened flexibility” and the resolution of inconsistency (p. 
14); and an art, not without guile, which acts as the basis for rhetoric (p. 13). 
In spite of this daunting polysemy, she chides scholars who have failed to see 
any sort of semantic coherence in the concept of economy. She also marvels 
that so many highly skilled translators fail to translate the term economy – 
oikonomia – directly as “economy” when working with Byzantine texts. 
(Oikonomia has been routinely translated as “incarnation, plan, design, 
administration, providence, responsibility, compromise, lie or guile, without 
any indication that all of these refer to the same word.) (p. 13) This, she 
argues, is surprising given how absolutely central the economy was to the 
Byzantine defence of images; and it reveals a widespread misunderstanding 
of the importance of the relationship between images and economy – central 
to the Byzantine understanding of the image but still with us today. Her 
detailed semantic study traces economy from its pre-Christian origins to the 
various ways in which it was conceptualized during the iconoclastic crisis, at 
which time the term gained its semantic coherence.  
The Greek word oikonomia has its etymological roots in the 
administration and management of domestic life (p. 18). The classical authors 
understood the concept to be one of utility and profit (either in a quantitative, 
financial sense, or in a qualitative sense (as in well being, or the sovereign 
good) (p. 18). For Aristotle, the term designated the acquisition and proper 
functioning of a domestic life; without such a preliminary site for social 
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cohesion, no concept of politics could be possible. (Thus, for Aristotle, 
economy is prior to politics.) Implicit in economy, for the Greeks, was both a 
conception of means (to an immaterial end), and a conception of an “organic, 
functional harmony” – a providential and natural order to be serviced (p. 19). 
In the writings of Dionysios of Haricarnassus, economy referred to the manner 
in which a literary work is organized (p. 19). From its very beginnings, 
Mondzain argues, economy presupposes a consideration of ends (without, 
consequently, being a cynical concept); it acts as a “science of relations”; and 
it “both renders a service and takes into account the very idea of service” (p. 
19). As expounded by the Church fathers, the economy’s role was to 
“introduce the figure and history into theological thought” (p. 23). According to 
the two main systems for Christian economic thought – the Trinitarian 
economy and the Christological economy – the incarnate Son is the economy 
of the Father. “The incarnational economy is nothing other than the spreading 
out of the Father’s image in its historic manifestation, which is made possible 
by the economy of the maternal body” (p. 23). The virgin birth produces the 
living image; the economy is a concept of relation within the divine, and 
between the divine and the providential management of the visible world (p. 
24). The economy’s semantic coherence lies in its status as a concept of 
relation that administers the visible world in the image of God.  
In service of this semantic organizational principle, Mondzain identifies 
five senses of the term economy as it appears in various early Christian texts. 
There is, first of all, the Trinitarian economy, which manages the relations 
between divine unity and triplicity; between the eternality of God’s “secret 
room” (p. 26) and the temporality of His unfolding in history as image; and 
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between the signifier and signified (as an economic relation of “relative 
similitude”) (p. 30). Secondly, there is the Christological economy, which 
follows as a consequence of the Trinitarian economy. According to this 
economy, Christ is “economy par excellence” (p. 31). He is image, relation 
and flesh – a prototype for the organization and management of the visible 
within the world. There is the providential economy, which covers the sense in 
which “there can be no economy without the spectacle of the world” (p. 36). 
The providential economy keeps open the relations between visible spectacle 
and the enigmatic spectacle of mystery, and bases the organization and 
management of spectacle on a natural model that is, in itself, an image of the 
divine order (p. 35). There is an economy of the flesh: the vitalist and 
functionalist sense of economy according to which the human form is itself an 
image of the divine. This economy encompasses the circulations within the 
body (for instance, of blood), makes transubstantiation conceptually possible, 
justifies the Church’s use of bodily metaphors to describe its own 
organization, and contrasts Christ, as one who gives of his flesh, with, say, 
the opposing image of the vampire, who takes flesh. Finally, there is the 
economy of speech, which is not without guile. This conception accounts for 
the discursive, educational and strategic aspects of economy. It also answers 
to the fact that, while icons can be faithful to (invisible, divine) images, they 
can also lie. Yet the Church fathers did not forbid lies or guile, if these were 
used in service of the truth. Mondzain concludes, firstly, that “The economy is 
thus a manifestation of history, but it is not limited by history. It exceeds all 
strictly historical circumstances in order to reveal the meaning of history itself” 
(p. 48). Secondly, she concludes that “the economy is an operative concept 
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that is defined by its living fertility” which is modelled after that of the virginal 
womb (p. 49).  
Given Mondzain’s groundbreaking study of the warp and woof of 
economy’s semantics; given the unparalleled detail of her attention to the 
performative and qualitative intricacies of the concept as it has been inherited 
(in at least ostensibly secularized form) from the Byzantine empire; and given 
the skill with which she accounts for the imaginal as a politics of 
representation, how might these insights be applied to more contemporary 
discussions of the state of the image with respect to financialized neoliberal 
capital?  
 This is a question that might lead us to examine Giorgio Agamben’s 
work on oikonomia (2009). Agamben delivers an incisive – and rather 
pessimistic – appraisal of the significance of the Byzantine economy for our 
time. In Agamben’s gloss, the Byzantine, imaginal conception of the economy 
arose as a direct response to the problem the trinity posed for the Church (he 
thus privileges one of the five senses of economy Mondzain analyses), which 
needed to both “introduce… God between being and action” (p. 16), and 
justify itself as a monotheistic religion by proposing a relationship of 
resemblance between the Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Oikonomia was the 
apparatus par excellence, in a Foucauldian sense of the term apparatus, 
which Agamben understands as a heterogeneous set of “practices, 
discourses, and bodies of knowledge” (p. 19) – “literally anything that has in 
some way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, 
or secure the gestures, behaviours, opinions, or discourses of living beings” 
(p. 14). These include not only familiar Foucauldian subjects such as schools, 
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confession, and disciplinary procedures, but also “the pen, writing, literature, 
philosophy, agriculture, cigarettes, navigation, computers, cellular telephones, 
and – why not – language itself” (p. 14). In a disciplinary society, such 
apparatuses create “docile, yet free bodies that assume their identity and their 
‘freedom’ as subjects in the very process of their desubjectification” (p. 19-20).  
But whereas the economy was once the apparatus that acted in service of the 
Church’s power, in our time the economy has run amok, and functions in 
service of nothing. We live in an era, Agamben intones, of “the triumph of the 
oikonomia, that is to say, of a pure activity of a government that aims at 
nothing other than its own replication” (p. 22). This shift in the function of 
oikonomia, as apparatus, points to a broader shift in how apparatuses can 
function in our contemporary moment. For while, Agamben argues, every 
apparatus implies a process of subjectification, and every process of 
subjectification also entails a process of desubjectification, in the current 
phase of capitalism, “processes of subjectification and processes of 
desubjectification seem to have become reciprocally indifferent, and so they 
do not give rise to the recomposition of a new subject, except in larval or, as it 
were, spectral form. In the nontruth of the subject, its own truth is no longer at 
stake. He who lets himself be captured by the ‘cellular telephone’ apparatus – 
whatever the intensity of the desire that has driven him – cannot acquire a 
new subjectivity, but only a number through which he can, eventually, be 
controlled” (p. 21). According to this logic, the very possibility of a subject 
position, by means of the economic apparatus, has been spectralized, turned 
into an image of itself.  
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There are problems with Agamben’s account: he is arguably rather 
quick to generalize about the triumph of desubjectification amongst 
contemporary apparatuses (though this is to some extent understandable as 
an andidote to, say, the rather naïve, utopian enthusiasm that greets many 
technological advances, such as the smartphone). By broadening (and 
arguably, overextending, or even over-generalizing) the range of 
understandings that Foucault himself suggested by the term apparatus, he 
risks conflating apparatuses and prosthetic objects (in Elizabeth Grosz’s 
sense of the term, 2005). In Grosz’s conception, the use of prosthetics – from 
clothing to tools to architecture to language – is a property of all animals; her 
Deleuzian-feminist conception of prosthetics relies much less on a 
preconceived separation between “human” or “animal” and “prosthetic object” 
than Agamben’s seems to do; instead, she views, say, humans and their 
prosthetic objects as co-evolving. While problematic in its own right in some 
respects, this conceptualization puts some pressure on the all-to-quick 
conflation of objects with apparatuses with power in Agamben. And there 
seems to be something rather teleological in Agamben’s conception of oikos 
for its own sake as a kind of means being end for politics; his pessimism 
seems to preclude a consideration of how current conditions might change. 
What other ways might there be to bring Mondzain’s complex analysis of the 
economy into discussions of contemporary art and finance? What kinds of 
narratives – and narrative analyses – might shift the focus toward a politics of 
representation, in Mondzain’s sense? 
The Adventures of a Bank Note 
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One potential answer may be to focus on works that stage complex 
encounters between the economy, its figurations and its perceptions. 
Beginning by focusing on the latter, a striking example of a narrative form that 
conceives of the economy as, in itself, perceptive in its circulations lies in a 
once popular, but now quite obscure narrative form: the eighteenth century it-
narrative with a bank note or coin as the main character. Such narratives, 
which unfold around a first-person note or coin, both represent the economy 
and recursively examine the economization of narrative space. Here, I will 
focus on Thomas Bridges’ The Adventures of a Bank-Note, which came out in 
two volumes in 1770, with a subsequent two volumes published in 1771. 
Around this time in England, there were several popular stories which 
featured coins and bank notes occupying the first person, including Helenus 
Scott’s The Adventures of a Rupee, Wherein are Interspersed Various 
Anecdotes Asiatic and European (1772) and Charles Johnstone’s Chrysal, or, 
The Adventures of a Guinea (published in 1760 with two subsequent volumes 
in 1765). There are also a number of more recent examples of narratives that 
follow a single bank note or coin as it weaves between people, places and 
situations. These include Bresson’s last film L’Argent (1983), which loosely 
adapts the first part of Tolstoy’s novella The Forged Coupon (first published in 
1910), and shows how the circulation of a forged 500-franc note eventually 
causes a man to lose his job and family, and finally commit murder. Other 
examples include Marguerite Yourcenar’s novel A Coin in Nine Hands (1934), 
which follows a ten-lira coin through nine hands on a single day in Italy in 
1933 (including a would-be assassin of Mussolini), contrasting the coin’s 
“sociability” with its owners’ solitude. Even more recently, Andy Frith’s low 
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budget independent films Dirty Money and Dirty Money 2 (2011) each trace a 
£50 note as it makes its way into various hands in a succession of shady 
deals on a single day in Southeast London. The American website Where’s 
George? (www.wheresgeorge.com) enables users to track their one dollar 
bills over time; they write “www.wheresgeorge.com” on dollar bills, prompting 
new recipients to go to the website and add locations and transactions to the 
roster. These works enact both a desire to know that which usually remains 
unknown about money – its social life – and a fascination with the 
relationships between the circulation of money and the narrative form itself 
conceptualized as a kind of circulation. Yet for the most part (with the possible 
exception of Where’s George?), these more recent examples have inherited a 
humanistic understanding of literary character that has been hegemonic since 
the late eighteenth century. They tend to narratively privilege complex, 
interiorized depictions of human agency over that of objects, animals and 
other non-human agents – even within narratives that examine the impersonal 
agency of money. The Adventures of a Bank-Note and other stories from the 
mid-eighteenth century explore narrative possibilities that, arguably, have 
been less accessible to writers since: both the depiction of money in the first 
person, and what could be seen from a contemporary perspective, at least, as 
a radical flattening out of human characters as they are seen from the 
perspective of money. Yet is it possible that there is also something quite 
contemporary about these mid-eighteenth century narratives of money – in 
Agamben’s sense of the contemporary as an untimely quality, a disjunctive 
and anachronistic relationship with the present that “puts to work a special 
relationship between the different times” (2009, p. 52), and sees the past as 
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something that, touched by the shadows of our own time, “acquired the ability 
to respond to the darkness of the now” (p. 53)? My own reading of The 
Adventures of a Bank-Note will not be a properly historical one; it will be an 
attempt to forge a relationship between its eighteenth century moment and the 
present, to use recent methods of narrative analysis to ask: what might The 
Adventures of a Bank-Note have to teach about the financial narratives 
needed in our own time?  
 One of the few published historical accounts of The Adventures of a 
Bank-Note comes from Deidre Shauna Lynch’s book The Economy of 
Character (1998). Lynch views Bridges’ novel (and others like it) as works that 
are more concerned with imagining society than the self (p. 7). The possibility 
to think of bank notes as having their own histories of circulation, Lynch notes, 
was readily available to mid-eighteenth century minds due to the physical 
form of bank notes at the time. Prior to 1797, when the Restriction Bill caused 
Britain to adopt a uniform, anonymous paper currency, bills of exchange 
would be produced by particular banks, and would require bearers to 
countersign them over to a third party, who would then be required to 
countersign them to another party, and so on (p. 97). Thus, the form of the 
bills themselves bore witness to their previous activities through the list of 
endorsements – or perhaps we could say characters – they accrued. (This is 
not the case with the narratives featuring coins as first-person characters; 
these Lynch reads in terms of their presentation of a flat physiognomy, in their 
circulation of the face of a head of state.) Yet these narratives were also 
useful tools for “readers and writers who found themselves dwelling in a new 
commercial world, one altered by new trade routes and new forms of credit 
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and full of strange commodities that invited the gaze and emptied the 
pocketbook” (p. 24). Money, Lynch notes, both acts as a vehicle for the 
narrative form, and stands in for a social agreement on a standard of value in 
this newly commoditized world (p. 96). The first-person banknote humanizes 
the economic system, and subordinates individuals to impersonal circulation. 
As it performs these functions, it also demonstrates the intricate relations 
between “coin, character and countenance” in the first place (p. 98). In fact, in 
Lynch’s view the banknote functions in a rather similar way to the figure of the 
gentleman, who has perfected the art of circulating in society, and, thanks to 
his being well-travelled and well-mannered, acts as a featureless “broker of 
differences”, who finds out others but is not found out himself (p. 98).  
 The Adventures of a Bank-Note gives a light-hearted and humorous 
account of a series of interactions between a banknote and its owners, the 
tales they overhear, and the objects they encounter. Volume IV, for instance, 
begins with the banknote enumerating several of its recent travels within a 
paragraph, and then settling down for several chapters with a Mr. Derbyshire, 
whose heart, the banknote notes, “was as light as a feather” (p. 2). As Mr. 
Derbyshire and a friend sit on a bench one evening at Ranelagh, watching the 
“curious figures” that passed by, they observe a fashionable, comely woman 
walking with an exceedingly strangely dressed man; the friend recounts the 
tale of how these oddly-matched figures came to meet. The man, being the 
captain of a large ship that trades slaves to the coast of Africa (p. 6), had 
come to land on a rare occasion to pay a visit to his cousin, who had recently 
married the fashionable woman mentioned above. Trying to look respectable, 
but unfamiliar with land customs, he employed a tailor, a hatter, and a French 
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barber to suit him up; the latter concealed his black locks with a strange white 
wig that he claimed was the height of fashion. When the captain called upon 
his cousins, he was taken into the parlour to wait. There, amidst all the 
unfamiliar objects of domestic life, he encountered a large mirror, which 
surprised him greatly, as he had not seen his own reflection before, and did 
not recognize himself in the new clothes and wig. Walking up to the mirror to 
see who was the strange person staring at him, he bashed into it and broke 
the glass, the surprise of which sent him barrelling backwards into an 
armchair, flattening a guitar, which in turn caused him to gesticulate and send 
the dessert glasses to the floor. On encountering this scene, the lady of the 
house admonished the servants for letting a madman into the house; finally, 
her husband arrives and explains that this was, indeed, his seafaring cousin. 
Being a discerning woman, she saw the captain’s honesty, sincerity and 
artlessness, and ever since relished her visits with him.  
The banknote and its owner follow the captain and his cousin, and 
observe both the captain’s observations of the passersby, and their 
observations of the captain, in two chapters entitled “Sea remarks on land 
animals” and “Land animals returning the compliment”. In the first of these 
chapters, the captain continually uses seafaring metaphors to describe his 
impressions of the people he encounters; in the second, various passersby 
use the metaphors supplied by their respective professions to describe the 
captain’s strange countenance. (For instance, the banker declares that “He 
never set eyes on such an unnegotiable piece of paper” [p. 31]). The 
banknote then goes fishing and to a sermon with Mr. Derbyshire, who, 
afterwards, explains to his friend the story of how he met the honest 
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clergyman, an Irishman who loves potatoes. Early in his career, he was 
warned of the dangers of innovation in his profession by a cautionary tale in 
which a clergyman tells churchgoers that there will be a plum pudding waiting 
for them each afternoon when they get to heaven, only to have several of his 
poor listeners hang themselves in time for their next lunch.  
With regret, the banknote leaves Mr. Derbyshire and, after six or seven 
exchanges, joins John the Ratcatcher, who conspires to take revenge on the 
rats in his cellar by trapping them under a large pot in hopes of starving them 
to death, only to find that he has accidentally trapped them in with a large 
portion of his favourite smoked ham, which they greatly enjoy. The banknote 
partakes of several more adventures, which take it in and out of London, and 
ends with what appears to be a direct address to its readers, imagined as 
though they were gathered in together in a public meeting.  
As described in the last chapter, Alex Woloch (2003) views the 
narrative space of the novel as a competition between many characters for 
limited narrative attention and import; minor characters – who tend to be 
caricatures rather than fully rendered individuals – reflexively draw attention to 
the limits of this narrative attention, and function as the proletariat of the 
novel. In The Adventures of a Bank-Note, all the characters are minor, in a 
sense: none of them hold the plot’s attention indefinitely. Together, they seem 
meant to represent society as a multitude of particularities strung together by 
exchange; and economic exchange, in itself, as a chaos of encounter – 
always involving misunderstanding in the exchange of appearances – 
continually unleashed upon the world. That said, several of the novel’s 
features might warrant an expansion or re-thinking of Woloch’s analytical 
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categories. In his assertion that characters compete for narrative space, there 
seems to be an assumption that characters (particularly minor ones) might, on 
a reflexive level, desire more narrative space for themselves, push back on 
the “desire” of the narrative itself in fleshing out certain characters and 
skipping over others. This assumption seems complicated in The Adventures 
of a Bank-Note by the fact that the banknote itself acts as a sort of economic 
spy, who lingers on certain lives it observes in a way that (we can imagine) 
might well seem invasive to its recipients. This is particularly the case with 
John the Ratcatcher, who is portrayed for several chapters as a vengeful man 
for his un-Christian anger toward rats. The humour in these chapters arises, 
first of all, from the banknote’s greater esteem for rats than its human 
counterparts might have, and therefore its deliberate “misapprehension” of the 
scene as it would appear to a more humanistic distribution of value; and, 
secondly, from the exaggeration in importance of the Ratcatcher’s private, 
domestic activities, which contradict how he might like to portray himself in 
public. (As the banknote notes, he is an intelligent, highly respected, patent-
holding man.) 
If this novel is certainly not operating within the rather humanistic 
understanding of a competition of characters for narrative space in the novel 
that Woloch develops, then what accounts for the differences in how the 
characters are portrayed? I argue that there are several factors that come into 
play in determining how the narrative space is parsed out. Firstly, the shape of 
the narrative space is determined by the interplay between the banknote’s 
passivity and activity. It cannot determine into whose hands it falls; and often, 
it repeats the conceit that it would have liked to tell us more about a particular 
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story, except that it was whisked away too soon. To this extent, it passively 
perchances upon the narrative thread it recounts, moved by a collective 
agency of circulation. However, within this conceit of passivity, the banknote 
clearly chooses which stories to focus on (based on what the reader might 
find entertaining), and develops dispositions toward the characters it portrays. 
Thus, it produces an interplay between monetary exchange and moral affinity. 
This interplay of passive exchange and moral judgment in the narrative form 
happens thanks to perhaps the most obvious fact about the narrative, and the 
most radical for contemporary readers: that it takes place within the 
perceptual purview of the banknote. Imagining money looking back, 
characterizing humans is the key feature of this narrative that differentiates it 
from most comparable contemporary narratives. The banknote perceives, 
observes, characterizes. It seems to oscillate between acting as a featureless 
object-agent, and (through the occasional mention of some rather human 
features or habits) a humanization of the economy; it even, at times, appears 
as a thinly veiled stand-in for the author. In spite of there being some 
ambiguity as to what features the banknote might, or must, possess in order 
to have a perceptual purview, this purview forms the conceptual basis for the 
novel’s narrative space. Yet it is not only the banknote’s perceptual purview 
that is at stake here: for the note also overhears the stories and perceptions of 
many others, which are often nested within each other; for instance, the 
banknote observes Mr. Derbyshire’s conversation with his friend, in which is 
encased the observations of the sea captain and his land-dwelling cousins. 
These nested perceptual frameworks create a division of degrees between 
those who characterize others and those who are characterized. (For 
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instance, the sea captain is both caricatured and characterizes others in his 
observations of passersby; Mr. Derbyshire, on the other hand, is scarcely 
fleshed out as a possessor of traits himself (other than the banknote’s 
assessment that his heart is “light as a feather”); rather, he is portrayed mainly 
as a possessor of disinterested perceptions of others. Roughly speaking, this 
differentiation between the characters who perceive, while having few 
features themselves (the banknote, first and foremost, and secondarily, Mr. 
Derbyshire), and the characters who are merely perceived or caricatured 
within the novel’s narrative spaces plays out in relationship to their respective 
proximity to money. The characters who make a purchase, thus acquiring the 
note, also have a purchase on the narrative’s trajectory. In addition, they are 
situated in the foreground of the banknote’s perceptual purview, and thus 
there is a closer sharing between their narrative perspective and the 
banknote’s. However, this narrative proximity between the note’s and its 
possessors’ perspectives is not equally shared between owners; the banknote 
takes a much more distanced stance toward its owner John the Ratcatcher 
than it does to Mr. Derbyshire, for instance. In addition to proximity to money 
differentiating between the novel’s observers and observed, a moral and 
dispositional affinity between the banknote and some of its owners – i.e. the 
banknote’s perception of certain of them as good, and possessive of an open 
attitude toward others – creates a closer affinity of perspective. Thus, while 
the novel portrays economic exchange as a comedic clash of 
characterizations and encounters between disparate worldviews, it also 
portrays the economy, as a relation between the banknote (its synecdochal 
representative) and its deterritorializing trajectory, as (in a way that 
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Mondzain’s account of the economy would recognize) a pursuit of the good. 
But this sense of the good is always in relation to the chaos of exchange, 
which accompanies the movements of the characters.  
 
Mark Lombardi 
 If the Banknote narrative constructs a first-person, embedded 
economic viewpoint, localizing economy in the exchanged note’s abstract 
range of perceptions, Mark Lombardi’s drawings do the exact opposite: they 
construct an omniscient perspective on an overwhelming range of financial 
transactions, contacts and influences. His diagrammatic drawings (which he 
referred to as Narrative Structures) document complex financial scandals, 
international money laundering schemes and other nefarious machinations of 
power. They were based on thousands of pages of research into scandals 
such as the Harken Energy scandal (which involved alleged insider trading by 
George W. Bush after his failing oil company was purchased by Harken, 
largely in order that it could make Bush a board member and take advantage 
of his extensive political connections) and the Savings and Loan scandal (in 
which several troubled American Savings and Loan institutions – many with 
high profile board members and close connections with the CIA – turned 
themselves into Ponzi schemes during the 1980s and 1990s in the wake of 
deregulation). Lombardi used a legend consistent across his mature work, 
according to which solid lines with arrows (either one- or two-directional) 
indicated any kind of influence, control or mutual relation; arrows with broken 
lines indicated flows of money; zigzags indicated a sale or transfer of asset; 
and looped lines indicated the sale or spin-off of a property (Ross, 2003, p. 
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52). The drawings take on various structures; some, such as Charles Keating, 
ACC, and Lincoln Savings, ca. 1978-90 (5th Version) (1995, Figure 12), and 
George W. Bush, Harken Energy, and Jackson Stephens, ca. 1979-90 (5th 
Version) (1999, Figure 13), are webs of names of individuals and corporations 
organized around timeline-strata, as if to translate a spatially disparate web of 
power and influence into a roughly temporally distinct mass of quasi-events. 
Others, such as World Finance Corporation, Miami, Florida, ca. 1970-79 (6th 
Version) (1999, Figure 8), take a roughly circular shape, envisioning the 
spidery tendrils of the WFC’s sphere of influence. (This drawing diagrams a 
series of “major and minor plots” surrounding a two-year inquiry into the 
WFC’s dealings, including Jeb Bush and his business partner’s default on an 
S&L loan that cost American taxpayers $4 million.) (Ross, 2003, p. 70) In 
spite of their punctuation by timelines and global clusters, all of these 
structures can clearly be understood as rhizomatic, diffused networks. They 
depart from Hans Haacke’s systems theory/institutional critique works (most 
famously Shapolsky et. al Manhattan Real Estate Holdings, a Real-Time 
Social System, as of May 1, 1971, 1971), which were a major influence on 
Lombardi; however, here, the complexity Haacke envisions is taken almost 
unfathomably farther. Looking back even further, we can see these works as 
not only extensions of early developments in institutional critique (by Haacke, 
Ashley Bickerton and others), but also as extensions of history painting. As 
Herbert Ross puts it, these drawings “update history painting in terms of 
theories of globalism and rhizomatic schematizations of power. In these 
works, [Lombardi] replaces the taproot theory crucial to history painting – that 
great individuals are the initiators of important events – with a new model 
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based on less centralized, more serendipitous channels of power” (p. 13). If 
the financial transactions chronicled by Bridges’ banknote represent an 
attempt, as Lynch claims (1998, p. 7), to envision society as a whole through 
the travels of a banknote which unites that society’s disparate members 
through its ongoing travels, then Lombardi’s drawings translate a similar 
concern into an era in which it is not a quotidian clash of (financially-inflected) 
encounters that might seem remarkable to readers and writers newly 
experiencing an unprecedented level of imported commodities for sale, but 
rather the emergence of a relatively concentrated global elite of key players 
from a web of dispersed, seemingly “open”, networked transactional 
structures which, in their very diffuseness, both produce and conceal this elite. 
In other words, whereas Bridges’ banknote reveals something of the 
deterritorializing propensities of finance, Lombardi’s drawings, for all their 
ostensible dispersion, reveal finance’s reterritorializing propensities in the 
form of a new, concentrated yet dispersed global elite. These drawings are 
attempts, in my reading, to make sense of the simultaneous dispersion and 
concentration of power within globalized capitalism. They implicitly ask: how is 
it possible to conceptualize new forms of the centralization of power, which 
must of necessity be continually dispersed, laundered, and otherwise 
exchanged between various governmental and corporate institutions and 
players, as the performative acts of its very coalescence?  
 One of the ways in which these drawings grapple with such questions 
is in their experimentation with the narrative form itself. As Hobbs writes, “We 
might hypothesize that Lombardi’s narratives correlate well with the enlarged 
scope of narrative studies and in fact expand them in a new direction, since 
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his drawn arcs replace the core element of stories, i.e. their action” (p. 47). If, 
Hobbs reasons, we adopt a structural definition of narrative (such as that of 
Russian formalist Vladimir Propp) as beginning and ending static situations 
delimiting a series of events, then Lombardi’s drawings can be considered to 
be both realistic and abstract: realistic in their use of names as static poles 
within the narrative, and abstract in that the actions and events themselves 
are lacunae within the drawings, replaced by mere lines and arrows. Hobbs 
notes that the abstraction of events in these drawings account for many 
viewers’ frustration in trying to “read” them, as they have been given, as it 
were, an architecture of events but little explanation of them (p. 47). Yet by 
abstracting narrative in this way – by keeping the realist referents of proper 
names but reducing the events in which they have been implicated to lines – 
Lombardi produces the meta-event of the structure of power and influence – 
which is represented, here, as a character structure of sorts; an associative 
dance of recognizable individuals and institutions. By reducing events to lines, 
he can also tackle multiple plots within the same narrative structure. For 
instance, Lombardi’s World Finance Corporation, Miami, Florida, ca. 1970-79 
(6th Version) consists of a circular web of transactions and influences 
arranged around a roughly central hub (the World Finance Corporation) with 
twenty-three transactional/influential vectors emanating from it. (One of these, 
for instance, shows Guillermo Hernández-Cartaya’s influence over the WFC. 
Hernández-Cartaya, who was both a head of the WFC and a “double agent 
working with the C.I.A., the Mafia, Fidel Castro and Colombian drug cartels” 
[Ross 2003, p. 66] had been a central figure in earlier versions of Lombardi’s 
WFC drawings.) Most of these vectors, in turn, split off into other vectors, 
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some of which, in turn, burst into a peripheral hub of activity centered around 
another institution (such as Union de Bancos, Panama). The spidery webs of 
connectivity are placed within a circular frame of influence (including figures 
such as Jeb Bush). The web’s structure encapsulates something of 
Lombardi’s multiple strains of research into the role of the WFC played in 
trafficking Columbian drugs and laundering their profits; Hernández-Cartaya 
assisting the C.I.A.’s money laundering activities while he maintained 
connections with Narodny Bank, which funded Russian undercover agents; 
Hernández-Cartaya opening Union de Bancos, Panama, which laundered 
massive amounts of hot money; Jeb Bush and Armando Codino’s $4.5 million 
loan from Broward Federal Savings in Sunrise, Florida, which, after being 
reappraised (and vastly undervalued) by federal investigators, led to Bush and 
Codino repaying only $500,000; and many other facets of the bank’s 
expanded networks’ undercover activities. The vectors linking the players in 
this dense field of legally sanctioned, illegal and semi-legal activity, being 
curvilinear, give a sense of gravity to the hub; the cluster, itself, appears as an 
autonomous globe. Hobbs describes this as a “circular and quasi three-
dimensional configuration where the dispersal of power appears to result from 
the almost autonomous force of liquid capital’s global flows” (2003, p. 66). 
Though the drawings represent crimes perpetrated by individuals and 
institutions, the drawings seem almost to ascribe more agency to the flows 
represented by the lines than to the individual actors themselves – or, at least, 
they seem to put into question whether the activity comes from the actor or 
the network. If, in The Adventures of a Banknote, the banknote’s circulation 
served as a direct analogue to narrative structure itself as the motion of a 
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particular viewpoint through space, then Lombardi’s Narrative Structures 
grapple with financial liquidity’s challenge to narrative structure. The 
complexity of financial transactions requires the development of narrative 
strategies capable of describing multiple, simultaneous plotlines and activities. 
This multiplicity, in turn, presents itself as a hybrid between literary and 
pictorial modes of experience. The arrows of multiple plotlines form a dense 
pictorial web that the wandering eye parses out, reorders into partial, quasi-
temporal sequences.45 And yet, similarly to The Adventures of a Banknote, 
these works also express a subject position by virtue of their construction of a 
vantage point from which this information can be viewed. Lombardi acts as a 
sleuth or an architect of knowledge (Ross, p. 17), and ultimately, in Ross’ 
view, constructs a utopian vantage point from which to consider the wealth of 
information presented (p. 39). Lombardi constructs an impossible overview, 
creates a hitherto impossible omniscient perspective – but one that favours 
structures of connectivity over explications of their particular content.  
Nearly the only realist content in the drawings (apart from a few 
annotations and the conceit that the lines represent a trace of the actual 
power relations within a given financial milieu) is in Lombardi’s use of proper 
names. The names are nodes, stable points within a dispersed, liquid flow. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 It is tempting to argue, here (though I have yet to encounter another author that has done 
so) that Jackson Pollock’s paintings are an important historical precedent to Lombardi’s use 
of pictorial space. (There are, of course many others: most obvious among these was, 
perhaps, Lombardi’s interest in the use of diagrams and flow charts in the corporate world.) 
Contrary to the Greenbergian interpretation of Pollock, and more in keeping with the 
persistence of pictorial elements in the latter’s works amidst their “abstract” webs of lines, 
remains the potential to read Pollock as a harbinger of a combined literary/visual form of 
understanding pictorial space. According to this reading, Pollock’s painterly lines demarcate 
the picture plane according to a flow of possible plot lines, which occasionally almost-
concretize in the form of possible representations emerging from the mesh. The emergence 
of such a literary/pictorial hybrid is, in many respects, one of the historical shifts that make a 
study of character important for art history. 
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For Hobbs, Lombardi’s use of proper names represents a new type of realism, 
according to which pictorial detail is replaced by detail in rendering 
connectivity. According to this form of realism, “the art object… performs a 
deliberately limited representational role at the same time that it reveals the 
identities of its subjects through the relationships it uncovers” (p. 32). (This 
line of thinking is in keeping with Latour et. al's subsequent work on monads 
as sociological tropes, mentioned above, which sees “within” an individual the 
scope of his/her networked relations.) While I agree with Hobbs’ claim, it is 
possible to expand on it, in light of Nitzan and Bichler’s Capital as Power 
(2009).  
The persistence of names in Lombardi’s networks, in the first place, 
could be understood as, in fact, prescient of Nitzan and Bichler’s theory of 
capital as power. These authors argue that both neoclassical economic and 
Marxian accounts of capitalism share in a fundamental problem: neither can 
explain precisely what capital is. Neither the ‘util’, neoclassical economy’s 
hypothetical unit of satisfaction (encompassing goods, assets and their 
productivity), nor abstract labour (the Marxian base unit of capital, which 
conceptualizes dollar value as reflective of the amount of social labour 
required in the production of a good) can account for fluctuations in 
magnitudes of price, which may have little to do with either production or 
assets. This is because both theories (having inherited two central dualisms 
established in the eighteenth century: one between politics and economics, 
and the other between the real and the nominal) (p. 10), attempt to 
understand capital as a merely economic entity. For Nitzan and Bichler, the 
dualistic thinking required to theorize capital as economic served various aims 
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of both neoclassical and Marxian economics (the former of whom were quite 
happy to perceive the market as autonomous, and the latter of whom sought 
to critique its machinations from within); but it is no longer adequate to an 
analysis of big business, big governments, mergers and other large-scale 
phenomena that “upset the presumed automaticity and self-regulating 
tendencies of capitalism” (p. 11). Such developments, which take price farther 
and farther away from the strictly “economic” considerations of goods, 
satisfaction or labour, require a less dualistic account of capital, which 
understands capital as power itself:  
The elements of corporate capitalization – namely the firm’s expected 
earnings and their associated risk perceptions – represent neither the 
productivity of the owned artefacts nor the abstract labour socially 
necessary to produce them, but the power of a corporation’s owners… 
Moreover, the power to generate earnings and limit risk goes far 
beyond the narrow spheres of ‘production’ and ‘markets’ to include the 
entire state structure of corporations and governments (p. 8).  
 
Given the importance, in business, of monopolization, dominance within a 
particular market, and maintaining important political connections, owners’ 
personal power comes to the fore as a central component in the analysis of 
capital. If Lombardi’s drawings, as Hobbs claims, replace the taproot theory of 
individuals’ significance seen in much history painting, they also give these 
characters a new kind of significance: as nodes of power capable of sculpting 
capital flows within the state of capital.  
Nitzan and Bichler’s understanding of capital as power rests on an 
important distinction between industry and business. Whereas many 
economic theories, they note, conflate industry with business, they instead 
follow the economist and sociologist Thorstein Veblen, who both distinguishes 
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sharply between the two, and insists that they have a negative relation to one 
another. Whereas industry is the sphere of production – a collective, creative 
endeavour – business is “the domain of pecuniary distribution”, which 
functions differentially rather than collectively (Nitzan and Bichler, 2009, p. 
15), in order to control and limit industry. Industry, within capitalism, does not 
function for its own sake, but rather for that of business. The ownership of 
industry by modern capitalists “doesn’t contribute to industry; it merely 
controls it for profitable ends. And since owners are absent from industry, the 
only way for them to exact their profit is by ‘sabotaging’ industry” (p. 16). In 
this view, it is not industry or production that acts as the basis of capitalism; 
rather, it is the control of industry by business – industry’s sabotage at the 
hands of business – which produces differential gains from what could 
otherwise be collectivist enterprise. “Ultimately”, Nitzan and Bichler argue, 
“capitalists are driven not to produce things but to control people” (p. 17). 
Capital, as power, is precisely what exerts that control (as well as the means 
of securing that control and its symbolic representation). Further, power, in 
these authors’ final analysis, is “confidence in obedience. It expresses the 
certainty of the rulers in the submissiveness of the ruled” (p. 18). If confidence 
is high, rulers will actively shape a society; if it is low, they might be more 
inclined to react to potential threats, rather than to initiate changes.  
Lombardi’s diagram-drawings, which focus on (often quite prominent) 
names and institutions, support precisely this view of capital. They speak not 
of industry, but of business (exemplified in large part, here, by financial 
institutions) as the exertion of power in what Nitzan and Bichler would call the 
state of capital (which comprises both corporate and governmental 
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institutions, embodying “the same encompassing mode of power”) (p. 8). 
Nitzan and Bichler’s conception of the state of capital as a unified 
corporate/governmental field might, arguably, downplay some of the important 
conflicts arising between governments’ and corporations’ respective 
geopolitical territories and infrastructural responsibilities (which are drawn out 
more sharply in, say, Benjamin Bratton’s Stactivist work, or Evgeny Morozov’s 
critiques of the insufficiently contested, increasingly political roles assumed by 
Silicon Valley) (Bratton, 2014; Morozov, 2011). Yet the “state of capital” 
perfectly suits Lombardi’s choice of subjects: instances of collusion, tax 
evasion, insider trading, money laundering, the acquisition of prominent board 
members with strong political connections and other nefarious activities that 
reveal capitalization as the accumulation of power (whether legally, quasi-
legally or illegally) across corporate and governmental platforms. The well-
known name – which gathers influence, power, and perhaps notoriety as it 
makes its transactions – is another kind of symbolic representation of that 
power.  
Nonetheless, the names in Lombardi’s drawings do not circulate 
uncontested; some are accompanied with annotations in red letters, which 
indicate their conflicts with the law. (For instance, World Finance Corporation, 
Miami, Florida, ca. 1970-79 [6th Version] notes that Guillermo Hernández-
Cartaya was convicted in 1982.) The proper name occupies a contested 
space between two conflicting connotations: power wielding, on the one hand, 
and legal rights and responsibilities, on the other. The proper name is subject 
to law; a proper noun, a distinct signifier, it is the potential subject of crime, 
the potential bearer of a crime’s responsibility. But the name which 
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accumulates enough clout can act in ways that most cannot: using its 
influence to bend the law, acquire privileged access, produce an oversight, or 
camouflage its private dealings into the governmental fabric to such an extent 
that to submit it to a full criminal investigation (as was the case with Guillermo 
Hernández-Cartaya of the World Finance Corporation) would “compromise 
national security” (Hobbs, 2003, p. 70). The name, made of characters, is an 
object, a character, which might, if it wields enough power, produce the 
means through which it can evade its status as subject to law. Composed of 
characters (letters, names, individuals, corporations), Lombardi’s structures 
reveal the centralization of power within dispersed networks (using drawing as 
an act of centralization, an occasion for omniscience). Operating at the basis 
of this centralization of power, the proper name oscillates between connoting 
an egalitarian, collectivist conception of human right and responsibility, on the 
one hand, and a differential site for the accumulation of power, on the other – 
whose logic, ultimately, is one of sabotage.  
Amir Chasson 
In quite a different way, Amir Chasson’s paintings also analyze the role 
of individuals within the spheres of business and finance. His series of painted 
diptychs from 2009-2011 feature quasi-realistic portraits of slightly awkward 
looking men: presumably businessmen, most often against a plain 
background, as if posing at a portrait studio. Next to the portraits are textured, 
layered canvases portraying abstract diagrams and charts, which often look 
as though they might convey financial or sociological information, except that 
there is no contextualizing information or legend with which to understand 
them (see Ten dimensional tetrahedron, 2011, Figure 9 and Green Three 
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Dimensional Topo Map Using Fishnet Lines, 2010, Figure 10). These works 
operate by means of stark contrasts: between portrait and diagram; between 
the rough, painterly texture of the diagram canvases and their “cool”, 
precisely-rendered objects; and, more minutely, between the photorealistic 
conceit the portraits entertain and their awkward handling upon close 
examination (the brushwork appears slightly inconsistent; the dimensions of 
the faces are more akin to a collaged sense of spatiality than to any deep, 
structural engagement with the architecture of the face). Awash with contrast, 
the eye seeks similarity. Darting back and forth between the pairs of 
canvases, it formulates transitions (formal, narrative, conceptual) between 
face and diagram. An arrow jutting out of a tetrahedron seems to answer to 
something of the upward tilt of a middle-aged man’s jaw; a topographical 
diagram, describing spiky irregularities emerging from a relatively flat surface, 
stands in for an idea of the portrait as a spatial descriptor, a device that 
morphs a flat surface, transforms a spatial plane into a facial plane by pulling 
out nose, cheek and brow. In a sense, the diagrams continue the act of 
painting the portraits for us; their spatial cues pull on the portraits, as if 
applying a bit of makeup to the latter’s spatial gestures. Thus, these works 
present the possibility that “painting” – as in the act of visually morphing a flat 
surface into a series of virtual mottled planes – can be done by a non-human 
actant outside of a particular canvas; an external perceptual influence which 
actively reconfigures a painting’s perceptual field over time. This inserts an 
Eisensteinian montage logic into painting. The principle according to which 
one image, in a filmic sequence, will magnetize the perceptual/semantic field 
of the next over time is re-envisioned here as a painterly device.  
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Of course, this would certainly not be the first time that an idea of 
montage or filmic sequencing has entered into painting (I think of 
Rauschenberg’s near-identical diptychs, or Joyce Wieland’s canvases 
showing temporal progression by means of a conceit of progressing film stills, 
as in Sailboat Sinking, 1965, to name but a few examples). But what seems 
remarkable here is that this cultural logic, in Chasson’s work, is absorbed into 
the temporalities of painterly looking. Juxtaposition, here, appears not as 
something that could go on ad infinitum, but as a lure for the eye to invent a 
transition between disparate members of a viewing a pair. And what makes 
this act of inventing transition seem so rooted in pairing (other than the 
obvious fact that these works are diptychs) is the extent to which this act of 
pairing seems so utterly asymmetrical (at least at first). The way that one 
canvas inflects the other is not a reciprocal perceptual/conceptual operation – 
for what the diagrams lend to the faces – a perceptual pulling on the face 
itself, a prosthetic physiognomy – the faces do not at first appear to offer back 
to the diagrams. Instead, they offer the diagrams a narrative infusion; a social 
life (which they always already have) doubled back to them by virtue of the 
faces’ ready ability to signify sociality by means of a scenario, a figure, a 
character. The men’s aspects function as anchors in a scenario navigable by 
means of available realist (literary) tropes. Are these the faces of the 
cognitarians “behind” the sociological, mathematical or financial work 
presented? Are they the purveyors of such abstracted information? Are they 
the repressed of the diagrammatic image – the abject, psychologised 
individuals who bear the privileges and burdens of such impersonal 
exactitudes of information? Are they the indexical referents for their 
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respective, legend-free diagrams? The real estate agent’s portrait; the CEO’s 
CV; the social climber’s profile pic. The portraits in Chasson’s paintings seem 
to speak to an aspiration to ascendancy carried out, in part, as a proximity of 
person to information. In another sense, they carry out the aspirational 
tendencies that the form of the businessman’s portrait implies, which is based, 
in part, on the projection of confidence. (Sianne Ngai, in her brilliant study of 
Melville’s The Confidence Man [2005, p. 62], argues that confidence is the 
affective tonality of capital itself, and can circulate within scenarios of capitalist 
exchange as a feeling that nobody actually feels: one agent falsely projecting 
it to the next and so on.) Stories, suggested ties between the images, swarm 
up in the gap between the canvases; but none of them seem fit to fill the gap. 
All that is left is a sense of confidence (orbits of confidence, belonging to both 
face and diagram’s forms of assertiveness) in the process of breaking down, 
as it plays out on faces overfull with ambivalence and distortions. Over-
fullness – as it pulls apart faces or dances in diagrams awkwardly forced onto 
pockmarked surfaces – disallows the unanimity of feeling that the “confident” 
demeanour must display.  
Each image, in itself, entertains an instability, inviting perception to 
navigate various kinds of gap, but also to come to terms with how unnatural, 
how hard won, are perception’s inventions of stability and self-similarity. The 
painterly textures hovering, in glossy paint, “behind” the carefully rendered 
diagrams, with no apparent causal relation to the latter’s rigid lines, introduce 
a wedge of expressivity into the diagram’s informative aesthetic. This meeting 
of texture and information both produces a provisional agreement between 
them (suggesting that the diagrams, freed of their measures and legends, 
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might collapse into “pure” expressivity), and upsets that momentary 
agreement, playing two seemingly incompatible aesthetics (one belonging to 
the figure, the other to the ground) against each other. But even more striking 
are the changes that happen over a prolonged engagement with the painted 
faces. Little by little, features appear to unmoor themselves from the face; 
eyes, oddly disproportioned, float in a sea of what should be their anchor: the 
socket. Noses protrude asymmetrically, rendered in the most skewed 
perspective. Curled up mouths lose their relationship to skin and jaw, 
becoming worm-like and autonomous on a fleshy field. Little parcels of 
features seem to swim away from the rest of the face. The face, itself, comes 
in and out of various states of comprehensibility; at times, it comes into focus 
as a face, and at other times, this strange autonomy of features seems to pull 
it beyond recognition, forcing viewers to come to terms with a momentary 
inability to produce a whole out of constituent parts, even in such a 
conventional form as the portrait.  
What happens to perception in Chasson’s portraits seems akin to the 
bizarre perceptual operations chronicled in Oliver Sacks’ exquisite 
descriptions of his encounters with patients suffering from rare neurological 
disorders. In The Man who Mistook his Wife for a Hat (1987), for instance, 
Sacks describes a brilliant and charming musician and teacher, Dr. P., who 
suffered from a profound visual agnosia owing to a tumour or pronounced 
degenerative process localized to the visual cortex of his brain. This man was 
able to see perfectly well (with a few exceptions) – but was often completely 
unable to make the cognitive leap from seeing to recognition. While he had no 
trouble in recognizing people from their voices or movements, he would not 
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be able to recognize faces unless by one pronounced feature; he could 
distinguish particular features but could not get a sense of the face as a 
whole. Even in their first encounter, Sacks noticed that the man looked at him 
strangely, as if scanning the face, searching it for singularities, rather than 
apprehending it altogether. Dr. P., Sacks remarks, “construed the world as a 
computer construes it, by means of key features and schematic relationships” 
(1987, p. 15). When handed a glove and asked what it might be, the musician 
gives a remarkably abstract response. Seeing it but not comprehending it, he 
describes it as a “continuous surface… infolded on itself”, that might be a 
container of some sort. When asked what, precisely, this infolded surface 
might contain, Dr. P. exclaims, “it would contain its contents!” with a laugh – 
and then speculates that perhaps it could function as a coin purse for coins of 
five different sizes (p. 14). (Insofar as there is abstraction in Dr. P.’s 
perception, there is also a compensatory practice of invention; strange new 
objects for thought, like the five-pronged coin purse, spring into being.) What 
is lacking in Dr. P.’s perception Sacks describes repeatedly in terms of 
physiognomy and persona. When Dr. P. mistakes a National Geographic 
photograph of an unbroken expanse of desert for an image of a riverside 
guesthouse with diners awaiting their dinner on the patio – as if meandering 
off into pure invention based on an extrapolation from a few of the image’s 
tiniest details – Sacks remarks, “He never entered into a relation with the 
picture as a whole – never faced, so to speak, its physiognomy” (p. 10-11). 
When he fails to recognize photographs of his family and friends, Sacks 
concludes, “A face, to us, is a person looking out – we see, as it were, the 
	   158	  
person through his persona, his face. But for Dr. P. there was no persona in 
this sense – no outward persona, and no person within” (p. 13).  
Sacks’ strikingly detailed descriptions of neurological anomalies carry 
with them several claims both tacit and explicit. They reclaim the captivating, 
accessible narratives once common to scientific writing (for instance, that of 
Darwin) for neurology. They keep alive the art of vivid description of the 
doctor-patient encounter in an era suffering from a bureaucratization of 
medical practices, and a resultant loss of nuanced descriptions in medical 
records (which have been largely replaced by a tick-box system – one 
symptom of investor oppression within financialized capitalism, which seeks to 
increase profitability by maximizing the efficiency of encounter). In portraying 
a relational encounter between a person with highly abnormal perception and 
a highly-trained examiner of consciousness, these narratives pull apart 
“normal” perception, reveal something of the layers of complex relational 
procedures – neural twists and turns, inter-objective relations, interactions 
between action and perception – that must be in place in order for people to 
be able to take for granted what they see. Though his work, of course, points 
to the importance of neural activity, Sacks never seems to ascribe a purely 
neurological causality to his patient’s experiences; on the contrary, he insists 
on house visits, pays close attention to the ways in which his patients 
navigate their worlds, their relationships, their objects. In this way, his 
approach is akin to a growing contingent of philosopher/neuroscientists, best 
typified, perhaps, by Alva Nöe, who argues (2009) that consciousness cannot 
be found locked away “within” the brain, but, rather, is something that we do, 
very much in the world, through interaction. With their detailed relational 
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mesh, Sacks’ narratives examine consciousness in this extended sense, as 
an ongoing mediation between patient and world. In undoing normal 
perception, these narratives also undo the objects perceived. These undoings 
are fertile soil for thought experiments: what might it mean to subtract the 
persona from the person? What might it be to depart from the perceptual 
procedures associated with physiognomy – to perceive the world abstractly, 
heterogeneously, without a capacity for the recognition objects, for an object-
oriented ontology? 
Do Chasson’s abstracted financial diagrams have a physiognomy – like 
Sacks’ photograph of the desert does, or like the portraits they are paired with 
surely do? In this question (to which the diptychs seem to clearly answer 
“yes”), finally, the doubly infusive procedure by which one canvas in 
Chasson’s diptychs inflects the other comes to a parallel. For the portrait – a 
device that, in the slow obstinacy of its features’ relations to the whole face, 
dismantles normal, transparent perception – inflicts its abstraction on the 
diagram. It asks us to recognize the tasks of understanding finance and other 
forms of informational power as physiognomic in ways in which we are not 
necessarily equipped to perceive. It uses perception as the ground on which it 
claims that power, in semiocapitalism, cannot be subjected to a myth of the 
given. It asks anew what kind of perception might naturalize the physiognomy 
of finance, might pull its “face” into focus, this object which so readily evades 
the realm of the sensible (even though we might ubiquitously sense its 
effects.) It proposes that, in an era of information oversaturation, in which, as 
Jameson describes, the task of understanding globalized finance is one of 
“unprecedented magnitude”, the ability to synthesize complex information – to 
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make the perceptual leap from information to its physiognomy – takes on a 
new import, becomes a contested terrain in the politics of representation. 
What might be required, these paintings seem to suggest, is to construct 
partial objects of study that denaturalize perception, and in so doing, might 
themselves produce (like Dr. P.’s five-pronged coin purse) means for 
constructing, dismantling and reconstructing physiognomies of finance, which 
ferry finance to the edges of the perceptible. 
Conclusion 
The Adventures of a Banknote, Lombardi’s Narrative Structures, and 
Chasson’s diptychs represent three possible approaches to economic 
figuration that might be understood as complex, iterative, and rife with both 
enunciative potentials and blind spots. The Banknote enacts an embedded, 
first person strategy based on personifying the economy. In so doing, it 
creates a link between the situated perceptual purview of the banknote, which 
unites strings of particulars in its travels, and a periphery of larger-scale 
referents. (For instance, we see the increased scope of international trade – 
and colonial exploits – both “close up”, through the banknote’s perceptions 
and the characters’ encounters with commerce and commodities; and in the 
extreme distance, in, say, the passing mention of the sea captain’s activities 
on a slave ship in Africa.) The task of the narrative space in the story is to 
envision the economy as a field of overlapping perceptions and encounters. 
Lombardi’s drawings construct omniscient narrative structures for global 
finance. They allow viewers to perceive that which is normally hidden: an 
overview of highly secretive transactions by the global elite. They give 
narrative logic pictorial dimensions by broadening the scope of narrative 
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beyond linearity; in doing so, they obfuscate particulars about the relations 
between actors in favour of clearly creating a place for them in a network. 
These networks of characters point to the tension between character as 
container for human right and as vehicle of power. Chasson’s diptychs call 
into question the perceptual schisms between feature and physiognomy, and 
between two seemingly distinct kinds of complex information: the face and the 
diagram. They render face and finance incomprehensible, in order to point to 
the paucity of perception in the face of finance’s physiognomy. In Bridges’ 
narratives, the economy possesses perception; in Lombardi’s, the economy is 
rendered perceptible; and in Chasson’s paintings, the economy ruptures, de-
familiarizes perception; or, conversely, perception is rendered inadequate to 
the tasks of conceptualizing the economy.  
Of course, there are many other works in both art and literature that I 
could have chosen to discuss: Cildo Meireles’ Insertions into Ideological 
Circuits 2: Banknote Project (1970), in which the artist stamped subversive 
messages (such as “Yankees Go Home!”) onto banknotes before placing 
them back into circulation; Hans Haacke’s Shapolsky et. al Manhattan Real 
Estate Holdings, a Real-Time Social System, as of May 1, 1971 (1971); Iain 
Baxter&’s “landscapes” made from framed Canadian bills; Melville’s The 
Confidence Man (1857) and Anthony Trollope’s The Way We Live Now 
(1875), each of which complexly describes social scenarios in which finance 
wreaks havoc. But it seems to me that the three strategies Bridges, Lombardi 
and Chasson explore delineate between them a broad and relatively inclusive 
range of possible strategies for mapping relations between economy, 
character and perception. I have chosen not to historically contextualize these 
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works overmuch, in favour of emphasizing their ability to produce new 
meanings out of context, or even be extended by future works. It is precisely 
in exploring the perception of the economy – the economy’s perception, the 
economy’s production of perceptions – that these strategies can raise 
questions about the aesthetics of finance. By inviting viewers and readers to 
construct a financial imaginary on shaky ground – personifying, abstracting, 
and de-familiarizing finance – these works challenge many of the ways in 
which art has been understood to relate to economy and finance: either, 
reductively, as a mere “reflection” or “expression” of finance (perhaps in spite 
of its alleged “critical” intentions), or (within the framework of Marxist 
criticism), as either expressive of a reified set of signifiers demarcating class 
positions through taste, conspicuous consumption, displays of wealth, and the 
like; or, more broadly, as expressive of a “pan-capitalist” alienation. Important 
though such analyses may be, they do fully address the performative 
dimensions of economic figuration. In rendering the economy within synthetic, 
unfamiliar perceptual purviews, the narrative and pictorial structures I have 
chosen escape some of the normative tendencies often found in economic 
narratives proffered by organizations such as Positive Money, and, perhaps, 
point to ways in which it might be possible to reframe discussions on the 
democratic distribution of information on incomprehensibly vast financial 
networks.  
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Chapter 3 
 
“All Data is Credit Data”: Reputation, Regulation and Character in the 
Entrepreneurial Imaginary 
 
In 2012, financial services entrepreneur and ZestFinance.com CEO 
Douglas Merrill told the New York Times: “All data is credit data. We just don’t 
know how to use it yet” (Hardy). Merrill, whose background includes degrees 
in psychology and social and political organization, worked as Chief 
Information Officer and Vice President of Engineering at Google before 
founding ZestFinance.com (formerly ZestCash). This Los Angeles-based 
financial services tech company uses big data to help its client companies 
make better credit underwriting decisions. In doing so, ZestFinance also 
claims to provide better credit options for the so-called “underbanked”: those 
whose reliability as borrowers may well exceed their credit score, due to their 
having either no credit history or a poor one. As Patrick Jenkins from the 
Financial Times describes it, ZestFinance operates on a simple theory: “that 
consumers’ online behaviour can be a decent proxy for their reliability in 
managing money” (2014). ZestFinance.com is one of a spate of recent 
“fintech” startups: companies that use big data analytics to improve, expand, 
update or even (to use the inflated rhetoric that the companies might like me 
to use) revolutionize current banking and lending practices. But such claims to 
innovation seem to hinge on a concept of realism, on a claim to better 
understand borrowers’ propensities – their “true” characters, as it were. 
(Indeed, a screen grab of the fintech company VisualDNA’s homepage from 
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November 2014 does exactly that, inviting visitors to “take a personality test 
and find your true character” – see Figure 11.)   
What are some of the implications of new methods of correlating 
character and finance for art practices – and what forms of insight might art 
practices whose interests are directly “economic” provide in the newly 
aestheticized fields of finance? In this chapter, I describe developments in, 
first, the fintech industry and, second, what Rachel Botsman and others have 
termed the reputation economy. In the latter, reputation, in itself, becomes a 
form of capital, of sorts; trust, in turn, acts a kind of currency. Such 
developments are particularly palpable in online forums and so-called “World 
3.0” businesses such as Airbnb, which sell bespoke local services, social 
encounters or relations – personal exchanges scaled up via online platforms. 
Before I consider the aesthetic implications of these developments, I must first 
pose two background questions about these terrains (to which, admittedly, I 
am neither aiming to give, nor capable of giving, particularly technical 
answers; rather, my analyses are intended to open up ways of thinking about 
the subjective implications of these terrains). First of all, how are the fintech 
industry and the reputation economy related to each other? Secondly, if 
fintech and the reputation economy do, indeed, work together to form the front 
lines of a multifaceted and ever-shifting economic regime, how do they 
redistribute power between users, micro-entrepreneurs and corporations? 
After exploring these questions about the structural effects of the reputation 
economy, I turn to a question that is (in something akin to Mondzain’s 
understanding of economy mentioned in the previous chapter) economic in its 
very aestheticism. If the idea of perceiving “good” character is both an 
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aesthetic construct (routinely felt and judged when, for instance, someone 
meets a prospective employer, renter, friend, colleague or partner for the first 
time) and an increasingly quantified, calculated phenomenon (in both big data 
analytics and in the increasing visibility of online metrics for measuring 
“clout”), what is the new economic role of this phenomenon (reflexive? 
vestigial?) as the very image of a meeting point between the perception and 
calculation of valuable personal qualities? 
In my analysis of the relationships between the economy of “credit 
data” envisioned by fintech and the reputation economy enabled by “World 
3.0,” it is productive to think of these developments as an 
unconscious/conscious “rhyming couplet,” or pair of developments. Whereas 
the architectures of the reputation economy enable and encourage the 
conscious self-projection of trustworthy characteristics, the fintech industry 
scours online behaviour for its hidden, unconscious signs. Both sides of this 
unconscious/conscious equation reveal a great deal about the redistributions 
of power enabled by online platforms (which, of course, are backed by highly 
centralized power, concentrated in the hands of a small number of financial 
players who wield stupendous economic advantages by operating 
sophisticated servers). The reputation economy encourages micro-
entrepreneurs to self-regulate their behaviour in a highly competitive 
environment that arises, in part, from a systemic evisceration of the middle 
class. (Scarcity of long-term, well-paid work increases competition for short-
term contracts, bit work, etc.) In such competitive environments, corporations 
can benefit from reputation by viewing it as both an embodiment of 
competition and a means through which to outsource regulation, and 
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encourage individual users to assume systemic risk. (In this economy, we 
could say, reputation replaces regulation.)  On the “unconscious” side of the 
equation, fintech companies increase access to credit for the “underbanked,” 
thereby expanding the credit market; in doing so, they also benefit from an 
online architecture that obfuscates provenance. In other words, as Jaron 
Lanier (2014) points out, pervasive design decisions, such as one-way linking 
rather than two-way linking, make it very difficult for those without powerful 
servers and access to sophisticated computation to understand online 
information or attention traffic patterns; this leads to a surveillance economy 
based on garnering value by “spying” on, and aggregating, user activities 
more effectively than one’s competitors. By reconstructing provenance, those 
who practice big data analytics wield advantage over competitors with less 
powerful computational abilities; they also invent a new master’s discourse (to 
borrow Lacan’s term), claiming to discern the “truth” about their subjects.  
In this milieu, it is safe, I think, to assume that cultural understandings – 
and aesthetic judgments – of “goodness” are shifting – perhaps 
fundamentally. How might these emerging conditions change the implications 
of artworks’ depiction of the relations between character and economy, past 
and present? French Fluxus artist Robert Filliou’s work, from the 1960s until 
his death in 1987, enacted principles of what Filliou called the “poetic 
economy”, in which objects could be exchanged based on the amount of 
innocence, imagination and freedom they were worth. While such thinking 
might have arisen from the utopian, radical economic thought of Charles 
Fourier (whose ideas Filliou espoused in his work), given recent shifts, could 
the “poetic economy” be considered a precursor for neoliberal-era 
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apparatuses through which qualities associated with character come to be 
directly valuated? If so, how can one conceptualize such a shift without simply 
bemoaning the loss of economic “innocence” in broad and general terms, in 
keeping with, say, Boltanski and Chiapello’s account of the recuperation of 
1960s artistic critique in 1990s management discourse (2007) – which, as 
Rancière points out, is extremely general and, for the most part, simply 
“provides fuel for the melancholic version of leftism” (2009, p. 35)? Might it be 
that the widespread, financialized interests in “good” character, as seen in 
fintech and the reputation economy, only reveal their precise dimensions and 
proportions in proximity to supposedly “bad” or “undesirable” character traits? 
Might it be something like, say, Lizzie Fitch and Ryan Trecartin’s recent 
exhibition at the Zabludowicz Collection, London (2014), that precisely tests 
the limits of creditworthiness, using “ugly”, yet “creditworthy” character traits to 
demonstrate that credit must always rely on a set of locally shared 
assumptions as to what might be considered “desirable” behaviour? 
Ultimately, fintech and the reputation economy challenge artists to 
reconceptualise “goodness” as “creditworthiness.” However, as such, 
goodness becomes a kind of application – and in the artworks I analyze, the 
question as to which credit-granting organization/apparatus goodness 
“applies” remains radically open.  
The Mathematical Unconscious 
Major players in the “fintech” industry can claim to capture “true 
character” through mathematical acts akin to an unconscious reading of 
“symptoms” of creditworthiness. (While there is a wide range of fintech 
innovations, including streamlining e-commerce payments and developing 
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software that can deal with crypto-currency platforms, here I will focus on 
companies such as ZestFinance and VisualDNA’s sophisticated methods for 
reading creditworthiness as a property of individual users.) By analyzing 
traces from users’ online and social media activity, ZestFinance can claim to 
improve underwriting by 40% compared to the best-in-class industry standard 
(zestfinance.com). Further, such realism – such accuracy in calculating credit 
risk – might result from unexpected methods for analyzing existing data. As 
Merrill explains in an interview with the New York Times, “All data is credit 
data… This is the math we all learned at Google. A page was important for 
what was on it, but also for how good the grammar was, what the type font 
was, when it was created or edited. Everything… Data matters. More data is 
always better” (Hardy, 2012). This statement aptly summarizes Merrill’s 
conception of credit data as something that might be read obliquely, 
manifesting in unexpected ways, through unconscious signs, if only it is 
interpreted with the “right” mathematics.  
Of course, Merrill’s comments reflect a highly idiosyncratic 
understanding of the significance and function of “all data.” It would be very 
easy to imagine a world in which data, as such (for instance, on weather 
patterns, astronomical phenomena or neurological processing), were not 
particularly closely linked to credit. Yet in a neoliberal era in which both 
household and government debt have skyrocketed; in which access to 
privatized social rites such as home ownership or, more broadly, having a 
family are increasingly predicated on access to credit; and in which intangible 
assets such as future profits on resources or cognitive capacities take on 
increasing importance, Merrill’s pronouncement provides a crystalline image 
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of the pervasive power of speculative value (both qualitative and quantified), 
harnessed by data analytics, and attached to individuals. It encapsulates the 
shape of an entrepreneurial imaginary – an avant-garde, if you will, in the 
business world – which ever more pervasively links data to character (in the 
Heraclitean sense of a tendency-as-destiny), and character, in turn, to 
finance: to the propensity to repay, and to behave reliably and responsibly 
with respect to money and other mediators of exchange. Such links are 
certainly not new; as Graeber (2011), Lazzarato (2012), Nietzsche (1967), 
Mondzain (2005) and others have suggested, the links between economy, 
debt and morality are very old indeed. Graeber, for instance, contends that 
the very languages of money and morality have been closely intertwined for 
millennia; Mondzain argues that the concept of economy inherited from the 
time of the Byzantine iconoclastic crisis is the very form of humanism today. 
That said, the pervasiveness of the link between finance and (moral) 
character achieved through data analytics has fundamentally shifted, due to 
both the speculative logic of the credit market and fundamental shifts in 
computational practices. In an era of fintech, quantitatively assessing 
“character,” institutionalized as risk assessment, takes on new proportions, 
and new algorithmic witnesses.  
As Jaron Lanier points out (2014, p. 110-113), so-called “big data” 
might, in fact, refer to two different things: big data in the sciences, and big 
data in business. On the one hand, in scientific analyses of very large data 
sets, robust methodology, skepticism, and the reproducibility of experiments 
to make sure that correlation has not been confused with causation are 
tantamount. On the other hand, business and financial uses of big data seek 
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profitability, not truth. As such, big data analytics used in high speed trading 
and computational business practices tend not to be overly concerned with 
distinguishing between correlation and causation. If a calculation works, it 
may be used. The drive to treat all data as credit data within the fintech 
industry, clearly, falls within the latter set of data analytic practices. It 
functionalizes data as a tool for expressing the power relation between 
creditor and debtor, both literalizing Deleuze’s pronouncement (1992) that, in 
a control society, man is controlled by debt; and driving that control into the 
very representational fabric of his being “creditworthy” (or otherwise). Merrill’s 
pronouncement focalizes “all data” toward this purpose, rendering data as a 
tool with which to paint a truthful picture of a person from the perspective of 
key measures of financial reliability, which might, in turn, have recursive 
financial effects (for instance, rendering one person as a good credit risk, 
thereby driving her interest rates down and making her more likely to be able 
to manage her loans – or, conversely, strapping other, “high-risk” prospective 
borrowers with prohibitively high interest rates, thus making them less likely to 
behave reliably as debtors).46 In addition to this potential recursivity, Merrill’s 
statement expresses a relation between data, quantity, and realism in 
portraying risk. “More data is always better;” it means more predictive 
accuracy when rendered in the right math, more fodder for equations. Further, 
in encapsulating a sense of the many oblique angles along which data 
analytics might inquire in their drive to determine creditworthiness (not only 
looking at the content of messages but also their form, their grammar, their 
metadata), Merrill renders data analytics as something akin to a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 For more on the “cascading disadvantages” of bad credit, see, for instance, Pasquale 
(2011). 
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psychoanalytic practice, a search to digitally read and interpret symptoms on 
the skin of one’s digital being, which run alongside (and possibly counter to) 
conscious online self-expression. Data mining digs for unconscious truth, 
reveals symptoms. (In the words of a TV character, an analyst of email 
records in the American legal and political drama The Good Wife, “metadata 
don’t lie.”) (Hail Mary, 2015). 
By using big data to make more accurate risk assessments, Merrill’s 
company can claim to be doing both lenders and borrowers a favour. Lenders, 
its website claims, can save money by lowering default rates. Worthy 
borrowers with unimpressive credit histories can gain much-needed access to 
loans. In an impassioned 2012 TEDx talk prominently displayed on his 
company’s website, Merrill paints a picture of the underbanked by describing 
his own sister-in-law, a single mother of three and a full time student with a full 
time job who, like more than half of Americans, would not be able to come up 
with a few hundred dollars to deal with an emergency on a few weeks’ notice 
(www.zestfinance.com). For responsible, yet underbanked prospective 
borrowers like Merrill’s sister-in-law, simply getting a flat tire could be the 
beginning of a downward financial spiral. Painting a more accurate picture of 
their character using big data, Merrill claims, ameliorates the situation. FICO® 
credit scores, invented in the 1970s, are “largely non-predictive.” Invented at a 
time when computation was difficult and data storage was very expensive, 
FICO® was built on logistic regression, a basic, probabilistic statistical method 
ideally suited to working with small data sets. The financial world, as Merrill 
puts it, is “stuck in FICO® Land;” yet with so many new data mining methods 
currently being developed at Google, Amazon and other tech and commerce 
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companies, there is no reason why this industry cannot shed its fear of “using 
all data as credit data,” thus helping those without recognizable credit scores 
to obtain the loans they deserve (www.zestfinance.com). Thus, a prospective 
borrower who does not have sufficient creditworthiness for a subprime credit 
card, but who is far less of a credit risk than a payday loan company’s interest 
rates would warrant, can get something in between two exorbitant, though 
vastly different, interest rates. “Close your eyes and imagine,” Merrill intones, 
“a world in which subprime credit is not dominated by FICO®, but is actually 
dominated by your behaviour… really deep, rich understandings of you as a 
person” (www.zestfinance.com). This system, Merrill suggests, would be, in 
some ways, similar to the days before FICO®, when bankers would assess a 
prospective borrower based on personal meetings and gut instincts. But it 
would be different in that such holistic “instincts” could be informed with much 
more complex, nuanced information than simply judging someone’s character 
on the spot could provide. Speaking to Wired UK, Merrill says that denying 
people access to decent credit rates is not fair, because “credit is the entry 
point to modern society.” To use big data well, however, to make this fairness 
come about, takes much more than simply solid math; it takes great 
inventiveness to work with data. As Merrill puts it, “It’s not just about science, 
it’s also about art. The hottest job should be data artist – those who 
understand the quirks of data” (Clark, 2013). For Merrill, then, both 
mathematical and perceptual practices of discernment are art forms, and 
require subtlety, sophistication and sound judgment to produce – although big 
data analytics, when used with sophistication, can render far more nuanced 
readings of an individual’s propensity.  
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Yet such expressions of the rarefied skills required to analyze data are 
offset by the fintech industry’s positivist bent and truth-centered assertions. Gil 
Elbaz, former head of Google’s engineering office and CEO of Factual, 
expresses the fintech and information industry’s positivist bent quite clearly. 
(He was also an early investor in Merrill’s company.) His company, Factual, 
sells information to companies on a sliding scale, depending on how much it 
is used. It employs advanced mathematicians and data scientists from Google 
and LinkedIn, and boasts customers such as Facebook, CitySearch and 
AT&T. According to Elbaz, Factual’s purpose is to provide information for 
scientists to watch and companies to use. (Thus, he conceptualizes the divide 
between big data for science and for business within his business model.) 
Elbaz’ father recalls that when Elbaz, who grew up in Israel, was told about 
the Israel-Palestine conflict, he responded that “the hatred would end if the 
two sides could just agree on the facts” (Hardy, 2012). Facts, for Elbaz, are 
conflict reducing, purely truthful (even if they require acts of interpretation) 
rather than socially constructed. Such truthful bases can also be found, in 
Elbaz’ business model, the in personal realm, if in a more medical sense than 
in Merrill’s more speculative construction of character. As Elbaz explains: 
“Lately, I’ve been thinking that we need to get more personal data… I want to 
figure out a way… to get people to leave their data to science” (Hardy, 2012). 
Facts such as “genetic information, what they ate, when and where they 
exercised — ideally, for everyone on the planet, now and forever” (Hardy, 
2012) could be used to further the health sciences in the future. Of course, 
such facts could just as easily be used to police access to jobs, health care 
and insurance options – a possibility to which Elbaz draws less attention in his 
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interview. Nevertheless, within fintech companies whose practices are 
primarily predictive, we could argue that there is a one-step removal from 
such “factual” ground, in that, however compelling computational analyses of 
tendency might be, the future cannot be predetermined in advance.  
Yet still, a discourse of truth prevails. For instance, the Shoreditch, 
London-based VisualDNA offers credit scoring based on psychometric testing. 
Its founder, Alex Willcock, quips, “Not everyone has a credit score, but 
everyone has a personality type” (Jenkins, 2014). In addition to analyzing IP 
address activity, VIsualDNA also administers a 10-15 minute personality test, 
which mostly asks test-takers to choose between images meant to reveal 
attitude toward risk. For instance, questions might ask quiz-takers to choose a 
favourite form of leisure: a day out with the family, a night of partying, or a 
good book? “Psychology + big data = understanding,” VisualDNA’s website 
homepage claims. As of November 2014, a bar along the bottom of the 
homepage added: “take a personality quiz and find your true character” 
(visualDNA.com, Nov 2014; see Figure 11). However, in 2015 and current at 
the time of writing, this has been changed to read: “Think you’re agreeable or 
conscientious? Take a personality quiz and find out!” (visualDNA.com, May 
2015). (Was the language of “character” too much, too judgment-rich for 
VisualDNA’s demographic?) VisualDNA has been running in Russia for a few 
years via Syvaznoy, a phone retailer-cum-bank; some lenders who have used 
their services report a 50% decrease in loan default rates (Jenkins, 2014). As 
a result, Experian (the credit rating agency) and Mastercard have signed on 
as clients. Willcock aims to target 30 million of 1.9 billion “addressable 
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unbanked” over the next few years using these psychometric credit-scoring 
methods. As Jenkins (2014) describes it:  
The world is not going back to the old order of a bank manager 
knowing each of his customers individually and making credit 
judgments on that basis. Big data and psychometric tests have the 
potential to replicate the personal touch, and ensure lenders know 
more about their customers than they ever used to.  
 
Jenkins, Willcock and Merrill clearly link big data analytics with a “personal 
touch,” seamlessly blending quantitative character analyses with more 
“intuitive,” qualitative conceptions of character discernment.47 Such claims to 
artfulness, truth and positivism require “master” figures, who are capable, 
through calculation, of knowing borrowers better than they know themselves. 
Like early psychoanalysts who claimed to interpret the meanings of dreams 
as if they could be read by a single, skilled eye, fintech calculates destinies, 
and in doing so, performs them, makes them true. 
If, for Heraclitus, character was “destiny,” perhaps for Merrill and others 
of our time, character, as pervasively represented destiny, becomes more of a 
gateway. A future-oriented concept such as character, in an era of 
widespread speculation, enables access to the security and rites of passage 
that, for a shrinking and increasingly pressed middle class, must be accessed 
through credit. Yet it is also a financial frontier for fintech companies whose 
business models depend, at least in part, on expanding the credit market to 
the “underbanked,” and perpetuating a passive language according to which it 
is tech companies and not, say, peers, who can ultimately determine a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 In the next chapter, I further discuss the history of FICO® credit scoring, which replaced 
more informal methods for granting loans, based on lenders’ discernment (McClanahan 
2014). Qualitative and quantitative conceptions of credit scoring continue to shift, complement 
and augment each other (McClanahan 2014, Dunkley 2014). 
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person’s character. This is the transactional language of a surveillance 
economy, made possible by online design choices favouring anonymity over 
sociality, and sophisticated servers over content providers (see Lanier, 2014). 
While some have addressed concerns over privacy that fintech exacerbates, 
amongst financial and tech journalists, the response to startups such as 
Merrill’s has tended to be positive. Peter Jenkins of the Financial Times 
writes, “Admittedly, some of the data mining that fintech companies carry out 
makes liberty campaigners jittery. On balance, though, it is refreshing to see 
new ideas being brought to the traditionally obscure process of granting 
consumer credit” (2014). 
The Reputation Economy 
 
If fintech presents the unconscious side of online reputation, which 
must be analyzed en masse by mathematicians and data experts, the 
reputation economy represents the conscious side of this equation. So-called 
“World 3.0” businesses – such as Uber, TaskRabbit and Airbnb – depend on 
reputation, encouraging users to leave reviews for each other in order to 
garner support for their entrepreneurial or consumptive activities. Such 
businesses model new ways to manage the sale of “real life” experience or 
service with online reputation as a guarantor; to wit, on these platforms, 
reputation outsources regulation.  
 One of the most prominent “World 3.0” businesses is Airbnb. (As of 
March 2015, the company has been valuated at $20 billion.) (Clampet, 2015) 
Airbnb was founded by Brian Chesky (its current CEO) and Joe Gebbia. Their 
background was in art and design; they attended the Rhode Island School of 
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Design and initially intended to start a design business together. After 
studying at RISD, Chesky moved to Los Angeles and worked as a designer; 
dissatisfied with the post, he moved to San Francisco to join Gebbia and start 
a business. They were completely broke, and there was a design conference 
coming to town, which they planned to attend. They noticed that all of the 
hotels listed on the conference website were already sold out; needing to 
come up with a way to pay their rent, they decided to blow up some air 
mattresses in their apartment, rent them out, and make breakfast for whoever 
came. The range of people who wanted to come surprised them; and 
eventually, after many stops and starts, they turned Airbnb into a business. By 
Chesky’s own account, he was incredibly naïve at the start of this project; he 
had never heard of couch surfing before. (In a sense, then, he and Gebbia 
accidentally financialized a domain that already existed, in a different form, as 
a “free” interchange – or at least, even if no gift economy is ever truly “free”, it 
was not yet a financialized form of exchange). It happened according to 
happenstance; their poverty necessitated entrepreneurial action, and 
eventually led to their design and development of new liaisons between small-
scale and large-scale entrepreneurialism. In the early days of their company, 
their background in design – and the lack of financial acumen that this 
seemed to imply – was perceived as a company liability by potential investors; 
but Chesky and Gebbia came to see their background as one of their greatest 
advantages. After all, at RISD they had been taught to create a world, not to 
simply conform to a pre-existing one. After all, Chesky argued, the business 
world had a rather limited view of design; entrepreneurs often tended to see 
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design as simply the practice of making a product. Airbnb, instead, designed 
situations, interfaces, and encounters.  
 Graham Harman has argued (compellingly, if not in a particularly 
airtight fashion) that “design will always be political, since it sets down the 
background conditions that govern the next phase of overt activity, which is 
doomed in turn to grind to a halt someday (2012, p. 93). Despite its critical, 
avant-gardist legacy, in Harman’s view, art mainly reflects on past 
configurations of objects and their potential, pulling cultural artefacts from their 
naturalized backgrounds. Design, on the other hand, produces that which will 
become the background conditions, the taken-for-granted, in the future. 
Harman’s division between art and design is certainly quite simplistic; 
nevertheless it provocatively proposes that design quietly carries the futurity 
that art expressly promises. Airbnb’s political restructuring of social encounter, 
its psychogeographic repositioning and redistribution of encounter with 
respect to tourism and tourist cities’ distributions of private and public space, 
have cornered a market. They have been scaled up to the size of big 
business, setting new background conditions for travel and commerce. Airbnb 
creates a new diagram, a new design, a new condition of possibilities for 
linking intimate, personal relations, on the one hand, with finance and the free 
labour of reviewers, on the other.  
 Airbnb’s business model designs a structure of relation based on 
exploiting the free labour of clients and customers, in the form of oft-
prompted, but ostensibly “freely” written reviews. These reviews allow the 
company to deregulate lodging. They contribute to a business structure in 
which reputation replaces regulation; reputation produces an alibi for the 
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company’s lack of regulatory oversight, and outsources responsibility for the 
risk deregulation carries onto the consumer.48  
This situation can be seen as just one aspect of the emerging 
reputation economy. Reputation, of course, is nothing new, and has been 
important in various arenas for centuries. Yet in an era of precarious labour, 
social media and pervasive online reviewing, reputation regulates a greatly 
expanded range of economic, financial and personal activities, and brings 
together the practices of personal and professional life, domestic and 
business activities in new ways. Analyzing the reputation economy as it is 
experienced through Airbnb-mediated encounters can serve as a point of 
departure for what I am calling a form of financialized psychogeography: a 
close analysis of the structures of feeling experienced by Airbnb users who 
are placed within this financialized structure that puts new, and newly 
configured, forms of pressure on reputation, disposition and character. 
 As Alison Hearn (2010) has argued, online ratings and reviews, now a 
dominant force in managing individuals’ encounters with businesses and with 
each other, comprise a newly dominant form of market discipline administered 
through affective conditioning. Hearn dismantles the prevalent assumption 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 In a famous case, in which, as Chesky concedes, the company failed to provide adequate 
customer support, a woman who rented her property through Airbnb had her home ransacked 
by crystal meth addicts, who, among other things, punched a hole in a wall to gain access to 
a locked closet in which valuables and documents were stored, while all the while sending her 
emails thanking her for respecting their privacy and assuring her that they loved her home. 
While Airbnb did eventually cover her damages, their initial response was poor. This 
prompted the woman to raise the question: what did Airbnb offer that a free platform, such as 
Craigslist, didn’t? Craigslist would have, in fact, allowed her more control as to how she chose 
to communicate with her prospective renters; so the free service might have been much 
better than the paid one. Chesky, for his part, refers to this as an incident that helped Airbnb 
to vastly improve its customer care. Now, he says, we simply bend over backwards for the 
customer (Lacy, 2013). In spite of the fact that Airbnb does now underwrite responsibility for 
major damages incurred, on a smaller scale, the customer still assumes responsibility for risk 
(which they can certainly afford to do), and may never know exactly what he/she is walking 
into.  
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that online tools for producing and managing reputation (such as customer 
reviews of products and sellers on platforms like Amazon) – are successfully 
making more voices heard, producing a democratic exchange of unbiased, 
freely-expressive, virtuosic consumers. Instead, she draws attention to how 
tightly controlled the reputation economy quickly becomes, and how 
remarkably homogenous it is. While many might assume that they are likely to 
find a fair and wide-ranging spate of reviews for a particular product or 
service, in fact, a 2002 study found that eBay seller ratings were 99% positive 
and 0.6% negative; similarly, a 2009 study of all online ratings across the web 
found them to average 4.3 out of 5 (Hearn, 2010, p. 434; Fowler and DeAvila, 
2009). This situation speaks to, performs and produces what Hearn calls the 
“smiley-faced” disposition of the contemporary work world. Hearn cites 
several possible reasons for this. (That said, we might do well to remember 
that, especially in recent years, this smiley-faced-ness has come to be 
counterbalanced by the voracious hatred of online trolls.) Smiley-faced-ness 
might be due, in part, to the sheer technophilic thrill of feeding back; or to a 
pervasive sense of fear of a bad review, coupled with a desire to enact a quid 
pro quo modus operandi with respect to reputation: if you give me a good 
review, I’ll give you one back. Ultimately, however, Hearn concludes, this 
disposition is “likely the combined result of reputation measurement and 
management systems working to bolster the interests of their corporate 
employers” (p. 434).  
Instances in favour of the latter explanation have only grown in number 
and in aggressiveness since the time of Hearn’s writing. These include 
several recent lawsuits launched by businesses against individuals who have 
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posted negative reviews. For instance, in July 2014, blogger Caroline Doudet 
was successfully sued in a French court by Il Giardino restaurant in the 
Aquitaine region of France, after she posted an online review entitled “the 
place to avoid in Cap-Ferret: Il Giardino” (Rawlinson, 2014). The restaurant 
owners argued that because the review appeared fourth in Google search 
results about the restaurant, Doudet’s words were unfairly hurting their 
business. Critics of the case argued that the judge had unwittingly invented a 
new kind of crime: ranking highly in search results while saying something 
negative. (Google’s search engine algorithms are, of course, beyond any 
blogger’s control.) As Doudet quipped, “What is perverse, is that we look for 
bloggers who are influential, but only if they are nice about people” 
(Rawlinson, 2014). Several similar cases have emerged in the U.S. – for 
instance, T&J Towing of Kalamazoo, Michigan filed a defamation suit against 
21-year-old college student Justin Kurtz, who started a Facebook group 
entitled “Kalamazoo residents against T&J Towing” after his car was towed 
from a building parking lot despite his having a permit, costing him $118 
(Frosch, 2010). As Frosch notes, First Amendment lawyers tend to see such 
cases as just the latest incarnation of a much older legal strategy: the 
strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP). These lawsuits, Frosch 
notes, are not necessarily put forward with an eye to winning (and often do 
not win); rather, they are meant to intimidate individuals who might speak out 
against businesses with the prospect of gruelling and costly time in court. 
(Indeed, as Rawlinson notes, Caroline Doudet’s French court case took place 
in an emergency court, since the prosecutors argued that their business was 
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still in the process of being hurt by her review; thus, she was not able to find 
herself a lawyer in time, and represented herself.)  
In a similar vein, the EU recently upheld the “right to be forgotten” in a 
case brought forward by Spanish man Mario Costeja González against 
Google Spain. González argued that search results persistently turned up 
information about his home having been repossessed in 1998; this was 
unfairly tarnishing his reputation. In an interview with The Guardian, González 
explained, “I was fighting for the elimination of data that adversely affects 
people's honour, dignity and exposes their private lives. Everything that 
undermines human beings, that's not freedom of expression" (Travis and 
Arthur, 2014). As New York-based British comedian John Oliver quipped in an 
episode of his show on the Right to be Forgotten, the irony is that, thanks to 
this case, the only thing anybody outside of Spain knows about González is 
the one thing he did not want them to know: that he was “that guy who didn’t 
pay his mortgage” (2014). Irony notwithstanding, the EU now mandates that 
Google must amend “inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant” search 
results when an individual requests it (Travis and Arthur, 2014). Both strategic 
lawsuits and the EU’s “right to be forgotten” legislation paint the reputation 
economy as a fraught, highly valued and highly contested terrain that pulls at 
the fabric of free speech and raises many questions as to what would 
constitute “fair” parameters for representing character online.  
  Strategic lawsuits and the right to be forgotten speak to a newly 
emerging form of inequality: inequality of means (financial, social, spatio-
technological, temporal and legal) through which to curate a reputation. Of 
course, if, as Douglas Merrill once said, “all data is credit data” (Jenkins, 
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2014), then the financial world has an incredibly foregrounded role to play in 
the production of new forms of subjection that would link a (broader, systemic) 
condition of financialized risk with individual responsibility, understood and 
rendered representable as “character”. Given such incredible and wide-
ranging pressures on individuals to produce and circulate “good”, “reliable”, 
“responsible”, and, above all, “nice” characters, and given businesses’ often 
vicious attack on those who would tarnish their image, Hearn’s description of 
the “smiley-faced” disposition of the reputation economy comes as no 
surprise. How might this “nice-ification” of capitalism through the reputation 
economy effect analyses of previous epistemic contexts in which the desire to 
be genuinely “good” – in the sense, for instance, that the French Fluxus artist 
Filliou advocated – operated?  
Robert Filliou at the Cédille  
 
“There is a great deal of poetry in economics. But there is also a great deal of 
economics in poetry. Definitely.” 
- Robert Filliou (1970, p. 76.) 
“… In the deadly jungle in which we live, the only genius is to be ‘good’…”  
- Robert Filliou (1970, p. 45) 
 I’m sitting in a flat I rented from Airbnb in the seaside village of 
Villefranche-sur-Mer, France (just east of Nice). It’s a beautiful late August, 
high tourist season. I’m sequestered from the sun by the shadowy, narrow 
streets in the old part of town, which was first built up after Charles II, Duke of 
Anjou, enticed locals to build closer to the water in 1295 with tax privileges, in 
order that their settlements might help defend the coastline from pirates 
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(Barelli and Rocca, 1998, p. 22-31). The bay onto which the town faces has 
been strategically significant for centuries, since its waters gain great depth 
close to shore. Now, it serves another strategic purpose: harbouring 
enormous cruise ships. By day, the beach swells with umbrellas, bathers and 
towels; by night, the patios of the old part of town swarm with diners. Cacti 
creep over balconies, flowerpots and steep, rocky hillsides. Once a fishing 
village, the main industry is now tourism.49  
 This is the village where, in 1965, the French Fluxus artist-poet Robert 
Filliou and the American artist-composer George Brecht opened a shop of 
sorts, called La Cédille Qui Sourit (The Cedilla that Smiles, Figure 12). It was 
located at 12 Rue de May, a small but central, stepped street in the heart of 
the old part of the village. Across the street was an antique shop; down the 
steps, a small, dark passageway led past cellar doors and kitchens, toward 
the seaside. (Natilee Harren has eloquently described this small, dark 
passageway as “the asshole of Villefranche”) (2013, p. 223). The shop was 
filled with Fluxus experiments and small works, displayed chaotically. Often, 
Filliou and Brecht would be absent, preferring instead to invent games and 
proposals at the café down the road. The two artists were sometimes joined 
by their Fluxus associates from New York. By 1968, Filliou and Brecht could 
no longer afford to pay the rent, and the shop closed; Filliou continued to 
elaborate his principles of a poetic economy.  
 The activities at the Cédille formed part of Filliou’s nomadic, often 
chaotic and unclearly-defined art/life practice – which I am envisioning as an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 In an interview with Sarah Lacy (2013), Brian Chesky, founder and CEO of Airbnb, remarks 
that tourism is a two trillion-dollar industry worldwide; fully half the size of the oil industry. The 
economic importance of this industry, Chesky argues, is routinely underrated.  
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expanded field spanning individual artworks, performances, collaborations, 
writings and studies, experiments of many sorts, a family ethos, and a 
constellation of techniques and modes of being through which to practice 
deep friendship. Filliou consciously combined interests in art and poetry with 
economic theory. He envisioned a qualitative conception of an economic 
praxis, which he theorized through his actions. He termed this the “poetic 
economy,” which linked an Eternal Network of artists through innocence, 
imagination and freedom. (This he opposed to what he termed an “economics 
of prostitution”, which emphasized competition, hierarchy, sales and self-
promotion). As much as Filliou theorized the economy consciously in many of 
his works and writings (and followed the utopian economic thought of Charles 
Fourier), perhaps the most important, most central component of his 
economic explorations was in his character; his performative embodiment of 
the qualities of the poetic economy, mapped into (and through) his 
personhood, his lifespan, the personal connections he worked on. As he put 
it, “The real talent I have is for friendship. Ninety-nine percent of my work is 
not visible” (Tilman, 2007, p. 174; trans. Harren, 2013, p. 210).   
 Since Filliou’s time, the economy has shifted in directions that seem, in 
certain ways, to be curiously aligned with those he envisioned (and in other 
ways, to be completely alienated from his vision). Precarious, temporary, 
somewhat nomadic employment conditions (of which Filliou and his friends 
were “pioneers” of sorts) have become far more the norm among what Franco 
“Bifo” Berardi (2010) has referred to as today’s alienated cognitariat. The 
virtuosic practices and performances of friendship, likeability, care and various 
forms of emotional and immaterial labour has – as Paolo Virno, Arlie 
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Hochschild (2003) and others have argued – been dramatically foregrounded,  
and often exploited, in a postfordist economy. Further, as Allison Hearn 
(2010), Evgeny Morozov and others have shown, reputations – be they 
garnered online through “likes”, reviews, credit scores or other quasi-metric 
platforms – have been given new forms of economic work, which has lead to 
a ubiquitously (and perhaps oppressively) “smiley-faced” disposition in online 
forums (Hearn, 2010), and to a state in which (as Morozov argues) subjects 
will be increasingly controlled by quantifications of their creditworthiness. The 
more citizens’ actions are measured, the more their past actions are linked to 
predictive models of their future character, the less uninhibited they might feel 
to experiment openly with “risky” behaviour or “abnormal” styles of being. 
Though these developments foreground links between the performative, the 
affective and the economic, much like Filliou’s embodied theorizations did, 
they are clearly a far cry from the utopian, emancipatory conditions that Filliou 
and his compatriots imagined for their embodied economic practices.  
 What, then, is it to consider Filliou’s embodiment of economic theory as 
a precursor to later developments in postfordist, neoliberal capitalism? What 
would it be to test the viability of Filliou’s “poetic economy” today, when 
arguably, such an economy has been seamlessly blended with an economics 
of prostitution? In what proportions should such comparisons be broad, 
general, specific, linear, or aberrant, transversal? Further, what can be done 
with such a critique? Is it possible for artists of today to put forward a 
qualitative conception of economy that is not always, already financialized?  
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Filliou: a Brief Introduction  
 In order to address such questions, it will first be necessary to 
assemble a brief overview of Filliou’s practice. Robert Filliou (1926-1987) was 
a French Fluxus artist and poet, active from the early 1960s until his death. 
After moving to the United States in 1947 to work for Coca-Cola, and later 
earning a masters degree in economics at UCLA, Filliou was stationed in 
Korea as an advisor to the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency. In 
1954, he left his career with the U.N., and traveled to Egypt, and later Spain 
and Denmark (Filliou, 1970, p. 8). In 1957, he married Marianne Staffels, and 
their daughter Marcelle was born in 1961. The family lived a largely nomadic 
life, as Filliou worked on various projects in France, Canada, the United 
States and Europe. They lived in poverty more often than not – sometimes 
living off of donations from friends, and sometimes giving away the money he 
acquired to his students. Filliou spent the last three years of his life in a 
French Buddhist monastery with his wife, and died in 1987.  
 Filliou’s artwork was diverse and often ephemeral, spanning 
performance, spoken word, writing, small-scale publications, video, sound 
recordings, sculpture, and various forms of collaboration and social 
experimentation. Commenting on the videotapes Filliou produced in Canada, 
Sharla Sava notes, “Perhaps they should not be conceived of as a coherent 
body of work, but rather as a collection that encompasses diverse proposals, 
monologues, or enactments of his ideas. Sketchy when considered as 
discrete units, these videos work in concert with one another and with the 
broader range of concerns on which Filliou had been working for many years” 
(Robertson, Sava et. al, 1995, p. 18). Sava’s observation applies equally well 
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to Filliou’s oeuvre as a whole; his work asks that one forge connections 
between disparate works rather than, on the one hand, isolating single works, 
or, on the other hand, generalizing about the body of work as a whole. Since 
Filliou is relatively little known, I will try to evoke a sense of his work below.  
 Filliou constantly blurred the line between art and everyday activities. 
He did not wish to reproduce the orthodoxies of art history, which separate 
“artist-geniuses” from “everyday people,” and “masterpieces” from quotidian 
creative acts. In his sound piece Whispered History of Art (1963, recorded 
1977) he teaches an “art history” bereft both of artists and of “artworks”, and 
filled, instead, with everyday acts of wonder from various points over the last 
one million years. Each time he describes some man’s creative act (and they 
are, indeed, all men) – squeezing some snow and listening to the sound, 
boiling a bone and watching it change, observing the imprint a coin makes on 
the earth – he whispers, “Who that man was is not important. He’s dead, but 
art is alive. I mean, let’s keep names out of this” (Filliou, 1963).50 A 
humourous lecture on the last one million years of art, the piece focuses on 
everyday experiments, and invites the listener to participate – by, for instance, 
pouring some vinegar onto a piece of chalk and seeing what happens.  
 Emphasizing the everyday experiment, Filliou redefined art as “‘a form 
of organized leisure’ capable of providing ‘a potentially revolutionary set of 
values’” (Filliou, 1970, p. 23, 78; quoted in Sava, Robertson, Sava et. al, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Robert Filliou, Whispered History of Art, UbuWeb Sound: Robert Filliou, 
http://www.ubu.com/sound/filliou.html. Of course, it is important to note that Filliou is less than 
“revolutionary” in rendering all of the “artists” in his account men (although, as he often does, 
Fillou weaves a personal narrative into his social narrative, and his wife and daughter feature 
prominently in these sections). Though a detailed account of gender in Filliou’s work is 
beyond the scope of this essay, it is fairly plain to see that he is replicating some patriarchal 
assumptions here.  
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1995, p. 22). Humour and playfulness were essential in enacting these 
values, and Filliou often employed a koan-like or riddle-like quality in his work. 
In his book The Seat of Ideas (1981), for instance, Filliou presented a 
photograph of a seatless chair frame, with a sign affixed to it that reads “The 
Seat of Ideas”. At first, such a gesture may appear as an overly literal, 
simplistic and illustrative approach to sculpture; yet perhaps the gesture might 
better be understood, firstly, as a point of intersection between poetry and 
sculpture; and, secondly, as a form of advocacy for a particular style of 
address – the simple, flat, innocent, naïve persona. The work takes off from 
its persona’s “simplicity;” and this simplicity becomes its riddle, its question, 
and its humour.51 
 Filliou often directly rethought social, legal, pedagogical and economic 
norms. At the Cédille, he and George Brecht proposed to a French legislator 
that marriage licenses become temporary;52 if a couple did not renew their 
license after five years, it would be automatically annulled. Likewise, Filliou 
rethought the axioms of primary school education, imagining contemporary art 
in the curriculum in his book Teaching and Learning as Performing Arts 
(1970). He also proposed alternative economic models in his artworks, 
suggesting that art needed to espouse “an alternative theory of value… an 
enhanced economy where abstract labour, instead of being defined through 
the relative exchange value of the commodity, could be evaluated in relation 
to the ‘innocence,’ ‘imagination,’ or ‘freedom’ it was worth” (Sava, in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 An accompanying text by Edwige Regenwetter playfully suggests many possible 
interpretations of “the seat of ideas” (which, unlike the hermeneutical digging that Susan 
Sontag disparages, form a friendly hum around the image). Robert Filliou and Edwige 
Regenwetter, The Seat of Ideas (Calgary: Syntax/Egg Press, 1981).  
52 This was one of the many proposals that came out of the storefront Brecht and Filliou 
operated in southern France, named “La Cédille Qui Sourit.”  
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Robertson, Sava, et. al, 1995, p. 22-24). Thus the “innocent” address of a 
work like The Seat of Ideas, in Filliou’s way of thinking, is directly economic in 
value. Filliou proposed this alternate theory simply and directly in his 
sculptural work Permanent Creation Toolbox # 1 (1969), which consists of a 
toolbox containing a collapsible yardstick and neon signs for “imagination” and 
“innocence.”  
The work of Charles Fourier largely inspired Filliou’s challenge to 
commodity-based notions of economic value. Fourier, the nineteenth-century 
French utopian socialist, has been known for uttering strange economic 
assertions, such as: “a beneficial increase in the passionate intensity of the 
earth would gradually transform the briny seas into a tangy lemonade flavour” 
(Fourier, 1971a, p. 9; Sava in Robertson, Sava et. al, 1995, p. 38). Marxists 
roundly critiqued Fourier’s work for “failing to provide a workable economic 
theory” (Sava in Robertson, Sava et. al, 1995, p. 38); yet twentieth-century 
thinkers such as André Breton, Herbert Marcuse and Roland Barthes took him 
up again as an important figure for the new left. In a manifesto published with 
the Great Bear pamphlet series in 1966 entitled “A proposition, a problem, a 
danger and a hunch”, Filliou writes with Fourierist fervor, “A problem, the one 
and only, but massive: money, which creating does not necessarily create. A 
Principles of Poetical Economy must be written. Write it” (Robertson, Sava et. 
al, 1995, p. 21). Through his artwork, writings and friendships, Filliou 
theorized a “poetical economy” – which embraced non-hierarchical, non-
competitive, friendly relations between an “eternal network” of creators. This 
points to “a different concept of value” which rejects the “endless consumption 
and accumulation of goods and property” and instead embraces leisure as the 
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most valuable commodity (1970, p. 49).  Filliou’s conception of economics 
gives economy a “character”; it replaces abstract, quantifiable conceptions of 
money for the qualitatively specific characteristics, inhabited, lived and 
performed.  
Filliou’s oeuvre reads not as a collection of discrete works, but as an 
archive of interconnected fragments which, to some degree, must be traced 
back to the situations of their initial production, and to the experimentations of 
their creator. Many of Filliou’s works and statements de-emphasize or 
disparage authorship. Concerning one of the twentieth century’s most famous 
artists, Filliou remarks:  
You know, Duchamp used to say in his later years, ‘What do you mean 
I’m famous – my greengrocer does not know who I am.’ I used to say that 
I am quite the opposite of Duchamp – only my greengrocer knows who I 
am. Duchamp added that ‘we must abolish the idea of judgment.’ I have 
worked it out further, I think we must abolish the idea of admiration (Morris 
and Trasov, in Robertson, Sava et. al, 1995, p. 72). 
 
But does Filliou’s work manage to abolish admiration? His works in homage to 
Fourier might suggest otherwise; and Filliou himself certainly had his 
followers. Vancouver curator Hank Bull recalls:  
he was pretty obsessed with his ideas, and had a powerful presence that 
was capable of taking over in many situations. I think he has been 
accused by certain people of demagoguery, and of having “followers.” It’s 
a problem with idealism, that it flirts with authority. But Robert was aware 
of all that and you can see in the tapes as he continually questions and 
deconstructs his own position (Craig and Bull, in Robertson, Sava et. al, 
1995, p. 69).  
 
Similarly, as Clive Robertson notes, in producing a historical account of 
Filliou’s work, it is “difficult in retrospect not to mythologize the person; to be 
blinded by, dismiss or decontextualize his maxims and aphorisms; or, finally, 
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to be seen to be installing another art monument to masculine generosity” 
(Robertson in Robertson, Sava et. al, 1995, p. 59). Thought Robertson 
laudably acknowledges the tendency to over-mythologize an artist, Filliou 
himself wove personal mythology into his works. For instance, in Whispered 
History of Art, he declares that art’s birthday is January 17th, one million years 
ago. January 17th happens to be Filliou’s birthday. Yet what if one were to 
view Filliou not as a positivist “origin” for his work, but rather as a character of 
sorts, who loosely weaves together the myths, tales and stories which 
inevitably swirl around a set of scattered, schizoid practices? (Is it possible to 
do this without admiration, or while deploying admiration differently?)  
In the past few decades, there has been a return to socially engaged 
art practices, which can be traced back to the experiments of Fluxus artists 
beginning in the 1960s.53 Often, these have been exhibited, discussed and 
critiqued under the rubric “relational aesthetics” – a term coined by French 
curator Nicholas Bourriaud. In the mid-1990s, Bourriaud (2002) declared that 
recent art reflected the larger turn toward tertiary economy, and that artists 
increasingly sought to offer social services rather than goods for exchange. 
This often involved artists using gallery spaces to construct temporary 
“service-areas” for visitors: offering free lunch, setting up a bar or a reading 
room.54 To many writers, these projects appeared to offer utopian, idealistic 
social spaces where barriers between people could melt away. Yet this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 See, for instance, Rodenbeck (2007). As Rodenbeck points out, the influential curator and 
critic Nicholas Bourriaud failed to contextualize recent participatory art practices in relation to 
the history of Fluxus art. This was “a defensive maneuver,” a deliberate erasure of the legacy 
of Fluxus work in order to make current practices appear more “new.”  
54 An example of the art that Bourriaud championed was Rirkrit Tiravanija’s installation 
Untitled (Tomorrow is another day) (1996). For this piece, Tiravanija built a life-sized, fully 
functional replica of his apartment in a museum. Visitors were invited to come inside, cook a 
meal, take a nap or shower, and “hang out” with strangers as if in the bounds of a domestic 
space.  
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utopian conception of social art practices has become increasingly unpopular 
over the past decade, due in large part to Claire Bishop’s highly influential 
essay “Antagonism and Relational Aesthetics” (2004). Citing Ernesto LaClau 
and Chantal Mouffe, Bishop argues that such utopian social practices are all 
the more exclusionary for their ostensible inclusiveness, as they fail to 
account for the inescapable antagonism that arises when people are 
socialized differently, internalizing slightly different symbolic orders. As such, 
these works preclude the possibility for truly democratic exchange – which, in 
LaClau and Mouffe’s account, must always leave open a space for 
antagonism to play out without resolution (Bishop, 2004). Bishop persuasively 
argues against the use of ethical criteria for judging socially engaged art 
practice, countering the assumption that more “inclusive” or “democratic” 
projects are necessarily better works of art (2006). However, as Amelia Jones 
points out, Bishop’s argument, in turn, falls prey to the assumption that 
“antagonistic” artwork is inherently “better art” than utopian work. Jones, for 
her part, questions the assumption that a stable, consistent cultural “value” 
can be located “within” a given artwork. In Derridean fashion, she insists that 
a work’s capacity to resist hegemonic forms of cultural production is always 
situational, and never inherent (Jones, 2010). Indeed, there seems to be an 
assumption of verisimilitude at work in Bishop’s essay: that if a work enacts, 
represents or reflects, say, a “naively” utopian ideal social space, its being-
effects (i.e. its influence on its visitors’ subsequent actions, reflections, social 
engagements, and ideas) will necessarily follow along the same lines.   
In light of this problem, perhaps Filliou’s practice offers a solution of 
sorts – for what if Filliou’s persona as “aberrant economist” is a necessary 
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performative frame for his Fourierist economic principles, precisely because it 
enforces a rhetorical distance between the work’s professed values and their 
effects in/on/as being? What if the naïve innocence of, say, The Seat of Ideas 
comes to be associated not with the artwork’s rhetorical claim to a truth value, 
but, rather, to the persona to which it is tied – the rhetorical belief in 
innocence, housed in a particular character or style of being, which both 
makes the artwork’s iteration of innocence possible in the first place, and 
subjectivizes its claim, introducing a critical distance between the work’s 
persona and the viewer’s belief (or lack thereof) in the artwork’s utterances? 
Filliou’s persona subjectivizes his artworks’ truth-claims; in performing the 
Fourierist economy, he stages a relationship between economy, performance 
and perception (much like Bridges’ banknote in Chapter 2) – and opens up 
the possibility for viewers to either share in that relationship, abstain from it, or 
nuance it with their own inflections. By framing his ideas as those of an 
aberrant economist, he turns his readers and viewers away from interpreting 
the theories he proposes as “true” or “false”; rather, he emphasizes their 
ability to do something through and for a subject, a character; and, in turn, to 
be either speculatively shared, diffused or dismissed. Filliou’s persona opens 
a rhetorical distance between ideas, their flows, and their representations – 
precisely the sorts of distance that the representational economies of 
character always must put into play, and navigate.    
The Depressed Subject of Possibility (or, Late Capitalist Decision Making) 
This is one way in which Filliou’s practice can speak back to current 
debates in contemporary art. His work clearly demonstrates how an artwork’s 
persona can enact, and enforce, a distance between representation and its 
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being-effects, between an utterance and the character who activates it. The 
persona opens up a subjectivized field, a space of indifference between a 
truth claim and its subjections. Yet if, on the one hand, a character such as 
Filliou’s aberrant economist persona opens up an indeterminate space 
between a work and its concomitant claims, on the other hand, the entreaty to 
become a character – to habituate oneself with an eye to one’s best future 
self – has become a perniciously overdetermined site of self-regulation in a 
neoliberal context.  How does the vast expansion of predictive practices (be 
they probabilistic or possibilistic, preventative or pre-emptive), operant in 
fintech and in other data analytic contexts, relate to the felt experiences 
associated with the rapid expansion of consumer choices and available life 
decisions (at least on some levels and for some, reasonably well-off citizens) 
– and the concomitant pressures these place on the formation of character?  
In a recent lecture at Goldsmiths (2014), Franco “Bifo” Berardi quipped 
that politics, today, is impossible, due to the proliferation of choices. In a 
landscape in which anything is possible, perhaps nothing is possible by way 
of political discussion; there is no ground, no vantage point from which to 
begin. Berardi’s view is one toward which, I imagine, the American 
psychologist Barry Schwartz would be sympathetic. Schwartz (2000, 2004) 
observes the effects of vast quantities of consumer choices on shoppers and 
citizens: the feeling that, just as one can choose between hundreds of styles 
of jeans in a shop, so too can one choose from myriad career choices, 
partners or life decisions. (Again, this sense of abundant choice may only ring 
true for some, reasonably well-off citizens, and it could very well be in the 
process of diminishing in the next decades, as debt straps new generations. 
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Nonetheless, for the moment at least, it at least partially generalizes as a 
consumer-democratic image of late-capitalist decision-making.)   In short, 
Schwartz speaks to the conditions and consequences of the decidedly 
contemporary feeling that one can choose to be whatever one wants. While 
the freedom to choose has been a broadly celebrated aspect of modern life, 
Schwartz studies the anxieties that comprise the underbelly of such (often 
overwhelming) freedoms. He argues that, while some choice is certainly 
better than no choice, too much choice can be extremely debilitating. 
Although Americans tend to greatly value freedom, autonomy and self-
determination, it is entirely possible for choices to become excessive, and for 
people to experience freedom as tyranny. Too much choice (whether in 
choosing a life partner or in deciding between hundreds of pairs of jeans) can 
increase people’s levels of dissatisfaction with the choices they have made, 
since the proliferation of choice gives the impression that it could always have 
been possible to choose better. Further, Schwartz argues, an excess of 
choice could be a contributing factor to clinical depression – since an 
abundance of choice increases a subject’s perceived responsibility for his/her 
(dis)satisfaction. When there is only, say, one career option to choose from 
(as when, for instance, a son must take over the family business), any 
dissatisfaction the subject feels with his fate can be attributed to the world, to 
“the way things are.” When options abound, individuals blame themselves if 
they are not satisfied with their decisions, haunted with the thought that they 
might have chosen better.  
Already, this form of haunting emerged as a trope in modern fiction. 
Andrew Miller, for one, argues that the alternate lives that characters in novels 
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by Dickens and James imagine for themselves “say something about the 
peculiar contingency of modern experience” (2007, p. 119). Yet, closer to the 
present, this image of being haunted by the paths one did not take re-
emerges in various accounts of depression – for instance, in Alain Ehrenberg 
(2010) and Christine Ross’ work (2006). Ehrenberg writes,  
Depression began its ascent when the disciplinary model for 
behaviours, the rules of authority and observance of taboos that gave 
social classes as well as both sexes a specific destiny, broke against 
norms that invited us to undertake personal initiative by enjoining us to 
be ourselves… Depression presents itself as an illness of responsibility 
in which the dominant feeling is that of failure. The depressed 
individual is unable to measure up; he is tired of having to become 
himself. (2010, p. 4) 
 
 For Ehrenberg, depression is the flipside of the weakening of disciplinary 
structures in the 1960s. This is not to say, of course, that one should 
nostalgically wish for a return to discipline; after all, the 1960s witnessed the 
very emergence of “sovereign man”… “the modern political idea… that we are 
owners of ourselves.” That said, the underbelly of this ideal is a pervasive 
sense that, as Ehrenberg puts it, “nothing is truly forbidden, nothing is truly 
possible” (p. 7). For her part, Christine Ross theorizes the depressed subject 
as both a trope and a mode of enquiry in contemporary art. She writes, 
“Depression – the insufficiency of self – could well be, as recent sociology has 
suggested, the fatigue that results from the individual’s compliance with 
neoliberal norms of independence based on the demand for the reiterated 
creation of self”’ (p. xxii). Earlier psychoanalytic discourses of sadness, built 
for a disciplinary society (such as Freud’s writing on melancholia) had an 
object, an external cause and, presumably, a finite duration, an eventual 
resolution. Depression, on the other hand, turns inward, starting and ending 
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with the depressed subject him/herself. “Closely related to this shift”, she 
continues, “is art’s apparent abandonment of emancipatory intent” (p. xxiii), its 
disavowal of avant-gardist strategies with all of their itinerant faith in the ability 
of art to provoke some form of social change. The failure of critique is the bad 
faith of the art world, the depressed admission of art’s political powerlessness. 
Ross’ writing expresses a similar sentiment to that in Sianne Ngai’s book on 
minor, un-heroic “ugly feelings” in literature (2005). Ugly feelings, Ngai 
argues, perform a reflexive role in literature, because they speak to the very 
condition of an art form that posits political critiques but has little power to 
change anything politically.55 In Ross’ view, many contemporary artists 
address a depressed subject, and embrace a “depressed” mode of address, 
as a positive condition. For instance, the “depressed” eye pictured by 
Rosemarie Trockel’s video Eye (1999), in its laconic, unseeing state, can 
bypass restrictive identificatory categories to which fully cognizant eyes might 
be subject. Given the weariness of too much choice, and the negative feeling 
loop that this generates, a new kind of vision emerges; new burdens give rise 
to the surprising potentials harboured in depressive vision.  
 In spite of such potential, it is worth bearing in mind that new burdens, 
such as those shouldered by the depressed neoliberal subject, also give rise 
to new forms of technocratic solutions and preclusive strategies. Take, for 
instance, the popular policy term “nudging.” This term was popularized by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Ngai and Ross’ observations are compatible, in my reading, despite that each author 
chooses to frame their observation slightly differently. Ngai’s privileges the ugly feeling itself 
over the subject who feels it (the latter of which Ross, on the other hand, foregrounds). Ngai 
speaks of the feeling as semi-autonomous, circulating between and across subjects, and 
perhaps, even, circulating without being felt by anyone – as in the false “confidence” that 
hangs in the air, passed off from fraudster to sucker to fraudster, in Melville’s The Confidence 
Man. On the other hand, Ross stresses the reflexive, depressive loop of feeling as particular 
to the neoliberal subject, who is continually asked to recreate herself. 
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economists Robert Thaler and Cass Sunstein, whose 2008 book Nudge: 
Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth and Happiness describes ways 
that policy makers can fashion “choice architecture” to help individuals make 
the best decision possible with the least effort. For instance, policy makers 
can carefully construct default choices in situations where individuals are 
likely to forget to “tick the box” before the deadline. Busy professors who have 
to choose whether or not to continue contributing to their retirement benefits 
package by a certain date may or may not remember to come in and do so; 
an effective choice architecture should set the default decision to that which is 
most likely to represent the best interests of the professors, even if they do 
not respond (in this case, it would be to continue on with the current 
contribution levels). Similarly, choice architecture demands that school 
cafeteria managers recognize that where they place foods (do the entrees go 
first? The desserts? The crisps? The fruit?) will impact which foods children 
choose, and thus impact their health. Thaler and Sunstein call their work on 
“nudging” and choice architecture a form of “libertarian paternalism”: a political 
and economic philosophy according to which individuals should have the 
freedom to do whatever they like – but policy makers should also actively 
intervene to help them recognize, and make, the best choices.  
Thaler and Sunstein are well aware that their work raises a 
fundamental ethical problem: according to whom are these architected 
choices the “best”? The school cafeteria example they use immediately calls 
to mind the school cafeteria’s close cousin, the grocery store, which has 
strategically placed products for decades (by, for instance, by positioning the 
most popular brands in the “bulls-eye zone” – on the second and third shelves 
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from the top – which is associated with the highest sales) (Sigurdsson et al., 
2009). Such placements, of course, are carried out in the name of profit, not 
public health. The authors maintain that this ambiguity – whose best interests 
are represented in an architected choice? – is an area of grave concern for 
choice architecture. Nonetheless, they maintain that nudging can be used for 
the public good as long as it serves the best interests of users, as they 
themselves would define their best interests. Considered in light of Ngai’s, 
Schwartz’, Ross’ and Ehrenberg’s writings, we might view choice architecture 
as a pre-emptive salve for the depressed neoliberal subject, overwhelmed by 
choice. Such tactics, as envisioned in behavioural economics, preclude the 
reflexive literary capacities of, say, Ngai’s ugly feelings, or the productive 
capacities of, say, the depressed eye in Trockel’s video installation, in Ross’ 
reading. They also reiterate the normative logic that Deleuze critiques in his 
essay on societies of control, through which non-normative decisions are 
welcomed, but architected into an uphill landscape – made subject to an 
economy of effort, pre-empted and scrutinized at every turn. Choice 
architecture, I argue, must be understood as a pre-emptive logic, which 
always risks conflation of that which is “best” for individuals with that which is 
best for stakeholders (be they those invested in grocery store profits or in 
privatized “public” health platforms). This is because, following Nitzan and 
Bichler’s work on capital as power (2009) (which I outlined in Chapter 2), 
there can be no dichotomy between the corporate and political infrastructure, 
which together form the state of capital.56 Choice architecture also must be 
understood, contrary to Thaler and Sunstein’s framing, as an address to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 In addition to this, we could consider the political import of Thaler and Sunstein’s choice 
architecture in light of Graham Harman’s description of design as inherently political, in that it 
sets the backgrounds, the givens, the taken-for-granteds, for future decisions (2012).  
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overwhelmed and/or depressed neoliberal subject. If we agree with Berardi’s 
assessment that politics is not possible in a landscape oversaturated with 
choice, then what does choice architecture do for the political landscape? It 
may be true that, with extremely limited and modest applications, nudging 
might be useful in increasing the time that subjects can spend on “more 
important” decisions. Yet if applied more broadly, choice architecture might be 
read as one component of a “one-two punch” against the political: if the 
depressed subject bears the mark of the exclusion from politics due to an 
overabundance of choice, choice architecture then moves into this 
overabundance, precluding and pre-empting politics within an always-already 
depoliticized field. The representative shape, the representational logic, of this 
depoliticized field is character. Choice and decision-making, insofar as they 
lead to habituation, shape “character.” The depressed neoliberal subject, 
oversaturated with possibilities, yet weary of self-actualization, arguably 
experiences far more pressure to become a “good” character than Filliou. 
Whereas for Filliou, the only genius was to be good, in a neoliberal context, 
being good is, perhaps, not so much a form of genius as it is a constant 
pressure.  
A Tyranny of Thumbs: on the Genius of Being “Good” in the Age of Fintech  
 
 This shift requires a shift in understanding as to how concepts of 
“goodness” – as a character trait – can play out in contemporary art. In an age 
of fintech, in which reputation both interprets unconscious expressions of 
“creditworthiness” and mandates conscious expressions of one’s reputable 
nature, what other forms of distance must must be introduced into statements 
about the genius of being good? In an age in which Airbnb has politically 
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restructured the financial imprint of encounter, psychogeographically 
repositioned sociality with respect to lodging and finance, is it possible to 
believe in the virtues of the nomadic life, like Filliou did – even to enact such 
belief for the purposes of locating its iterability? Given the great many thinkers 
of late (Graeber, Lazzarato, Mondzain) who have been preoccupied with the 
deep relationships between morality and indebtedness, is a Fourierist 
economics practicable in a neoliberal era? What viable contemporary 
directions might arise from Filliou’s concerns given the widespread 
colonization of “goodness” by fintech and reputation? 
One such direction (which is worth mentioning, although I will not go 
into a great amount of detail on it here) is that measurement takes on 
increased importance. Some of Filliou’s lesser-known works, such as Eight 
Measurement Poems (1966) propose odd, idiosyncratic means of 
measurement, such as measuring distance by insoles, whistles, mousetraps, 
hair berets or tea bags. Given the arbitrary and market-driven nature of 
pervasive forms of (self-)measurement today, and given the instrumentalized 
confusion between qualitative assessment and quantitative measurement that 
characterize the reputation economy’s interest in “character,” such strategies 
take on great significance. Works such as Rafael Lozano-Hemmer’s Zero 
Noon (2013, Figure 13), a digital clock that counts the hours according to a 
vast array of internet-refreshed statistics, which reset at zero each noon, 
might be considered inheritors of Filliou’s concerns on this front. At the press 
of a button, users can switch between various units of measurement: the 
number of pistols manufactured in the U.S. since noon, the number of 
tobacco-related deaths since noon, the number of tortillas (in tons) consumed 
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in Mexico since noon. In a talk at Carroll/Fletcher, London (2014), Lozano-
Hemmer spoke of this piece in light of his interest in archaic, associative 
forms of measurement: the practice of measuring, say, a journey from one 
village to another in raindrops. This line of thinking echoes Filliou’s measuring 
sticks, which line up various mass-produced objects as “units.” In such 
examples, the relationship between the unit of measurement and the thing 
measured might have both metonymic and poetic dimensions. Distance takes 
on the haptic qualities of felt raindrops encountered on a particular trajectory 
through the countryside; space borrows the concept of infusion from the tea 
bag. Zero Noon asks users to consider the relationships between such poetic 
dimensions of measurement and the particular kind of truth claim taken on by 
statistical data, which both purports to accurately represent something of a 
collective state of affairs, and to generalize about how that very state of affairs 
intersects with any given subject, any given swath of time. As statistical 
subjects, we become immersed in the act of imagining human activity on an 
unimaginably large scale, while all the while being acutely aware of the 
generalization within statistics: the dubiousness of their having an exact claim 
on the present based on their analyses of the past, however oft-refreshed 
these statistics might be. 
 Of course, it would be easy enough to dismiss Filliou’s optimism about 
goodness, to label it a mere anticipation of postfordist working conditions and 
neoliberal pressures on reputation to come. Such is the basic structure of 
many critiques of the fates of critical gestures from the ’sixties; Boltanski and 
Chiapello’s (2005) is perhaps the most well known example of such an 
argument. Yet such critiques can tend to become rather over-general, and fail 
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to account for the small-scale successes within a given project. In light of this, 
another way to consider Filliou’s purchase on the present might be to say that, 
for more recent artists, “goodness” must be understood as a generalized 
apparatus that continually morphs into an extremely context-specific currency 
– as an apparatus that, in a data analytic context, performs its generality 
through analyzing and appealing to the particulars of a social context. Lizzie 
Fitch and Ryan Trecartin’s exhibition at the Zabludowicz Collection, London 
(2014, Figure 20) might be considered exemplary of a tendency in this 
direction. The strange, futuristic characters featured in the artists’ movies are 
obsessed with popularity, gossip, and conspicuous consumption – the very 
embodiment, we could say, of an economics of prostitution. Rampant and 
repulsive, yet seemingly very desirable to each other, they challenge viewers 
to understand “good” character traits as utterly context-specific, and 
dependent on a set of local norms of expression, being and belonging. 
However, in suggesting this, I do not wish to suggest that Filliou’s concept of 
goodness is transcendental. For already, in Filliou, there is a sense in which 
goodness aligns itself with creditworthiness, and acts as a sort of application: 
an application for companionship, care, love, friendship, support, shelter, 
money, experience or opportunity. The question, then, is simple: with one’s 
goodness, to whom, and to what, can one apply? Perhaps there is something 
in this question that must always, even in the most controlled of situations, 
remain open. 
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Interlude 
 
Quantifying Character? On Character Counts and Strategic 
Quantification  
 
In a 2014 Frieze blog, Jörg Heiser asked several artists and writers to 
respond to recent developments in big data, algorithms and surveillance. 
What is art’s responsibility, he asked, in the face of these pervasive shifts? 
Martha Rosler’s response conjugated this question in terms of quantification 
more broadly. She articulated the classic (and arguably somewhat romantic) 
conception of quantification as an essential bureaucratic tool – part of the 
problem, “part of the rationalization of the world picture” (Heiser, 2014). “Data 
nets,” she writes, “are at the beating heart of modern states, requiring 
intensive, long-term joint efforts in all fields to mount meaningful defences 
against their expanding, pernicious use” (Heiser, 2014). It is easy enough to 
describe this anti-data battle cry a little bit simplistic; after all, are all uses of 
data necessarily in the service of bureaucracy? Following Jaron Lanier 
(2014), might we argue, instead, that the problem with such bureaucracies is 
not data as such, but rather that data is corralled and controlled by very few 
key players? Given an era in which right-wing governments often actively 
suppress data – as in, for instance, the Canadian Harper government’s 
notorious muzzling of scientists whose research does not support their 
political agenda (Jones, 2015) – wouldn’t a more nuanced conception of the 
ways in which data might, at times, be profoundly anti-authoritarian, anti-
bureaucratic be required? (To be fair, Rosler points to “détourning the data” 
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as a viable artistic strategy in the struggle against quantification.) Critiques 
such as Rosler’s, insofar as they presuppose a pastoral image of a world prior 
to quantification, when things were less bureaucratic, less controlled, more 
immediate, certainly contain a hint of romanticism. Nonetheless, this form of 
critique has thrived in modern and contemporary thought. From Bergson’s 
rallies against the measurement of time, to Oliver Sacks’ lamentation for the 
bygone days of richly nuanced, narrative patient reports in hospitals (replaced 
by simplistic, yet supposedly efficient tick-box forms) to Jacob Silverman’s 
recent writing on the pernicious pervasiveness of online metrics, the past 
century (and more) has been punctuated with rallies against a homogenized, 
wholly quantified world. Such critiques seem to speak to a deep-seated 
frustration with the reduction of rich, qualitative experiences to bureaucratic 
procedures and surveillant control – however, soft, nuanced and pliable those 
controls might come to be. Yet how can these critiques be mobilized 
effectively against quantification, against the violence on which bureaucracy is 
ultimately based (see Graeber, 2012), without simply amounting to a pining 
for a pre-quantified era, dreaming of an “outside” to contemporary life that, if 
anything, might mar activist progress by over-generalizing the terms of 
contention, or deflecting what otherwise could have been effective, situated 
counter-strategies?  
The concept of character is at the crux of such difficulties. As we have 
seen, character is being quantified and calculated in many new ways, as it 
becomes an ever more important locus for control in a credit economy. Yet it 
also holds a privileged relation to qualitative particularity. How, then, does 
“character” relate to quantification? Insofar as observers can claim to judge 
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character – to assess the tendencies and particularities of a singular being – 
what happens when such particularities and habits are quantitatively 
analyzed? What is the precise relationship between quantified analyses of 
habits and tendencies and the fleeting sense of qualitative particularity – say, 
looking into someone’s eyes and getting a sense of who they are – that the 
concept, and act, of perceiving character suggests? Is “character” inherently 
quantifiable, given, for instance, the ability of a robotics lab’s algorithms to 
program Artificial Intelligence operating systems with ethical decision-making 
parameters, or the ability of a corporation’s algorithms to predict what a 
specific consumer might want to do (or buy) tomorrow? Conversely, does 
quantification merely represent an abstraction of character, a 
bureaucratization of character? Does the ability to “quantify” character 
represent a fundamental epistemic shift in the evolution of the concept of 
character itself?  
Given various analytic practices associated with big data – as we have 
seen with respect to new practices of credit scoring in the previous chapter – 
the tenor and currency of such questions are shifting fundamentally. Yet, even 
beyond these recent upheavals, the tensions between quality and quantity 
were already built on shaky philosophical ground. Thus, alongside examining 
some new technologies and practices through which character comes into 
contact with quantitative modes of understanding (new algorithmic 
conceptions of identity, pre-emptive policing, algorithmic ethics programmes 
implanted in robots, various forms of consumer forecasting), it will be helpful 
to briefly examine some twentieth- and twenty-first-century philosophical 
debates on the relationships between quality and quantity in general. My 
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intention, here, is certainly not to solve such philosophical conundrums; 
rather, it is to point to the conceptual difficulties involved in articulating the 
relationships between quality and quantity, and also to give a sense of what 
might be at stake in a conception of qualitative particularity as either 
amenable, or foreign, to quantification. Finally, a brief look at the educational 
policy advocacy organization Character Counts, with a few thoughts as to how 
their work links to art’s privileged relationship to producing “character,” gives a 
sense of what the practical consequences of articulating fundamentally 
qualitative or quantitative conceptions of character might be. Against the grain 
of many discourses on “character,” Character Counts advocates for strong 
metrics for character capabilities (such as emotional intelligence, 
determination and self-control), in order to make a clear case to policy makers 
that it is worthwhile to teach “character” to students. While this position is 
questionable on a number of fronts, it is nonetheless a compelling example of 
what I might call the strategic counter-quantification of character: quantifying 
character in with an aim toward an emancipatory pedagogy, which could at 
least potentially increase class mobility, rather than control.  
Modern and contemporary thought has questioned the relationships 
between quality and quantity again and again. Bergson famously championed 
the ontological priority of quality over quantity in Time and Free Will (1895). 
He argued that number was necessarily a spatialization of time – it is 
impossible to “count” units of time unless one imagines this series of units 
lined up in succession – and hence to count time is to abstract it. Quantity, for 
Bergson, reductively encroaches on the ever-changing, rhythmic textures of 
heterogeneous, durational experience. To count a clock’s pendulum swings 
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and conclude that, say, ten seconds had passed would be to abstract time, to 
falsely quantify what can only be qualitative: the continual, rhythmic shifts in 
the continuous experience of the pendulum swing (Bergson, 1913, p. 104). 
Writing in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century – an era of 
increasing scientificity – Bergson’s account of the illusory nature of 
quantification had high stakes. Through this argument, he countered the rising 
tides of measurement, and argued that is was in duration, that we are free. If, 
after all, he writes, “our action was pronounced by us to be free, it is because 
the relation of this action to the state from which it issued could not be 
expressed by a law, this psychic state being unique of its kind and unable 
ever to occur again” (Bergson, 1913, p. 239). Duration, for Bergson, was both 
antithetical to measurement, and the realm of both free decision and the 
emergence of the new.  
Deleuze, of course, was one of the main inheritors of Bergsonian 
thought. Yet despite that he actively differed with Bergson on very few points, 
he did take issue with Bergson’s ontological prioritization of quality over 
quantity. If Bergson was one of the major influences on Deleuze’s conception 
of the virtual, the other was Leibniz, whose conception of virtuality comes from 
his work in calculus – his discovery of the necessity of a number that was not 
zero, but which was too small, as it were, to exist. For Deleuze, “quality is 
nothing other than contracted quantity” (Deleuze, 1988, p. 74; Hallward, 2006, 
p. 19). As Peter Hallward points out, “One of Deleuze’s main criticisms of 
Bergson is simply that his way of privileging the intensive and the spiritual 
over the extensive or spatial wrongly attributes ‘to quality everything that 
belongs to intensive quantities’” (Hallward, 2006, p. 167, citing Deleuze, 1994, 
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p. 239). Affect, for Deleuze, was fundamentally a quantity of charge, which 
would, in turn, produce qualitative effects. Deleuze was certainly not alone in 
taking issue with Bergson’s understanding of quantification; Bertrand Russell, 
for instance, spoke of Bergson’s poor understanding of number, and the 
latter’s famous debates with Einstein were something of an embarrassment. 
Nevertheless, echoes of Bergson’s ontological prioritization of quality can be 
found in various strains of neo-vitalist and animistic thought.  
More recently, notable proponents of the ontological priority of 
quantity/maths over quality can be found in Badiou and his disciple 
Meillassoux. Badiou famously claimed that mathematics is the very basis of 
ontology (2005), and uses set theory extensively in his philosophical work; 
Meillassoux (2008) follows suit. However, Graham Harman, amongst others, 
has argued that Meillassoux is wrong to mathematize ontology; he advocates, 
instead, the ontological primacy of objects, which, for him, can be reduced 
neither to qualities nor to equations. In the sciences, as Ted Striphas points 
out (2015; see also Granieri, 2014), the emergence of the concept of 
information in the 1940s was one of the major intellectual developments that 
would eventually make algorithmic culture possible. The concept of 
information implies a new understanding of the relationship between 
phenomena and information; all events, beings, qualities and situations, 
according to this formulation, can be understood as information-bearing and, 
therefore, quantifiable, comparable and analysable. Yet another intellectual 
legacy that might lend credence to quantification’s ontological priority – and its 
broad applicability to a wide range of values and phenomena – comes from 
Gabriel Tarde’s 1902 treatise Economic Psychology. A variety of 
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contemporary thinkers are viewing Tarde’s treatise as increasingly relevant to 
recent economic shifts, according to which it is less and less plausible to 
assume that psychological and qualitative factors (such as moods) are merely 
epiphenomenal to the market’s measurements. Tarde accounts for many 
psychological factors, such as glory, in his economic theory; if economics is 
the study of all values, then surely, according to his view, it should study as 
wide a range of these as possible, and not merely those that are routinely 
monetized. As Bruno Latour and Vincent Antonin Lépinay (2004) point out, 
Tarde never repeats the well-worn, humanist lament that economics 
quantifies everything – even those aspects of life that should remain unsullied 
by quantification. Rather, he argues the exact opposite: economists do not go 
far enough to quantify all of the forms of value that exist in a society – of 
which monetary value is merely the tip of the iceberg. The few instances 
outlined above give a sense of the wide range of intellectual, political and 
philosophical stakes in prioritizing either quantity or quality across philosophy, 
the sciences, cultural theory and economics. According to a view such as 
Bergson or Rosler’s, quantification is directly linked to bureaucratization and 
homogenization; in a Deleuzian or Tardean view, qualitative particularity, far 
from being antithetical to quantification, either emerges from quantity in the 
first place, or can be rendered fully quantifiable. 
Character tests the limits between such qualitative and quantitative 
parameters. According to older practices of characterization, such as 
interpreting a literary character, or judging what kind of person someone is by 
observing her qualities, a glimpse of someone’s “character” aggregates 
qualities, tendencies and rhetorical subtleties so densely, so experientially, 
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that they might be thought of as antithetical to quantification. On the other 
hand, as new algorithmic paradigms for stylistic analysis, determining 
creditworthiness, and constructing ethical parameters take off, we may find 
that character is by no means antithetical to quantification – or even that what 
humans perceive as “qualitative” in character, machinic analysis perceives 
quite differently as precisely quantifiable, analysable traits and tendencies.  
Algorithms for Ethics? 
To give just one example of the ways in which traits classically 
considered to belong to “character” have migrated to the realms of 
computation, a recent article in Wired Magazine (Higgins, 2014) revealed that 
the U.S. Office of Naval Research is funding a team at Rensselaer 
Polytechnic Institute, Tufts and Brown Universities (headed by Matthias 
Scheutz) to explore the problems associated with providing autonomous 
robots with a sense of right and wrong. In the Human-Robot interaction lab at 
Tufts, the team explores ways in which “unique algorithms and computational 
mechanisms” might be embedded into existing Artificial Intelligence 
architectures, enabling the system the flexibility to “override… planned actions 
based on moral reasoning” (Higgins, 2014). Thus, a medical robot on a 
battlefield could algorithmically determine whether, for instance, to stop to pick 
up another soldier while in transporting a first soldier to hospital; or whether to 
perform a painful surgery on the spot if it meant saving a soldier’s life. 
Developing an algorithm for ethics would allow robots to function 
autonomously, making their own decisions at a deeper level of reasoning. 
This research is an extension of Scheutz’ ongoing examinations of human-
robot interactions (Scheutz, 2012), on which I will not elaborate here. Yet the 
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very possibility of producing an algorithm for ethical behaviour raises 
questions as to whether such complex “character traits” as ethical 
propensities are, indeed, inherently personal in the first place. Computational 
practices for producing and judging character traits may well render people 
subject to new forms of control (as in the sophisticated credit scoring methods 
in Chapter 3). Yet they also free “character” from the strictures of human 
perception and, thus, begin to slowly change cultural conceptions as to what 
constitutes a character trait in the first place. 
Character Counts 
Whether or not character traits are inherently quantifiable, however, is 
only one aspect to consider. Another is what the strategic implications are of 
using either qualitative or quantitative language to describe character within a 
neoliberal policy milieu. Character Counts is a small organization, which 
navigates such questions. Character Counts describes itself as a “new, 
independent centre that promotes, evaluates, and designs public policy 
interventions that build character” (Character Counts). It was founded by Jen 
Lexmond (a London-based social researcher and policy analyst) and Richard 
Reeves (a Washington, DC based writer and journalist). Character Counts is 
certainly not alone in promoting a return to “character values” in education; 
other centres with a similar agenda include the Jubilee Centre for Character 
and Virtues, University of Birmingham; Character First (a division of Strata 
Leadership, Oklahoma City); the Washington, DC-based Character Education 
Partnership; and the Center for Character and Citizenship (based in St. 
Louis).  
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 As Lexmond points out, “the most effective strategies to build character 
cannot take aim at it directly” (2012, p. 6). While there is a place for direct 
discussions of compassion, fairness, honesty and other character attributes in 
education, character cannot simply be didactically taught; it must develop 
through experiential learning opportunities in supportive environments. 
Lexmond’s task is to work with policy makers, youth, families and social 
researchers to “identify character building programs” across various 
educational platforms, “build consistency in defining and measuring 
character”, “link outcomes to future costs and benefits”, and “improve the 
commissioning process”, building demand for quantitative evidence for the 
benefits of character development in various policy-making contexts 
(Character Counts). Lexmond argues that even though the concept of 
character is sometimes an awkward fit with contemporary society, a growing 
body of research from neuroscience, social mobility analysis and 
developmental psychology shows that developing what she calls “character 
capabilities” – such as “integrity, empathy and grit” can have long-term 
impacts that benefit society as a whole (2012, p. 1). Tracing the development 
of character discourses back to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, she points 
out that the term ethika in Greek translates not as “ethics”, but as “matters to 
do with character” (2012, p. 1). Character is a complex concept at the core of 
ethics, which refers to how people are shaped through their repeated actions 
and habits. Lexmond defines character as “the qualities that make someone a 
good – or not so good – person, but also… a set of skills that contribute to 
personal success and wellbeing” (2012, p. 1); in short, it is both a self-
interested and other-interested idea, bringing together interests in doing good 
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to others with aims toward “happiness and flourishing” (2012, p. 2). Yet 
developing policy for character building in education also faces challenges; for 
how is it possible to help students develop character-based skills needed to 
achieve the “good” life without prescribing what that good life might look like? 
The answer, Lexmond argues, is to consider character as capability – a “set 
of general abilities that allow an individual to live a flourishing life, both in an 
ethical and instrumental sense” (p. 4). Policies should look to developing 
character capabilities, but should never prescribe what kind of a “good” life 
these capabilities should be aimed toward.  
Lexmond’s concept of character capabilities is not only both self- and 
other-interested; it also refers to internal capabilities, which might be 
strengthened or weakened by external circumstances. (For instance, a banker 
working in a banking firm in which prudence is not encouraged might find that 
his/her ability to calculate risks and benefits diminishes.) Thus, on a policy 
level, character development has to do with providing appropriate 
environments for the development of character. This, Lexmond argues, can 
be seen in the move toward Thaler and Sunstein’s “nudging” concept in 
behaviour change policy, according to which policy makers manipulate 
“choice architecture” in order to subtly influence behaviour toward more pro-
social, environmentally friendly, healthy directions.  
 Lexmond is careful, in her analysis, to note the discrepancy between 
discourses around “good character” in education and the surrounding political 
landscape in which such discussions might take place. Growing up in the Iraq 
war era, she writes of her experience of a keen sense that there was a 
separation between the virtues she studied in the classroom and how they 
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were applied in the world (p. 4). However, her analysis of those discrepancies 
could be sharpened both by a deeper analysis of what character, itself, can 
be, and by a more critical analysis of the ways in which “character”, as a 
concept, might be instrumentalized politically. While she defines character as 
both a set of attributes and a set of capabilities, she fails to acknowledge that 
character traits might be both relationally and individually defined. As we have 
seen, Sara Ahmed (2011) notes that the attribution of a character trait – for 
instance, wilfulness – to a person might say more about the person attributing 
the trait than it says about the person to whom the trait purportedly belongs. 
Further, the character trait might say more about broader cultural 
presuppositions than to any essential property of the individual. For instance, 
in the George Eliot novels that Ahmed discusses, wilfulness is attributed again 
and again to female characters who swim against the grain, challenging the 
hierarchical power structures to which they are meant to submit. The 
attribution of character traits itself, then, is a technique of power, a way of 
pinning cultural ideals and power differentials on individuals. To say that 
character is exclusively relational would perhaps be to fall prey to a 
poststructuralist over-emphasis of the power of performatives. That said, 
Lexmond’s analysis leaves open the question of how to establish policy, 
pedagogy and metrics for character without accounting for the relational, 
normalizing and performative roles that such metrics themselves might play. 
An attempt to quantify or algorithmize character traits such as the ability to 
defer gratification might tend to reinforce, rather than challenge, what count as 
“good” traits within a given milieu.  
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Further, while having strong character capabilities may, indeed, help 
empower individuals, in the face of increasing disparities between the rich and 
poor, and a widespread erosion of the middle class, it is important to carefully 
question what character can and cannot provide in terms of mobility. In the 
face of increasing poverty and income disparity, it may well be that many 
students with perfectly “good” characters will not manage to find the mobility 
they have sought, in spite of their scholastic achievements and well-adapted 
attitudes. I would also question Lexmond’s claim that a character-based 
pedagogy is in keeping with nudging strategies in behaviour modification 
policy. Following Evgeny Morozov (2013), one could just as easily argue that 
nudging can actually preclude the decision-making processes that might rely 
on character capabilities. For instance, a “smart trash can” nudges individuals 
to improve their recycling habits by taking photographs of their trash each 
time the lid is closed, analyzing the photos to assign recycling points, and 
publishing these points on Facebook. Yet this activity has fundamentally 
changed the motivation an individual might have had to recycle in the first 
place. Rather than being about an ethical commitment to environmentalism, 
the gesture becomes gamified, turned into a points-gathering exercise. 
Further, such nudging techniques place a disproportional emphasis on 
individual self-monitoring of habits, rather than broader discussions about 
more challenging political questions to do with monitoring industry and 
business. (For instance, nudging focuses on helping individuals closely 
monitor their diets, rather than the much more difficult task of, say, holding the 
food industry accountable for its effects on public health.) Morozov calls this 
over-emphasis on self-monitoring solutionism: the reduction of complex social 
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and political problems to simplistic, “there’s an app for that” pseudo-solutions 
on the level of the consumer.  
Along this line, another potential critique of Character Counts’ claims 
might come from a Rancièrean account of the role of ethics in contemporary 
politics. As Rancière argues (2009, p. 120-123), a focus on ethics in political 
discourse – deference to “doing the right thing” – is fundamentally an 
exceptionalist logic, which precludes political discussion by deferring to a 
“common humanity” rather than dealing with sustained conflicts, antagonisms, 
and legal debates. To defer to ethics is to sidestep politics; to refer to a 
“common humanity” fails to account for the fact that any conception of the 
common must always include some and exclude others. Further, there must 
be a way for such character-based pedagogies to care for styles of being that, 
while they may seem not to fit within a metrics of “good” character, actually 
perform complex and perhaps not readily understood roles within various 
milieus (social or otherwise). I have often thought of Manfred Pernice’s 
sculptures, for instance, as material “arguments,” of sorts, for the importance 
of the curmudgeon (see Figure 21). While seeming, perhaps, not to possess 
“good” or “positive” character traits, the curmudgeon might perform more 
complex observations, sentiments, insights and styles of caring than others 
with a more straightforwardly and recognizably “good” or “well-adapted” 
character. The curmudgeon’s styles of caring, I would argue, are differently 
temporalized, and scaffold different forms of relation between caring, 
intellectual observation, and practices of agreement and disagreement, than 
those with more straightforward styles of caring, of enacting a relationship 
between caring and emotion. It is entirely possible that temporal and stylistic 
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diversities in caring practices are highly beneficial to the diversity of social 
(and even antisocial) space. Although Character Counts certainly seeks to 
reconcile a qualitative heterogeneity of character traits with the strategic 
benefits of applying metrics to character (so that “character” might become 
more visible to policy makers as a valid concern), metrics risk normalizing 
conceptions of “good” character traits, failing to account for either the 
relational properties of character (as something that is differentially attributed 
to people), or the rich complexity and unique capacities of marginal styles of 
being – minor forms of thought enacted, through image-being, as character. 
And yet, for all of its potentially normative and conservative tendencies, 
for all of its potential to reduce political discussions to familiar personal terms, 
for all of the potential pitfalls of Character Counts’ project, I remain ultimately 
sympathetic to its aims. As Michel Feher argues (2013), any effective form of 
activism must necessarily borrow from the available representations of the 
human condition proffered by the very form of power that it aims to critique. In 
light of this, one could argue that Character Counts’ drive to quantify character 
is a perfect answer to the neoliberal era’s emphasis on both metrics and self-
esteem. By becoming visible to policy makers on their terms, Character 
Counts might be able to use metrics to support a richer range of qualitative 
experiences for students. Further, if one were to use Lexmond’s reasoning in 
order to arrive at a slightly different definition of character than the one she 
herself uses, one might come to define character as both a representational 
concept governing the economization of personhood, and as an ability to 
resist or defer immediate, imitative agreement with the socio-political practices 
and presuppositions that form the fabric of one’s surroundings. If such a 
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definition were taken, then character could be understood as a hinge-concept, 
which combines (depending on its discursive context) both extreme 
normativity and the potential for parrhesia in the Foucauldian sense: the ability 
to speak truth to power. In this sense, perhaps Character Counts holds open 
a space for resistances to come. Quite unlike Rosler’s blanket refusal of data 
and quantification as violently rationalist and bureaucratic, Character Counts 
uses metrics for character to nourish and sustain the possibility of resistance. 
Further, as we have seen in Chapter 2, many arguments on art and 
financialization entrench the idea that, by producing, circulating and selling 
artists’ rarefied, signature styles – their “character” evidenced in, and doubled 
by, the character of their masterworks – artworks enact a humanist apology 
for the machinations of the financialized market, both justifying and prefiguring 
wild, idiosyncratic pricing fluctuations. Yet, on the other hand, perhaps it might 
be interesting to consider how the status of artworks, as privileged carriers of 
qualitative particularity (established by the perceptual acts that contemplate 
these particularities), is changing from the opposite perspective as well. As 
metrics become more pervasive, and more pliable, than before, and as 
metrics for character, in particular, become more pliable and subtle, in some 
ways, due to data analytics, and more homogenous in others, certain artworks 
might challenge the kinds of subtleties in character analysis metrics privilege, 
and support minor, or marginal, styles of being. As we have seen in the last 
chapter, Robert Filliou’s practice upholds just such a marginal style of being; 
in doing so, it anticipates some of the “character-work” to come for artists 
working in a neoliberal milieu. Manfred Pernice, Ryan Trecartin and many 
others continue the work that Filliou’s practice anticipates in this regard, 
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presenting odd or idiosyncratic “characters” (whether directly through images, 
or rhetorically through material constructions), who challenge viewers to think 
differently about how concepts of “good character” function, and how they 
might come to matter.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Surveillance and the Production of Character 
 
In 2003, the art collective SWAMP57 (Doug Easterly and Matt Kenyon) 
videotaped themselves going through a McDonald’s drive-thru fifty-seven 
consecutive times in Calera, Alabama (McService, Figure 122). The two 
artists order hotcakes and sausages, Sprite and other typical fast food items 
in a perfectly usual way, generating almost $200 in sales over five hours. 
Eventually, their behaviour arouses suspicion; McDonalds staff call the police, 
who prevent the pair from going through the drive-thru a 58th time. But what, 
exactly, aroused this suspicion? Ostensibly, the drive-thru customers are the 
perfect consumers: politely generating sales, enacting the most zealous and 
insatiable of appetites. Yet the pattern of their behaviour is irregular (or, more 
precisely, it is so regular that it is irregular; a series of completely “normal” 
activities repeated to the point at which they become a hyperbolic caricature 
of consumption). Having ordered one round of meals, they are supposed to 
be full; or at the very least they are supposed to move on. The biological 
rhythms of hunger and satiety, and the demands of daily life activities, are 
meant to intervene in this perfect circuit of consumption. Repeating an action 
to such an extent that it no longer finds a grounding logic in the body’s 
appetites or in the routines of daily life – normative expectations of what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 SWAMP stands for Studies of Work Atmosphere and Mass Production. Doug Easterly and 
Matt Kenyon, who worked together until 2012, founded it in 1999. Kenyon now runs SWAMP 
as a solo project.  
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should motivate the behaviour – means that there must be other strategic 
considerations informing it. The repeated drive-thru loop (a consumptive 
death-drive diagram? a Sisyphean drawing on the pavement?) – brings up a 
deep-seated fear (grounded, ultimately, in exceptionalism and counter-
terrorist politics) of the opacity of strategy with respect to the actions of which 
it is comprised. The act of going through a drive-thru, having become 
unhinged from its usual motivations, acts as a sign of a hidden, strategic 
motivation, the nature of which the actual act – going through the drive-thru in 
the usual way – reveals nothing. Their strategy’s illegibility – which is also the 
customers’ illegibility (the over-perfect drive-thru customers are allies, 
perhaps, of some of the great illegible protagonists of modern literature: 
Melville’s Bartleby, Wharton’s Lily Bart) activates a fear, particular to post-9/11 
life in the West, of the ability of quotidian actions to be détourned for nefarious 
purposes.  
Yet terror may even be too strong a word, as such fears, arguably, 
have become more quotidian and more banal since 2003; in a “smartphone 
state”, there is a widespread unease at the differential relation between site 
and context. Interventions into daily life can easily be uploaded to social 
media sites on the spot; thus, there is a strong sense that a person’s 
behaviour might be intended as a sign for an audience that is not present. 
Similar drive-thru customers could be “playing” the McDonalds staff for the 
amusement of their Facebook friends, for instance. (This sense of the 
potential to be “played” was already palpable in 2003; the police officer in 
McService asks, “What are you gentlemen looking for? What’s the prank, 
what’s the joke?”) Such a sense might not provoke fear so much as 
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annoyance at being reduced to a dupe within someone else’s prank, at being 
caught between one’s performance as emotional, service industry labour and 
one’s performance as the “whole” person one senses oneself to be. Indeed, 
Easterly and Kenyon might well be annoying the drive-thru employees toward 
the end of their circular travels, by increasing their labour – which may well 
increase McDonalds’ profits, but does nothing for the workers’ pay. The video 
documentation of the performance sets up an uncomfortable tension between 
two different dichotomies of oppression: one in which the mostly black women 
who work at the drive-thru serve the white male artists, who mildly provoke 
them as they use them for their video; and another in which producing and 
consuming are re-envisioned as equally laborious tasks, equally profit-mined 
by McDonalds. Who, precisely, is the oppressed in this image, which double-
codes oppression – as if to suggest that McDonalds has swallowed previous 
class divisions whole, preserving and mobilizing their retroactive clashes, as it 
subsumes both sides?  
The employees’ decision to call for help seeks to stop “vaguely 
suspicious” behaviour from escalating into something dangerous. (This peer-
to-peer policing partakes of a subjectivist logic that equates the ability to 
arouse suspicion with criminality in the future anterior.) Enjoyment, a reliable 
source of legible motivation, does not have a stable relationship to quantity; 
whereas one McDonald’s meal might be enjoyable (to some), fifteen in a row 
would surely not be. Likewise, one trip through the drive-thru could be 
classified as “normal” behaviour; fifty-seven trips in a row could not. The post-
9/11, post-internet sense of unease at the separability both of action from a 
seemingly “legible” intention, on the one hand, and of act from context, on the 
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other, becomes narratable as a question of character: what kind of a person 
spends their day going through a drive-thru over and over? What are their 
hidden motives – and how can one understand the significance of the fact that 
they appear to be hidden?  
One place to begin would be to link the work back to its artists’ 
intentions, which appear to be camouflaged in a field of quotidian actions. In 
this case, the intentions appear to be largely analytical. SWAMP claims that 
its aims were to examine the drive-thru’s contribution to “highway culture,” its 
role in siphoning profits from local communities to international corporations 
(SWAMP, McService). However, as the drive-thru siphons profits, they note, it 
also produces a “regular pattern of information.” They write:  
Control regulated by mass marketing and mass production is 
exchanged at the window, with regular intervals of profit 
occurring throughout the day. Our performance, despite the fact 
that we spent almost $200 in 5 hours, contradicted the 
semantics of this socioeconomic construct (SWAMP, 
McService).  
 
McDonald’s collects patterns of information from its customers, and not just 
money; these patterns seem to impose far more exacting expectations on 
their consumers than simply that they spend as much money as possible – 
even if such expectations remain largely hidden from consumers. The artists’ 
intention to analyze, through mild provocation, seeks out the intentionality of 
the corporation; it tries to understand McDonald’s’ means of conceptualizing 
its customers, and not merely its production of profits. Yet by creating a 
complex scenario of looking, which depends on several actors’ attributions of 
abnormality to others, SWAMP also manages to arouse police suspicion. 
Clearly, more than just the semantics of the drive-thru and its corporate 
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overlords are at stake; the spectre of terrorist threat has seeped into the 
picture. Thus, McService activates a field of tensions between overlapping 
surveillance acts and apparatuses, each of which attributes characteristics to 
its subjects in different ways. In what ways, for instance, does corporate 
surveillance (companies’ analysis of not only their sales, but also of who 
generates those sales, and why) relate to police surveillance (which, in this 
case, seems aimed at pre-empting potential threats in response to citizen 
calls – even if its actual target ends up being consumer abnormality)? How do 
acts of citizen pre-emption (for instance, the employee who must have called 
the police to report SWAMP) relate to the counter-terrorist police apparatus – 
and unfold against a backdrop of the constant attribution of intentionality and 
characteristics to other actors in a complex scenario? (These, of course, 
include attributions that SWAMP might make of McDonald’s, its employees – 
in this case, mostly black, disadvantaged women – and McDonald’s 
normalizing effects on the employees’ behaviour.) Consumerism and counter-
terrorism: how do these two motivations – one corporate, the other driven by 
state security – overlap with one another within concrete, multifaceted 
surveillance scenarios? What do these two subspecies of surveillant 
motivation share, how do they diverge from one another – and how can their 
interconnectivity be felt, perceived and sufficiently analyzed in the complex 
relational milieus implicated in acts of surveillance? In this chapter, I suggest 
that performances by SWAMP, Hasan Elahi and Erica Scourti offer an 
analytical method through which to approach the complexities of multiple, 
overlapping motivations in surveillance. My analysis, I should note, does not 
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focus directly on the dizzying complexities of state-corporate relations.58 
Rather, I focus on how various state and corporate motivations become 
visible, perceptible, and representable within surveillance scenarios. As I will 
argue, an account as to how a variety of actors, each with different 
motivations and capacities, might conceive of a surveillant subject requires a 
theory of surveillance scenarios as sites of characterization. By 
characterization, here, I mean complex, relational acts of attribution by which 
characteristics are ascribed to an object of surveillance, often based on some 
form of analysis of his/her propensities and patterns of behaviour (whether 
observed by people, through computational analysis, or with a combination of 
these). Characterization, the representational concept that best conveys how 
surveillance scenarios rely on the attribution and circulation of characteristics 
rather than their mere “discovery,” highlights the fact that representations of 
surveillant subjects are not simply reflections of who that subject “is,” but, 
rather, crystallize complex power relations between subject and state, and 
between consumer and corporation. Acts of characterization come into play in 
situations in which the relationship between a person’s patterns of action and 
their motivation come into question. Analyzing surveillance performances 
through the lens of characterization highlights the disjunctions between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Indeed, there are vastly divergent theories as to precisely how state and corporate power 
relate to each other. To cite just two here, which make for a pointed contrast: Benjamin 
Bratton (2014) argues that national governments are a vestigial form of power, more symbolic 
than actual, in the process of being superseded by corporate power. Just as monarchies 
remain, in many countries, as the last remnants of an outdated form of power, so nation-
states remain, despite the fact that their power has already been largely lost to corporations. 
Nitzan and Bichler (2009), on the other hand, argue that state interests and corporate 
interests form a continuous whole, a “state of capital.” Corporations use governments to 
extend their power, just as governments use corporations to extend theirs. Indeed, their 
interests are one and the same: that of accruing capital, which they define as power. Power, 
in turn, they define as “confidence in obedience… the certainty of the rulers in the 
submissiveness of the ruled” (p. 17). Indeed, recent pronouncements about the ambiguous 
relations between state and corporate power, such as Julian Assange’s recent article on 
Google conducting back-door diplomacy for the U.S. government (2014), probably exacerbate 
more than they resolve the tension between these two theories.  
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various forms of surveillant motivation, which play out differentially in – and, 
indeed, as – representations of surveillant subjects. Characterization enacts a 
form of commerce between self, state, and corporate interest, allowing 
representations of personhood, behavioural pattern and tendency to circulate 
between actors and accrue legitimacy and value.  
 
Patterns of Life: Characterizing Behavioural Tendencies 
What kind of person would go through a drive-thru fifty-seven times in a 
row? At moments in which an unusual behavioural pattern throws the 
relationships between action and intentionality into question, characterization 
steps in to bridge the gap. SWAMP’s piece draws attention to the complex 
semantics of the drive-thru as a site of information gathering. This focus, in 
fact, anticipates developments in surveillance practices and problematics that 
would become increasingly dominant – and increasingly automated – in the 
years to come. Writing twelve years after McService was made, Grégoire 
Chamayou (2015) speaks to the possibilities and limitations of the National 
Security Agency’s surveillance practices in a manner that closely echoes the 
issues brought to light by SWAMP’s performance. NSA surveillance picks out 
“signatures” from an “ocean of information” (Chamayou, 2015, p. 2-3). Its 
practices, Chamayou claims, are descendants of those that monitored older 
oceans: the U.S. Navy’s Sound Surveillance System, established in the 
1950s, which searched out signature patterns in complex sound signals. Yet 
unlike the 1950s Navy, for whom the target, if not the signal, of sound 
surveillance was quite clear (one sought to distinguish a submarine from, say, 
a school of fish), the NSA’s counter-terrorist mandate seeks to distinguish 
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benign from nefarious intention. Such a target is inherently problematic: “What 
algorithm,” Chamayou asks, “would be capable of detecting behavioural 
indices that could unmask this kind of intentionality?” (2015, p. 4). Given this 
difficult philosophical problem, the NSA does its best to reconstruct intention 
through Activity-Based Intelligence; analyzing patterns of life and seeking 
irregularity, it seeks to make activities induce identities (p. 8) and intentions. 
Yet, in spite of the Orwellian nightmares to which the NSA’s seemingly all-
knowing gaze (revealed to the public by Edward Snowden in 2013) might 
justifiably give rise, Chamayou notes that the NSA has been spectacularly 
ineffective in foiling terrorist plots, contributing nothing whatsoever to public 
safety throughout its entire telephone metadata collection program (p. 8). Just 
as the pre-emptive prohibitions on SWAMP’s drive-thru activities, carried out 
by “touchy” McDonald’s staff and police in a fear-gripped, post-9/11 America, 
failed to distinguish between an analytical artists’ project and a prospective 
terrorist plot, so the NSA’s sophisticated surveillance apparatuses seem far 
more likely to produce presumed intentions than to uncover them lurking 
behind abnormal behavioural patterns. As an analyst of surveillance practices, 
how can one begin to develop a critical language for such acts, which involve 
the active selection and production of characteristics? 
Technologies of Attribution 
 Many critical responses to surveillance practices in the post-9/11 world 
take privacy as their central concern. While there are certainly important 
reasons to advocate the right to privacy, it is also necessary to point out 
privacy’s limitations as a lens through which to analyze the complex, relational 
milieus of ever-shifting surveillance scenarios. Some of these limitations have 
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been well articulated within the emerging field of feminist surveillance studies. 
As Dubrofsky and Magnet (2015) argue, privacy, in and of itself, does not 
necessarily help or protect everyone; for instance, victims of domestic abuse, 
if anything, suffer from the privacy of their own homes. Moreover, given that 
surveillance makes certain bodies hyper-visible, while it allows others to 
“blend in” or even remain entirely hidden, focusing on privacy as a blanket 
issue fails to account for the fact that it “is a right not granted equally to all” 
(Dubrofsky and Magnet, 2015, p. 4). Another way to question privacy’s ability 
to address new forms of inequality facilitated by surveillance have come from 
accounts of corporate and financial surveillance practices emerging largely 
out of Silicon Valley. Evgeny Morozov (2013), for instance, asks: what good is 
a hypothetical right to privacy, given that, in a world of vast concentrations of 
corporate and financial power, customers are routinely rewarded for 
“volunteering” to provide their information – receiving better rates, better 
access, and supposedly “free” extras if they do so? When added up, such 
bonuses make privacy a pricey proposition. Enacting customer loyalty in a 
surveillance economy, as SWAMP do in contracted fashion, involves not only 
fitting into corporate semantics, but also willingly volunteering one’s 
information along with one’s cash. Ours is a time of immensely concentrated 
wealth and power in the hands of a few corporate, computational and financial 
players.59 Privacy, in the face of such vastly privatized interests, becomes a 
luxury many cannot afford. Given these dynamics, as Mark Andrejevic points 
out, “Privacy debates… come to stand in for discussions that might more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 For an account of how the surveillance economy and how it concentrates wealth in the 
hands of a few businesses and financial players, whose computational capacities can vastly 
outstrip their competitors, thereby eviscerating the middle class of content and service 
providers, see Lanier (2014). 
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directly address the question of who controls the information infrastructure 
and for what ends” (2011, p. 279).  
Such critiques are quite important; however, there is another, perhaps 
even more fundamental representational problem with the privacy debate. In 
painting images of governments and corporations peering into private lives, 
stealing traces of propensities, behaviours and intentions – seemingly traces 
of their subjects’ “true selves” – privacy advocacy fails to account for the 
speculative nature of intentions and propensities in the first place. Whose 
suspicion, for instance, is reflected in the police’s characterization of SWAMP 
as suspicious? The attribution of possibly nefarious intentions to the duo 
expresses complex speculations by various perceivers, as well as observed 
abnormalities in the actions of the perceived. Given this, and given, for 
instance, the NSA’s complete failure to discern intentionality in complex 
behavioural patterns, it is misleading to imply that the objects surveillance 
apparatuses seek are unearthed, pre-existing coordinates from private lives. 
Rather than viewing the attributive acts of surveillance as invasions of privacy 
(though they certainly may be facilitated by these), conceptualizing them as 
complex, relational, and speculative sites of characterization more aptly 
speaks to the sense in which the suspicious characteristics of surveillance 
subjects are not so much found as they are co-produced.    
As Sara Ahmed (2011) suggests in her study of “problem characters” in 
nineteenth-century novels, it is useful to think of character as a glimpse: “it is 
not that we have a glimpse of character but that a character is a glimpse, [is] 
what creates an impression that there is someone being glimpsed” (p. 232). 
To characterize a person is to play with the impression that one has reduced 
	   232	  
her essential qualities, behaviours and propensities from a larger whole in an 
act of perception (and perhaps preconception), fabricated a smaller set of 
attributes that seem to aptly express the whole, while still sensing the limits of 
this smaller set as knowledge of the “whole” person. If this is so, then 
surveillance apparatuses such as the NSA’s, which rely on vastly expanded 
data storage capacities, rewrite the relations between the total quantities of 
data collected and such productive acts of glimpsing, by expanding the palette 
of available information that can be used to characterize someone. Ironically, 
in this context, personal characteristics become more qualitatively malleable, 
due to the increased quantity of personal information in sleeper dossiers, and 
to the increased capacity to quantitatively analyze this information.  
In the age of big data, enormous databanks of personal information, 
along with sophisticated analytical techniques with which to correlate the data, 
might induce a broader, more wildly inventive range of prospective 
characterizations than ever before. On the other hand, data’s strong 
association with “truth,” for many (though this correlation is, of course, quite 
contestable60) might lend such characterizations the conceit of an 
unprecedented realism. With the capacity to analyze such vast quantities of 
data, algorithmic analyses can interpret their subjects’ behaviours like never 
before. Yet in spite of any such conceit to realism – to adequately (could we 
say democratically?) represent the whole person from whom these few 
qualities have, somehow, become elected representatives – characterization 
is always (to use Ahmed’s phrase), a “technology of attribution,” an ascribed 
sense of self-fulfilling intentionality that “establishes ‘the commerce’ between 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 See, for instance, Van Dijck (2014) and Lanier (2014). 
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reader and text” (2011, p. 233). If, as Ahmed suggests, such a description of 
characterization might be extended beyond the bounds of fictional worlds to 
describe relations between readers and characters, then surely it can also be 
repurposed as a fitting description of the commerce between surveillance 
apparatuses and their subjects, describing how characteristics are attributed 
and exchanged between various actors.  
Characterization, as “technology of attribution,” speaks to the ways in 
which tendencies to understand certain subjects as more “problematic” than 
others might be self-fulfilling. Racial profiling, of course, is a prime example of 
this. Hasan Elahi, along with millions of non-white people in the U.S. and 
elsewhere, knows very well how pervasively and violently the state can 
differentially attribute suspiciousness according to racist preconceptions. 
Harcourt (2007) has shown how deeply ingrained racial profiling is in 
contemporary juridical and police practices, which rely on statistical 
calculation of individuals’ propensities, many of which are filtered through 
highly problematic, preconceived racial categories. McClanahan has written of 
the ways in which ostensibly “objective” FICO® credit scores launder racial 
discrimination (2014, p. 47-48). Writing in the aftermath of yet another recent 
instance of police brutality against African-Americans (this time, an attack 
against teenagers at a pool party in McKinney, Texas), Sinthujan 
Varatharajah (2015) reflects on the difficulties and ironies involved in even 
being able to find a position from which to protest as a racialized subject, 
given that acts of protest often have higher costs (legal, personal and 
financial) for non-white subjects than for those who can mobilize their white 
privilege to protest racism. He writes: 
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Growing up in white suprematist societies many of us have 
been conditioned to work hard to remain invisible… we grow up 
internalizing the criminalization of our bodies and are taught 
from childhood life-saving lessons to circumvent these macro- 
and micro-aggressions. It is these many little moments that 
accumulate throughout our lives when we, for instance, pull the 
seatbelt tighter when the cops drive by, when we dress in ways 
to not appear as threats, when we make sure that the 
supermarket bill is visible to not be considered looters, or when 
we choose to not call out racism (2015). 
 
Varatharajah compellingly portrays how deeply internalized is the threat of 
constant characterization for non-white Americans, who must expend so 
much effort, day in and day out, simply to appear non-suspicious – or, rather, 
simply not to appear as a subject of interest. Characterization, as a concept, 
covers both acts of attribution that are directly linked to preconceptions about 
race, sexuality and gender, and those that appear more minutely adapted to 
assess individual traits and propensities (even though these, of course, are by 
no means entirely separable from larger identificatory categories). Yet, while 
surveillance apparatuses can characterize anyone, some bodies have a much 
harder time passing as inconspicuous than others. In a field of newly 
proliferating, automated and arguably correlative “technologies of attribution” 
– big data analytics, social media platforms and credit scoring innovations, for 
instance – characterization speaks to the active yet subtractive, perceptual 
and conceptual work of attribution, which actively creates characteristics to 
match preconceived problems. “Put simply,” Ahmed writes, “when someone 
becomes a problem, we tend to question their character” (2011, p. 233). 
Equally, when a surveillance apparatus characterizes someone, this may 
express a self-fulfilling response to a preconceived problem.  
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 The surveillance-based performances I examine below – McService, 
Elahi’s Tracking Transience (2005-, Figure 23), and Erica Scourti’s Life in 
AdWords (2012-13, Figure 24) – span ten years (2003-2013) between 9/11 
and the Snowden revelations. Each of these works enmeshes “problem 
characters” – or problematic traits in character – with idiosyncratic acts of 
attribution carried out by, through, or (so to speak) “in the style of” 
surveillance. Given the rapid changes in surveillance practices and players 
within this decade, these three works represent a broad range of apparatuses, 
monitoring practices and concerns, involving many actors, from citizens, to 
police, FBI agents, online users, corporations, self-documentarians and 
algorithms. While McService focuses on pre-emptive citizen reporting and 
extra-legal police measures, Tracking Transience documents Elahi’s location 
and daily activities in obsessive detail online. Finally, Scourti’s piece 
documents the artist keeping a daily diary, emailing it to her gmail account, 
and then reading out the AdWords Google’s algorithms selected to match her 
consumer profile. Each of these works experiments with making its 
performer(s) visible as surveilled subjects; in a play of exaggerated docility, 
the performers produce acts of what could variously be read as curiosity 
about, empathy with, or even submission to their respective surveillance 
apparatuses, giving each apparatus what it seems to “want” (an anomaly; full 
transparency; and a fertile range of emotions and interests amenable to 
consumer desire, respectively). The performers’ acts allow their audiences to 
learn something about how such watchful eyes and sensors see. Revealing 
complex, surveillant scenarios, these three pieces delineate an evolution, of 
sorts, between three different rhetorical structures through which surveillance-
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based characterization comes to be represented: from self as threat, to self as 
set, to self as product. 
From Threat to Set: Character, Quantity and Spectres of Motivation 
McService demonstrates, with elegant simplicity, how easily absurd 
repetition unhinges action from motivation. In this piece, the performers’ 
actions have lost their legibility with respect to hunger and other motivating 
factors that would normally determine an individual’s decision to go to 
McDonald’s. Enjoyment, a reliable source of legible motivation, does not have 
a stable relationship to quantity; whereas one McDonald’s meal might be 
enjoyable (to some), dozens in a row would surely not be. Likewise, one trip 
through the drive-thru can easily be classified as “normal” behaviour; fifty-
seven trips in a row cannot. This normalizing gaze, which seeks to distinguish 
“normal” from abnormal behaviour, can be understood as part of what Brian 
Massumi (2007) has described as a wholesale shift toward pre-emption as an 
“operative logic of power” in contemporary politics. (Massumi focuses 
particularly in American military tactics, though his discussion could also be 
generalized to account for shifts in the politics of everyday life.) The Bush 
administration, he writes, unabashedly embraced a pre-emptive logic, as is 
evidenced by the following statement from Bush himself in 2002: “If we wait 
for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long. We must take the 
battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before 
they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path 
to action. And this nation will act” (quoted in Massumi, 2007). Massumi 
delineates three ontological and epistemological modalities through which the 
future might be understood and strategically grappled with: prevention, 
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deterrence and preemption. Prevention, he argues, does not have its own 
ontology. It “operates in an objectively knowable world” and must be applied – 
as in, for instance, the use of specialist information (from economics or 
medicine) to build preventative policy. Deterrence steps in where prevention 
fails. It operates in the same way as prevention, epistemologically (in that it 
“assumes knowability and measurability”); but it transforms not-yet-seen 
effects into future causes. It is according to a deterrent logic, for instance, that 
a nuclear arms race makes sense; it translates a future threat into a present 
danger by building up a nuclear weapons arsenal in the present. But it does 
so in a balanced way; it aims at equilibrium between one’s own nuclear arms 
and one’s neighbour’s. Oddly enough, deterrence also acts as an “apotheosis 
of humanism” (Massumi, 2007), in that it relies on the fundamental humanity 
of the opponent: surely he is sane enough not to push the button. However, 
deterrence only works as an operative logic between potentially equal military 
powers; it fails in unbalanced or unstable circumstances, which call for 
preemptive measures. Unlike previous modalities for operating tactically with 
respect to the future – prevention and deterrence – pre-emption, for Massumi, 
operates in relation to a fundamental uncertainty in a world in which potential 
threats have not fully formed, and may not have even yet emerged. Within this 
strategic logic, “threat has become proteiform”; and “the global situation is not 
threatening so much as threat-generating: threat-o-genic” (2007). Operating in 
an imbalanced playing field, in which a highly funded, yet large and 
cumbersome US Military responds to terrorist threats that might be smaller in 
scale but wield the significant advantage of surprise, preemptive action 
follows an incitatory logic, according to which “the most effective way to fight 
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an unspecified threat is to actively contribute to producing it” (2007). In other 
words, in order to fight a threat that has not yet emerged and is thus not yet 
knowable, it is best to provoke it into concrete existence. Such a strategy is, of 
course, inherently performative and self-perpetuating; it operates on a 
conditional logic according to which it is impossible for policy makers to ever 
have been wrong. For instance, even if it has been proven since the Iraq war 
that Iraq never had the weapons of mass destruction that Colin Powell 
claimed it did as an alibi for U.S. invasion, the former Bush administration can 
argue that Iraq still would have used them if it could have. Pre-emption 
responds to fear as the “palpable action in the present of a threatening future 
cause”; it operates on an affective plane, and retroactively makes its enemy 
into “what it always could have been” (2007). Truth, in this schema, is 
retroactive; facts are grown “conditionally in the affective soil of an 
indeterminately present futurity” (2007). For Massumi, the self-perpetuating 
logic of preemption – as a kind of “conflict unlimited” – is of the utmost 
concern.61  
While these border zones bear the weight of the most brutal forms of 
data-managed violence, a softer violence pervades data analytics’ more 
quotidian, consumerist, financialized inflections of online activity. Snowden’s 
image of “deriving suspicion from an innocent life” (cited in the Introduction) in 
light of Massumi’s argument, places characterization firmly within the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Certainly, more recent scholarship on U.S. military practices in zones of exception only 
lends further credence to Massumi’s concerns. For instance, Susan Schuppli (2014) analyzes 
the legal implications of the U.S. military’s drone program’s use of kill algorithms, which can 
quite literally execute without involving humans in their decision-making processes, and 
manage decisions such as whether or not the sixteen-year-old son of a radicalized cleric 
should be added to the kill list because his father had been killed by a U.S. drone strike, and 
thus he might be more likely to become radicalized himself. Who is legally responsible for a 
killing executed by an algorithm? Schuppli’s work, we could say, attests to new forms of 
sovereign power emerging at the margins of control societies through analytic technologies. 
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framework of pre-emptive logic. “Character” and characteristics (such as 
being “suspicious”) are always speculative, and often self-affirming objects; in 
McService’s case, they are brought into being through fear as an affective 
agent through which potential future threats can act on the present. SWAMP’s 
piece demonstrates how such indeterminately present futurity plays out in the 
sphere of domestic security in post-9/11 America, through citizen fear and 
extra-legal police prohibitions. In the post-9/11 domestic security climate, 
character is the speculative object of pre-emption par excellence.   
 If McService speaks to the creation of a threat simply through repetition 
of an action, American artist Hasan Elahi’s Tracking Transience project (2005-
) does just the opposite: it ameliorates threat through repetition. In 2002, Elahi 
was detained at the Detroit Airport on his way back from an exhibition in 
Amsterdam. Without knowing why he had come under suspicion (perhaps 
another with his name had been placed on a no-fly list?), he was held and 
questioned by the FBI for hours about the reasons for his frequent travels, 
whether he had visited any mosques, and whether he had moved explosives 
out of a storage unit. His familiarity with American culture, as well as showing 
the agents his Palm Pilot filled with records of gallery exhibitions, meetings 
and talks, eventually led to his release. He was subjected to lie detector tests, 
and required to check in with FBI agents for six months back in Tampa, where 
he lived at the time. But how could he ensure that he would not be detained in 
the future? As he put it, “Once you're in the system, you're in… It's incredibly 
disturbing when a country, particularly your own country, uses discrimination 
as a basis for an investigation" (Scharper, 2013). The ubiquity of false leads, 
biases and scapegoating generated by racial profiling across a wide range of 
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surveillant and predictive monitoring practices – from airport screenings to 
credit risk assessment and policing – is certainly a stark reminder that the 
traits attributed to subjects of surveillance are not “theirs,” but are complex 
outcomes of characterization.62  
In response to these experiences, Elahi began notifying the FBI 
whenever he left the country, in order to avoid hassles in airports. Eventually, 
this practice led him to launch Tracking Transience: the Orwell Project. On his 
website, www.trackingtransience.net (2005-ongoing), he frequently updates 
his location, and posts copious photographs of the scenes that comprise his 
everyday life: meals, highways, hallways, toilets, airports, gas stations, chain 
stores, and signs. The current version of the website begins with a homepage 
detailing his most recently entered coordinates with a flashing red arrow on 
top of a map and a scroll over a photo of the location. (The maps are 
produced in collaboration with the United States Geological Survey, which 
provides aerial surveillance images in response to his photographs’ 
geographic coordinates.) (Creative Capital) Without warning, the page begins 
to flash through images (or whole subsets of images) from Elahi’s life: 
perhaps an unmade bed in a hotel room, a nondescript watering hole, or a 
mosaic of small images of toilets or tacos compiled from various locations on 
various days. There are purely textual entries, detailing the coordinates of 
some of his favorite locations, his flight history, and his bank records. Elahi’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 See, for instance, McClanahan on the laundering of racial bias in supposedly “objective” 
FICO® credit scores (2014); Harcourt (2007) on racial profiling in predictive policing practices 
(both mentioned above); Dubrofsky and Magnet’s emphasis on the ways in which new 
categories of racial identification are emerging in surveillance scenarios, such as the “terrorist 
look-alike” (2015, p. 9); and Chamayou’s discussion of the use of racist sobriquets in NSA 
training material, as well as new forms of racial profiling emerging in the realm of big data 
analytics (2015, p. 4) 
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project responds to surveillance, yet without advocating for privacy in a 
straightforward way. (Indeed, although he ostensibly gives up his privacy, 
Elahi claims to lead a very private life, in spite of – or even, given that he has 
pre-empted the FBI’s targeting him, because of – constantly sharing its 
coordinates.) (Ashraf, 2010) Rather, Elahi’s work intervenes in the economy 
of surveillant information. In other words, he intervenes in how images and 
information from his private life circulate – how they play out, in their very 
circulation, a relation between images of life and life-as-image, between 
visible spectacle and the mystery of the unknown (in some of the senses 
Mondzain elaborates, as discussed in Chapter 2). As he puts it, “I share 
everything with the FBI — and everyone… Their currency is secrecy and 
access to information. Making information public devalues their currency” 
(Creative Capital). Of course, Elahi’s assessment here is debatable; in one 
sense, making information public might increase its currency in various 
contexts (for instance, within art discourses). Yet Elahi wishes to draw 
attention to the fact that publicity devalues the currency of information for 
those who benefit from its being broadly unavailable to the public: in 
particular, the purveyors of surveillance apparatuses. Given this analysis, we 
could say that Tracking Transience tackles privatization rather than privacy as 
such – it is not the individual’s right to privacy that is the object of critique, so 
much as the ability of secrets (be they governmental or corporate) to generate 
value for some while they impoverish the power of others. Surveillance is part 
of an economy that garners value due to its being held privately, at an 
advantage over others; such value diminishes as soon as that information 
becomes public. If characterization establishes a commerce between a 
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represented person and his/her “readers” (be these governmental agencies, 
corporate algorithms or online user-citizens), then Elahi’s project explores a 
way to enact that commerce differently, making his “character” more widely 
available so as to counter the privatization of his information-assets.  
There is another sense in which Elahi’s piece focuses on privatization 
more than privacy: in its interest in mass-produced objects, architectures and 
meals, and the ways in which they intertwine with a hollowed-out expression 
of his character – a sum total, of sorts, of his habits and propensities, which 
establish his “normalcy” as a consumer, but reveal little, if anything, of his 
thoughts, ideas or intentions. His images are sparse, unpopulated and banal. 
No friends or family come to view; there are only objects, meals, places and 
occasional passersby in the distance – a portrait of an alienated, consumerist 
life, rendered in the first person. The photographs bring to mind Ed Ruscha’s 
series of deadpan portrayals of American locations (such as Twentysix 
Gasoline Stations, 1963). Like Ruscha’s, Elahi’s images seem to dissolve 
their own interest in spatial specificity. Presenting spatially specific 
phenomena as so many quantities overwhelms their specificity, draws 
attention to the tensions between the local and the non-local in these scenes. 
On trackingtransience.net, users witness mass-produced outputs of 
globalized corporate and financial circuits, whose origins, structures and 
workings are just as obscure to the casual observer as the inner workings of a 
surveillant subject’s mind might be to the FBI, even when it has some help 
from citizens like Elahi, who provide personal information and correct at least 
some of its misattributions. Unlike in Ruscha’s project, Elahi (as target, 
referent, viewpoint, persona) remains the conceptual focus of the work, even 
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as the specificity of his own life seems to disappear into an atmosphere of 
everyday artifacts. He becomes a set, in the mathematical sense of “a 
collection of things (called its members or elements), the collection being 
regarded as a single object” (Enderton, 1977, p. 1). Elahi does not picture 
himself as a subject (his own likeness does not appear in the work); rather, he 
appears as nothing more than the sum total of all locations, surroundings, 
activities and meals experienced (or, at least, indexed, evidenced), 
photographed and put into circulation by his website. He turns the cameras; 
he becomes, in a sense, an empty container – nothing more than a first-
person perspective that links many different objects and environments. The 
sum total of these is his character, his represented being – but one which 
turns the focus away from his own particularity, away from future speculations 
as to his behaviour, and onto the world, and the economy, he witnesses. Elahi 
has been subject to the FBI’s characterization of him as suspicious, based on 
a few, erroneous and poorly chosen indices of “possible terrorism.” In 
response, Tracking Transience proposes the set as an alternative structure 
through which to represent character online – one which devalues privatized 
information currency, shifts the focus away from racialized bodies, and 
democratizes the weight given to each of Elahi’s (often rather mundane) 
activities, eroding exceptions with tides of represented habits.63  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 This act, arguably, generates empathy for the mundane objects Elahi pictures in his 
photographs, or even experiments with what it means to become an object (be it a thingly 
object or an object of investigation): to partake in objects’ stubborn recalcitrance to the 
cultural logic of surveillance. Hito Steyerl (recounting a conversation she had with Elizabeth 
Lebovici) remarks that emancipatory practices generally involve striving to become subjects 
of history, rather than its objects; but, she asks, given the difficult contradictions involved in 
adopting a subject position, why not “side with the object for a change?” (Steyerl 2010) Elahi, 
indeed, “sides with the object” in this work; dissolving himself into his web of objects and 
places, he generates some remarkable portraits of generic objects and places with curiosity 
and wit. To disappear as an object of surveillance, in Elahi’s project, is to embrace 
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Tracking Transience seems ever more prescient, as today, droves of 
citizens routinely volunteer information about their activities, meals, and 
whereabouts on social media. Elahi’s project acts on the faith that sharing 
information about so-called “private” life will, in a sense, de-privatize its 
information-flows, decrease its usefulness to government agents who only 
derive value from that to which they have privileged access. This is certainly 
the case in some instances (in Elahi’s case, the public’s witnessing his project 
tempers the FBI’s singular hold on characterizing him as “threatening” or 
“non-threatening”). That said, there are also a host of recent developments in 
big data analytics that allow corporations to benefit from users’ free sharing of 
personal information online.  
Life in AdWords 
London-based artist Erica Scourti examines some of these 
developments, which make newly automated forms of characterization 
possible. For almost a year (March 2012 – January 2013), she emailed her 
daily diary to her gmail account, to see what kinds of AdWords would come 
up. She then “performed to webcam the list of suggested keywords linking to 
clusters of relevant ads” (Scourti, 2013a). This process resulted in deadpan 
readings of disjointed, generic yet oddly personal clusters of words and 
phrases, at times hilariously at odds with her webcam-recorded image as a 
lived being-in-time. As she reads (often, it appears, in her bedroom at home, 
dressed casually in tank tops, bathrobes, sweaters or pyjamas – and at times 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
surveillance fully until it flips its gaze, and looks out onto the cold, dead world of planes and 
plazas, meeting rooms, living rooms and fast food joints.  
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accompanied by a black and white cat), the keywords settle in clusters on 
varying aspects of her activities, emotions, musings and social roles. “Heart 
problems. Match single. Video funny. Makeup look,” she reads, in a robe and 
what appears to be a partially dry, greenish facial mask, with a bit of cluttered 
bedroom in the background (2013b). Some of the keyword clusters relate to 
generic experiences that reveal more about the time of year (and how it is 
feted by large groups of people) than about Scourti herself. “New Year’s eve. 
Drank. Drank too much. Fireworks. Good wishes for New Year,” begins her 
January 2013 AdWords compilation (2013b). Other keyword clusters offer 
glimpses of her interests and concerns as an artist; MFA degree programs, 
London galleries and shipping solutions all feature. Still other keywords seem 
to speak to consumer concerns – prospective spending habits or online 
searches (for song lyrics or friendship poems, for instance); and to health and 
physical ailments (severe sore throats, or the benefits of drinking water). 
Finally, there are those keywords that touch on subjects typically coded as 
private, and even “internal:” anxieties, stress, depression, emotions, love and 
relationships. Essential to each of these provisional categories is a rhythmic 
ebb and flow that sees them waft in and out of each other’s purview, loosely 
weaving together scraps of separate activities, anxieties and aspects of 
identity. In her March 2012 compilation, she recites: “Lyrics lyrics. Feeling 
tired. Always feeling sad. Feeling depressed. Healthy eating food. Music and 
lyrics. Eating out. Song lyrics.” And the next day, slumped in bed, she reads: 
“Love relationship. Love relationships. Love and romance. Severe sore throat. 
Lyrics lyrics. Anxiety and depression. Anxiety and stress. Depression and 
anxiety” (Scourti, 2012a). The keywords circulate feelings, interests and 
	   246	  
concerns, quite literally, as commerce in an attention economy, in which 
companies pay for the privilege of having their websites stand out from 
millions of others by competing in keyword auctions. What substantiates these 
keywords’ claim to value is that they are hinged on algorithmic “readings” of 
the individual online user and, thus, ostensibly closely reflect her expressed 
habits, interests and concerns. In doing so, Scourti’s piece points out, they 
also paint a picture of her character.  
 That habits shape character is certainly nothing new. In The Gay 
Science (first published in 1882), Nietzsche describes the relationship 
between a worker and his habits in terms of character (1974, p. 302). He 
remarks that when someone has worked the same job for several years, he in 
effect becomes the character he once merely played. From playing to being: 
character is that which stiffens through work, repetition and time. What is the 
analogous scenario to Nietzsche’s in an era of immaterial labour, in which an 
“alienated cognitariat” (as Franco “Bifo” Berardi [2010] calls it) drifts from job 
to job, task to task, contract to contract? The keywords algorithms Scourti’s 
piece reveals highlight at least two new means through which habits stiffen 
into representations of character in the surveillance economy. On the one 
hand, the concept of the working self, here, extends beyond the traditional, 
liberal-era realms of work to encompass consumer behaviour, entrepreneurial 
activities associated with landing art projects, the emotional labour of 
maintaining personal relationships, and the like. One’s character 
encompasses more than simply a particular role one plays in a specific 
context; it blends work, consumption, personal life and entrepreneurialism, 
navigating the tensions between all of these roles and conceptualizing each of 
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them as, in some sense, equal forms of immaterial labour. On the other hand, 
the automaticity and ubiquity of such readings reifies the rhythmic flux and 
flow of habits, interests and concerns, making their stiffening into 
representations of “character” through algorithmic analysis a matter of course. 
Yet neither of these statements go far enough – for there has also been a 
complete reversal. The worker – for all her precarity, her anxieties, her 
endless mixing of heterogeneous tasks and social roles – becomes a product, 
whose attention, tendencies and even identities are sold to Google’s 
corporate clients.  
 As Christian Fuchs writes in his critique of the political economy of 
Google, “Google commodifies users’ cognition, communication and 
cooperation by engaging in surveillance of these activities, creating data 
about them and selling these data to advertising clients. The cognition 
dimension features personal, ecological, technological, economic, political 
and cultural user data as well as user-generated content” (Fuchs, 2011). 
Google AdWords, a primary agent of this political economy, is based on an 
auction system through which advertisers compete for prominent screen 
positions with respect to keywords linked to specific users (Fuchs, 2011; 
Girard 2009, p. 31). AdWords allow advertisers “to target ads for example by 
country, exact location of users and distance from a certain location, the type 
of device used… the mobile phone operator used… gender, or age group” 
(Fuchs, 2011). While Google may well be a pioneer in selling such 
specificities to advertisers, it encompasses only one amongst a host of recent 
developments in monetized online surveillance. John Cheney-Lippold (2011) 
refers to some such developments in his work on algorithmic identity 
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production, which he understands as a form of “soft biopolitics.” He describes 
the online data collecting practices of, for instance, the Quantcast corporation 
– one of many companies that provides audience measurement services for 
member websites, thus helping them to best target advertisements to 
individual IP addresses. Based on browsing history, one of Quantcast’s 
algorithms might decide that in individual user is, for instance, male. Maleness 
emerges as a trait, in Quantcast’s formulae, purely numerically, without any 
reference to the user’s embodied identity. Yet, conversely, the identifications 
at which the algorithms arrive self-modify in a cybernetic loop, sometimes 
overturning or modifying the initial assumptions that led to a particular 
identification being made in the first place. For instance, if I visit cnn.com, and 
am thus designated as male (due to 78% of visitors to the site having been 
previously identified as male), and then, because of my subsequent browsing 
history, I am adjusted to female, this new information might modify the initial 
statistics that declared 78% of cnn.com visitors to be male in the first place. 
Such practices make gender a completely digital, and thus measurable, 
property. 
In the process, Cheney-Lippold argues, “the regulation of gender as a 
category… becomes wholly embedded within the logic of consumption, where 
categorical behaviours are statistically defined through a cybernetics of 
purchasing and research that marketers have deemed valuable for 
identification and categorization” (p. 171). This new algorithmic identity, 
Cheney-Lippold argues, operates at a distance from traditional liberal politics, 
and enjoys an unprecedented ubiquity (p. 165), as its “logic, rules, and explicit 
functioning work to determine the new conditions of possibilities of users’ 
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lives” (p. 167). Whereas earlier in the history of market research, census-data 
laden geographies and psychographic categorizations (which identified 
various consumer types in order not to essentialize demographic 
categorizations) involved retroactively interpreting limited data-sets, new 
online analytic capabilities allow companies to analyze consumer data in real 
time. Further, such shifts in market research focus “not on essential notions of 
identity but instead on pliable behavioural models, undergirded by algorithms, 
that allow for the creation of a cybernetic relationship to identification” (p. 
168). The more data that is collected, the more identified the user’s identities 
and desires become; and the more identified users become, the more 
cybernetic modeling can be streamlined, optimizing the ways in which it 
calculates the user’s identity. This constant feedback loop, Cheney-Lippold 
argues, is a form of control best understood according to Deleuze’s concept of 
modulation (1992): a technique used in societies of control in which actual 
“discipline becomes more or less unnecessary if control can be enacted 
through a series of guiding, determining and persuasive mechanisms of 
power” (Cheney-Lippold, 2011, p. 169). Instead of working through discipline 
and normativity, modulation “configures life by tailoring its conditions of 
possibility. Regulation predicts our lives as users by tethering the potential for 
alternative futures to our previous actions as users based on consumption 
and research for consumption” (p. 169). As online identification apparatuses 
constantly – and automatically – characterize users based on their 
consumptive and affective labour, so they shape users’ potential future online 
experiences along the same lines as their characterizations, thus actively 
closing the loop between characterization and subjectivation. Scourti’s piece 
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stages a dialogue between two descriptive technologies for representing 
complex, interior life (one very old, the other quite recent): the diary (as a form 
of becoming-character through self-representation) and its algorithmic 
analysis (an apparatus that characterizes). As she continually reads her 
AdWords, a double pedagogical process takes place. She “teaches” Google’s 
algorithms to recognize her more efficiently – to translate diaristic interiority 
into algorithmic interiority. In doing so, she learns something of how these 
algorithms see; as she reads out her keywords, it is almost as if she is 
learning how to speak their language. Ted Striphas’ work helps to 
conceptualize this dialogue further (Hallinan and Striphas, 2014; Striphas, 
2012; Granieri, 2014). He argues that concepts of culture and technology 
(which were closely aligned in pre-modern times) are now re-aligning in new 
ways. For instance, the emergence of the digital humanities, which uses 
computational tools to analyze cultural materials in ways that human 
observers cannot (for instance, by analyzing several thousand novels to find a 
heretofore unrecognized subgenre) shows that there may be certain aspects 
of “human” culture that are only intelligible to machines. Striphas’ term 
“algorithmic culture” describes the ways in which algorithms increasingly do 
traditional “cultural” work: “of the sorting, classifying, and hierarchizing of 
people, places, objects, and ideas” (Granieri, 2014). For instance, Google and 
Facebook use algorithms to determine what appears in a specific user’s 
search engine. This language wrests interests, doubts and desires into clouds 
of tendencies. Scourti’s actions point to the cybernetic feedback loops at the 
heart of a newly emerging “political economy of propensity” (Thrift, 2009) 
articulated, in large part, through data analytics companies, online advertisers 
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and social media platforms. As Nigel Thrift (2009) argues, there is a newly 
emerging “political economy of propensity” in contemporary societies, the 
outlines of which have yet to be entirely written. Propensity, he argues, should 
be “understood jointly as both a tendency-cum-attraction and an innate 
inclination, that is, as a disposition to behave in a certain way which is only 
partly in control of the agent” (p. 83). In order to understand propensity in 
societies in which communication capabilities have been ramped up, and, 
thus, in which contagion is all the more palpable as a bio-social phenomenon, 
Thrift turns to Gabriel Tarde’s Economic Psychology (first published in 1902). 
Tarde’s work helps to explain what Thrift views as a missing component in 
most theories of political economy: something akin to Keynes’ ‘animal spirits’ 
– “contagious spirits like confidence, fear, ‘irrational’ exuberance, bad faith, 
corruption, confidence, a sense of fairness, and the very stories we tell 
ourselves about our economic fortunes” (Thrift, 2009, p. 84). Until recently, 
very few thinkers considered such forces to be “anything other than 
epiphenomenal to the real business of economy and, even then, they are 
often consigned to what is quite literally a spirit world outside of the bounds of 
normal economic calculation” (p. 84). Tarde’s economic theory differs in that it 
considers psychological processes of imitation to be integral to the operation 
of markets, and to be inherently quantifiable. As such, it is well aligned with 
“how aspects of the economy which were considered as without the sphere of 
economic calculation are gradually being brought within through the 
increasing interest of business and economics in things biological”, leading to 
a world in which “semiconscious action can be put up for sale” (p. 85). The 
ever more ubiquitous predictive and pre-emptive practices of algorithmic 
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surveillance (or dataveillance, as Van Dijck, 2014 prefers to call it) trade in 
propensity, routinely produce and monetize its images out of desires, 
disturbances and moods that are partly personal, and partly expressions of 
“imitative rays” of shared interests, feelings and behaviors that spread through 
social networks. These analytic apparatuses analyze older modes of 
documenting interior complexity (for instance, letter writing reconfigured as 
email), in real time, in hopes of securing future value in the present. In her 
May 2012 compilation of AdWords, Scourti speaks to such concerns in the 
language of AdWords’ algorithms: “Relaxation techniques for anxiety. Predict 
future. Tell me my future. I want to know my future” (Scourti, 2012b). This 
string of AdWords seems meant to appeal to the “personal” anxieties about 
the future attributed, by algorithms, to Scourti; yet perhaps they speak even 
more loudly to how such anxieties (be they actual or invented through 
analysis) have fallen into lockstep with the surveillance apparatuses’ own 
preoccupations with prediction, propensity, risk assessment and producing 
value through these. If Elahi’s piece represented character as a set of indexed 
habitual experiences and tendencies, in order to devalue the highly 
anomalous attributions to which the FBI subjected him, then Scourti’s piece 
grapples with the commercialization and normalization of characterization 
through the analysis of precisely such rhythms of habits and tendencies. 
Scourti’s piece analyzes a structure of characterization as a cybernetic 
feedback loop in which algorithmic analyses of her tendencies align with and 
shape the personal desire for self-actualization64 in complex ways.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Self-actualization, in itself, can be understood as a form of neoliberal governmentality. As 
Michel Feher (2009) argues, concepts of self-appreciation are inextricably linked to the 
emergence of the concept of “human capital” in the mid-twentieth century, which initially 
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Characterizing Differently? Toward a Critical Language of Attribution 
With each surveillant act of characterization comes a complex 
expression of the interplay between a surveillance apparatus and the 
“character” of its subject. Several actors’ and apparatuses’ inclinations, 
perceptual capacities, economic interests, presuppositions and desires 
actively shape how a characteristic can come to be attributed to its character. 
Scourti’s project clearly demonstrates this by setting up a nuanced, ongoing 
dialogue between her self-reflection through writing and the algorithms that 
track her, amplifying certain doubts, desires and consumer interests over 
others and transforming these into monetized attention-lures. Elahi’s project 
takes the FBI’s desire for his transparency to an extreme, and sees its subject 
dissolve into a haze of locations, habits and objects that open surveillance 
onto other forms of witnessing and self-characterization. While Elahi’s website 
inscribes – and protects – his lifespan with a “safe” range of represented, 
repetitive habits and tendencies, SWAMP uses repetitive, habitual behaviour 
against the grain, as (to use Massumi’s term) “threat-o-genic.” Repeated 
behaviours, in SWAMP’s setup, unmoor action from intention, throwing 
character into question. (The question “what kind of person would do such a 
thing?” lurks in the background whenever intention seems conspicuously 
illegible.) All of these projects establish character as a vitally important, 
speculative object of surveillance. Characteristics belong to no one person, 
since they are always attributed relationally; as such, their problematics are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
referred to “the set of skills that an individual can acquire thanks to investments in his or her 
education or training” (p. 25). The widespread use of the concept of human capital, Feher 
argues, “is less a symptom of the gradual “commodification” of the liberal subject than it is the 
expression of an emergent neoliberal condition” (p.25), which must, in fact, be embraced as 
an enabling condition by activists in the neoliberal era. 
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those of privatization (which determines which actors have the 
representational power to attribute characteristics to others most forcefully 
within a given surveillant milieu), rather than of privacy.  
SWAMP, Elahi and Scourti provide insightful studies of these emerging 
dynamics. In doing so, their projects also suggest that an adequate response 
to contemporary surveillance involves developing new criteria for 
characterization: a critical language for the ways in which characteristics can 
be selected, elected and co-produced from available data sets and tendencies 
by various interested parties. Such a language could speak far more pointedly 
than privacy to the aesthetic and speculative dimensions of surveillant 
citizenship, in an era in which representations of individuals’ futurity have ever 
more influence on their present. 
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Conclusion 
 
 In spite of the rapidly changing technological, financial and 
representational contexts with which we all must grapple, some moments 
seem almost to repeat themselves. Let us return, once more, to Patrick 
Keiller’s film London, which so compellingly captured, through the narrated 
attitudes of an absent, silent character, the sense of keen disappointment felt 
by many after John Major’s surprise, outright election win for the British 
Conservative Party in 1992 – despite the polls’ previous pronouncement that 
Labour was narrowly in the lead. On 7 May, 2015, the British election almost 
perfectly echoed the results Keiller (through Robinson, his film’s silent, absent 
main character) lamented. Robinson clearly and plainly characterizes London 
in the face of what he views as an abysmal election result, denigrating the 
unfairness in the capital, the repressiveness of British life, London’s backward 
policies, its backward thinking, its hatred of intellectuals. In 2015 as in 1992, 
the polls indicated a vote much further to the left than the actual results 
reflected. Thus, there was a wave of shock the morning after, as the nation 
woke up to David Cameron’s surprise majority win.  
 The polls were wrong, again, in 2015; but by now, there was yet 
another problem, another apparatus of political miscalibration. This is best 
encapsulated by Eli Pariser’s term the “you loop” (2011). As Pariser points 
out, the more that algorithms identify users online, the more they guess our 
identities and interests, the more they pre-emptively filter what we see online 
according to our presumed tastes. This leads to a “filter bubble,” or “you loop” 
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– a sense in which one finds oneself in an echo chamber online, an infinite 
regress of reflections and inflections of what are already (more or less) one’s 
own perspectives and opinions. My own Facebook feed, right before the 
election, was some kind of a progressive paradise, filled with left-wing artists, 
writers and activists swapping Labour and Green votes to maximize their anti-
Conservative weight. While it is certainly nothing new that one’s friends might 
tend to share in one’s political interests and commitments, online filtering 
exacerbates this tendency to sameness, actively eliminating antagonism from 
each user’s perceptual purview online, and enabling the spectre of political 
solidarity to seem more concrete, more tangible, and less fragile than, 
suddenly, it reveals itself to be the morning after the votes are counted. The 
automatic governance of online feeds and search results speaks to a new 
politics of the first-person perspective online, which will continue to have 
profound consequences for the ways in which political will can be felt, 
understood and practiced in the future.  
 In this thesis, I have attempted to show that character – an economic 
expression of the paradox of the shared/interior perspective, reduced and 
rendered circulable – is an ever-more important, contested site in an age of 
both widespread speculation and widespread computation. One’s “character” 
– for instance, one’s creditworthiness, or one’s being a good investment for a 
job or contract – is increasingly subject not only to older forms of judgment 
(such as the complex perceptual and [pre-]conceptual acts involved in one 
person looking into another’s eyes and seeing, represented there, her 
“character”), but also to a host of new technologies of judgment: online, 
algorithmic assessments, which actively calculate one’s riskiness as an 
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investment of any sort. Bernard Harcourt (2007) traces the use of statistical 
means to calculate – and thereby influence – individuals’ future behaviour 
back to 1935, when the first American prisons predicted recidivism rates using 
the Burgess Method (invented in 1928) and granted parole accordingly. Since 
then, and in the face of both increased computation and increased 
privatization, character has come to be measured more and more – and 
access to education, opportunities, good prices, credit and, in some cases, 
even freedom are granted or curtailed accordingly. On the one hand, these 
dynamics emerge through, and as, representations of people – for instance, 
by new online identification or credit scoring algorithms. On the other hand, as 
Pariser’s “you loop” reminds us, such characterizations also actively feed 
back to us what are deemed (credibly or otherwise) to be our “own” 
perspectives. Online, automated characterization filters first-person 
perspectives of digital space, producing a new politics of self-similarity which 
pre-conditions vision. 
The pervasive and ever-changing measurement techniques employed 
in the age of big data have been associated, on the one hand, with a broad 
and ambitious (if by no means uncontestable) claim to truth. As MIT 
researcher Alex Pentland enthusiastically puts it,  
Who you actually are is determined by where you spend time, 
and which things you buy. Big data is increasingly about real 
behaviour, and by analysing this sort of data, scientists can tell 
an enormous amount about you. They can tell whether you are 
the sort of person who will pay back loans. They can tell you if 
you're likely to get diabetes…They can do this because the sort 
of person you are is largely determined by your social context, 
so if I can see some of your behaviours, I can infer the rest, just 
by comparing you to the people in your crowd (Naughton, 2014).  
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Within this positivistic understanding of big data, more data, and more 
sophisticated means for analysing it, amounts to more realistic renderings of 
people’s “true” feelings, tendencies and motivations: or, as Douglas Merrill 
would put it, “really deep, rich understandings of you as a person” 
(ZestFinance.com). Yet viewed from another perspective, big data does not 
produce truth about the users it analyzes, so much as it produces a new set of 
techniques for power, pre-emption and control. In a short piece for The 
Baffler, Jacob Silverman suggests that metrics, in the age of big data, might 
best be seen as ways to divide and conquer – to encourage people to blame 
themselves if they fail to live up to the arbitrary and flawed criteria to which 
they are subject. In a world in which workplace analysts and data brokers 
divide citizen-consumers into hyper-specific demographic categories enabled 
by big data analytics, such as “Busy and Coping,” “Irritated and Unsettled,” 
“Rural and Barely Making It,” or “Ethnic Second-City Strugglers,” perception, 
Silverman notes, is reality (2015). Those perceived to be credit risks for any 
reason, however arbitrary, may experience what Frank Pasquale terms 
“cascading disadvantages” (Silverman, 2015, Pasquale, 2011) – self-fulfilling 
prophesies – whereby, for instance, those deemed uncreditworthy are more 
likely to act as bad credit risks, due to the exorbitant interest rates they face; 
as a result, they might face even worse interest rates in future. While the 
analytic languages of character in the age of big data claim to be predictive, it 
might be better to say that they are pre-emptive; they actively parse out, 
allocate and shape individual perspectives and potentials based on an 
intricate, analytic dance with the subjects they perceive. In so doing, they 
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render representations of their subjects’ futurity as active agents governing 
their options in the present.  
If the equations in Thomas Piketty’s tome Capital in the Twenty-First 
Century (2013) are to be believed, the rate of economic growth no longer 
exceeds the rate of returns on capital; in other words (to put it very simply): 
broadly speaking, having money, in the first place, makes more money than 
working for money ever could. Thus, the dream of class mobility vanishes, 
and the world slips back to Victorian levels of wealth inequality. For Piketty, 
massive disparities between the rich and poor are central features, not 
accidents, of capitalism. It was only due to an unusual sequence of events, 
which produced large capital shocks from circa 1914-1945 – destroying 
massive amounts of wealth owned by the elite – that economic growth 
momentarily exceeded the rate of returns, leading to a short-lived, more 
equitable wealth distribution in the post-war period. Now, this economic 
situation is reversing itself; barring another round of unprecedented capital 
shocks that target what is owned by the elite – or revolution – an increase in 
wealth inequality seems likely in the decades to come. (Indeed, at the time of 
this writing, Credit Suisse just released a report which found that the top 1% 
of the world’s population now own 50.4% of the world’s wealth.) (Treanor, 
2015)  
If this is, indeed, where wealth distribution is headed, will all of the 
twentieth century’s concomitant modern ideals fade into the background? 
Caught up in this slow and massive shift in wealth distribution, a generation or 
two of thinkers (who are, more or less, the same age as neoliberalism – which 
was born, so the story goes, as I was, in 1979) were raised with a gap 
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between our modern-era ideals and the new, neo-Victorian economic realities 
we now face.65 We grew up with the ideals of the welfare state, of class 
mobility, of equality and equal opportunity for all (however flawed or 
incomplete might have been their realization). If these values are already, in a 
sense, slipping away – shadows of the twentieth century as we enter a new 
age of the super-rich, who benefit, among other things, from privileged access 
to the economic benefits of computation – then what is the best 
representation of the human condition (to borrow a term from Michel Feher, 
2013) that would make this vast shift in wealth concentration palatable 
enough, invisible enough, seemingly justified enough to pass without mass 
revolt? One answer to this dilemma, of course, is to parse out people’s 
differential benefits, advantages and opportunities based, on the one hand, on 
the presumption of a base equality, in keeping with modern, egalitarian ideals 
– on the presumption that anyone could have a “good” character and thus, 
reap the benefits they so richly deserve, should they only choose to act, self-
actualize, accordingly; but on the on the other hand, to differentially grant 
interest and investment to people based on differences in their behavioural 
tendencies, their character – differences of character, which (at least, so they 
seem) are within one’s purview, one’s power to change: yet, in fact, stand in 
for a newly personalized rationale for inequality emerging in the age of big 
data. This is not to say, of course, that the structural disadvantages of being 
poor, or being subject to racism, sexism, homophobia or transphobia have 
gone away. Rather, it is to say that the representational economies trading in 
images of such structural (dis)advantage come cloaked in an ever richer, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 I am indebted to Andrea Phillips on this point; she raised similar questions about the gap 
between welfare state and neoliberal ideals as a problem for educators at Goldsmiths in fall 
2014. 
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deeper, more personalized languages of behavioural particularity, aspiration 
and tendency, which can ever more convincingly claim to afford individuals 
the advantages they “truly” deserve. 
In a sense, this is nothing new. Many have already noted the right wing 
tendency to blame the poverty of the poor on their poor “character” (see, for 
instance, Giridharadas, 2015). There is a deeply entrenched right wing 
literature on character; to cite just one example, in the run-up to the 2008 
American presidential election, Republican candidate John McCain and his 
co-author Mark Salter published Character is Destiny: Inspiring Stories Every 
Young Person Should Know and Every Adult Should Remember (2007). 
Inspirational figures, such as Winston Churchill, who overcame adversity and 
hardship to become great leaders, in this context, seem poised as if to justify 
policies that produce that hardship in the first place. Retroactively, they give 
austerity measures a starring role in a moralizing tale – however demoralizing 
the realities of austerity might be. Yet, even though this may the case, 
character transcends the bounds of this right wing narrative. In the very same 
U.S. election of 2008, in fact, Heraclitus’ aphorism “character is destiny” also 
emerged on the opposite end of the political spectrum. Ralph Nader, when 
asked to describe his views on Barack Obama just after he was elected in 
2008, said he believed Obama to be highly intelligent, with a keen perception 
of key political issues. Nevertheless, as he told interviewer Paul Jay:   
…The key is his personality. You know, Heraclitus, the ancient 
philosopher, once said, “Character is destiny.” And I would say 
personality is decisive. He does not have a challenging personality. He 
doesn't speak truth and democratic power — you know, organizing 
people — to plutocratic power (The Real News, 2008). 
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Already in 2008, Nader understood Obama’s overly conciliatory character as 
the destiny of his presidency. Given droves of disappointing developments in 
American politics since 2008 – failure to close the Guantanamo Bay detention 
camp, unlawful killings perpetrated by the U.S. drone program, the NSA’s 
surveillance program and the subsequent scapegoating of Edward Snowden, 
to name only a few – perhaps many might view Nader’s judgment of Obama 
as having been subsequently justified. Yet the very idea that one politician 
could change an enormous, and enormously corrupt, system of government 
seems, in itself, far more suspect than Obama’s character. To pin the sundry 
failures of the American political system since 2008 on one man’s flaws, of 
course, is to grossly over-simplify an enormous – even unfathomable – 
institutional complexity, to partake of a shorthand that would circumvent the 
complexities of policies, legalities, and closely intertwined corporate and 
institutional interests: to render these, somehow, intuitively perceptible, boiled 
down to “character.”  
This is a form of fiction that, if Nader’s comments are any indication, 
are every bit as compelling, as a representational shorthand for futurity, on the 
far left as they are for the far right. If the right wing discourse of “good 
character” focuses on figures who overcome austere conditions in order to 
succeed in a difficult economy (thus embodying the perfect, “creditworthy” 
subject), the corresponding far left discourse envisions great individuals with 
the strength of character to speak truth to power, questioning the grounds 
through which creditworthiness comes to be allocated in the first place. Such 
imagined individuals are characters, in fact, so truthful that they can break the 
bounds of character, which doom us all to conceive of ourselves, and others, 
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as either creditworthy or otherwise. As carriers of public faith in the relativity of 
late-capitalist values – in, at least, the vague potential, in the age of the 
bloodless coups of finance,66 for something other than capitalist accumulation 
to hold sway – the left wing discourse of character preserves faith that 
goodness, as an application (as I framed it in Chapter 3), can apply, so to 
speak, to other institutions – perhaps institutions yet to come. 
We could say that the president’s role, as figurehead in a 
representative democracy, is both representative and representational: he 
personifies the government, and perhaps also the propensities and potentials 
any government might have to change tack, to better represent its citizens. As 
figurehead, Obama economizes institutional complexity as qualitative, felt 
character – and, in doing so, translates speculative, economic concerns into 
the moral/perceptual realm of personal qualities, of creditworthiness. It is this 
double role of the politician in a democratic system (however suspect its 
status as an actually democratic representation of its citizens might be) as 
both representative and representational that is at stake in a politics of 
character. The ubiquitous intertwining of representative and representational 
roles encapsulates the ways in which traits, too, become selected and elected 
representatives in a broadly moralistic, speculative system of power, and 
circulate as economic values.  
 Politicians, along with celebrities and other public figures, are 
surveillance pioneers. In 2013 (as discussed in the introduction), Edward 
Snowden spoke to the sense in which surveillance apparatuses like those of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 I refer particularly to Greece here, which has been all but forced to accept austerity 
measures, against the will of its people, in the summer of 2015. Many commentators have 
framed his turn of events as an illegal act of financial violence – a bloodless coup that aims at 
regime change for the benefit of the investor community (see, for instance, Milne, 2015).  
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the NSA could allow those with privileged access to information databases to 
go back in time, deriving suspicion from innocent lives, painting anyone and 
everyone as wrongdoers simply by scrounging for scraps of unpalatable 
behaviour, tucked away in sleeper dossiers. Yet if these are, for most of us, 
conditions yet to come, politicians and other prominent public figures already 
live them. A politician’s having tried marijuana once as a teenager can easily 
be repurposed as smear campaign fodder in the competitive game of 
squeaky-clean public images. The American legal drama The Good Wife 
(CBS, 2009-) speaks very well to these frontiers of online surveillance culture, 
of which public figures (unwittingly or otherwise) bear the brunt. At one point 
in the series, a prominent Chicago lawyer, Diane Lockhart, comes under 
consideration for a judgeship. When she finds out she is in the running, the 
first order of business is to hire her firm’s investigator, Kalinda Sharma, to 
conduct a private search, digging up any and all information that could 
possibly be used against her, in the vast landscape that is her digital footprint. 
Among the scraps of “dirt” Kalinda finds are corny, steamy fan-fiction blog 
entries about the characters in romance novels, traceable to Lockhart’s IP 
address. These, it turns out, had been written from Lockhart’s desktop 
computer by her cleaning lady. Into this moment of confusion, The Good Wife 
condenses many intertwined logics of character and characterization. The 
romance novel characters, enveloped in the cleaner’s enthusiasm, bear the 
reified markers of a class position expressed through readerly tastes. Leaping 
out of the pages of their novels, these fictitious subjects find their lives 
extended, on the blog, in the sugary medium of the cleaner’s prose. Through 
a routine conflation of all of Lockhart’s IP address activity with her own, 
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personal activity, these signs of classed desire stick to the more prominent 
woman, thwarting the unimpeded flow of her otherwise relatively untarnished 
reputation. If the series, in itself – as just about any realist fiction does – uses 
characters, and character development, to fuel plots, The Good Wife also 
juxtaposes this essentially literary technology with another emerging 
technology of characterization: that of the surveillance apparatus, which 
produces another kind of fictioning of personhood that will, so it seems, only 
have more impact on citizens in the future.  
 If politicians, prominent public figures and celebrities are surveillance 
pioneers, rehearsing and prefiguring the kind of scrutiny to which all citizens, 
one day, might be subjected, activists are another group that bears this 
burden. In one of the most poignant scenes in Laura Poitras’ film about 
Edward Snowden and the NSA revelations, Citizenfour (2014), journalist 
Jacob Appelbaum asks a group of Occupy Wall Street activists, assembled 
for security training, how many of them have been arrested, had their retinas 
scanned, had their phones confiscated and taken into the back room on their 
court date, or had been subject to other acts of targeted surveillance 
designed, in part, to intimidate protestors. (Many raise their hands.) 
Appelbaum tells them that these are the conditions that all protesters will face 
in the future. Made to bear the brunt of characterization enabled by 
surveillance, future activists will face more personal scrutiny than ever before 
as they face the structural inequalities that over-produce images of the 
personal in the first place.  
 It is clear that, in an economy of reputation-images, bolstering or 
tarnishing character becomes subject to more and more tactical concern; and 
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negative characterizations are differentially allocated to some more than 
others. This is very clear both in the realm of politics, and in the politics of 
online prominence. Yet another recently emerging example of this would be 
revenge porn. Women whose angry ex-boyfriends publish intimate images of 
them online without their consent face a new form of non-consensual image 
violence – reputational violence, even. As Hito Steyerl has suggested (2010), 
in a culture of ubiquitous image circulation, we are not only, not so much, 
represented by images as we participate in them, finding ourselves inflected 
by their circulations, their lives. If this is so, then revenge porn represents a 
new form of image-rape, which is aimed at tarnishing its victims’ character. In 
a landscape of creditworthiness and risk, praise and notoriety, 
characterization can be a tool or a weapon. And yet, for all of these critiques 
of the economies of character – for all of the ways in which characterizations’ 
claims to realism might, in fact, turn out to be, quite simply, claims to power – I 
certainly do not wish to dismiss the topic as an object of study, or subject it 
only to critical scrutiny. To the contrary: character, and characterization, 
redistribute represented relations between individuals and power – they stage, 
contain and carry the conflicts between ungrounded speculation and the truth 
claims made by the apostles of big data analytics. All this makes character an 
exceptionally urgent area of study. For it is by understanding how character 
works, how economized personhood, distilled in acts of characterization, 
navigates the conflicts between data, truth, qualitative particularity and 
speculative economic value, that we might arrive at an understanding of how 
to characterize differently, to hold open the possibility for other, less normative 
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forms of recognition for qualitative particularity than those most often upheld 
by big data analytics to take hold. 
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Illustrations 
 
Figure 1. Emily Rosamond (2012-2013) Model for a Screen. [Notebooks, tar, 
aquarium pebbles, glue, laser level, Perspex plinth. Dimensions variable –
sculpture: 11.5 x 8 x 1”]. 
 
Figure 2. Emily Rosamond. (2013) Birth of a Decision Maker. [Video, 2:03]. 
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Figure 3. School of the Event Horizon (Steven Levon Ounanian, Kate 
Pickering, Emily Rosamond) (2014) Oracular Sponge (Version 003.1a). 
[Custom packaging, press release, and product launch performance with 
unboxing and divination exercise] London: Tenderpixel/Tenderbooks. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Emily Rosamond. (2014) Weathervane. [Performance with arms 
emerging from two holes cut into gallery wall, displaying various objects, 3 
hours; documentation video 4:36]. London: ASC Gallery. 
	   270	  
  
Figure 5. Emily Rosamond. (2014) And now I’m going to tell you a story, and 
it’s the story of the selection process. [Performance with wall and objects]. 
London: Laurie Grove Baths, Goldsmiths. 
 
 
Figure 6. Emily Rosamond. (2014) A Way to Choose the Divination System. 
[MDF and various domestic objects, approx. 32 x 32”]. 
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Figure 7. Geoffrey Farmer. (2008) Ghost Face. Montréal: Musée d’Art 
Contemporain. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Geoffrey Farmer. (2004) I thought that I could make a machine that 
would pierce the fabric of reality, in your world it appears as a 16th century 
sign. 
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Figure 9. James Luna. (1987) The Artifact Piece. San Diego: Museum of Man.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Jimmie Durham. (2004) Still Life with Stone and Car. Sydney: 
Sydney Biennale.  
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Figure 11. Patrick Keiller. (1994) London (still, with subtitles). London: British 
Film Institute.  
 
 
Figure 12. Mark Lombardi. (1995) Charles Keating, ACC, and Lincoln 
Savings, ca. 1978-90 (5th Version). [Coloured pencil and graphite on paper] 
Collection of Sarah-Ann and Werner H. Kramarsky. 
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Figure 13. Mark Lombardi. (1999) George W. Bush, Harken Energy, and 
Jackson Stephens, ca. 1979-90 (5th Version). [Coloured pencil and graphite 
on paper]. 
 
Figure 14. Mark Lombardi. (1999) World Finance Corporation, Miami, Florida, 
ca. 1970-79 (6th Version). [Coloured pencil and graphite on paper]. 
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Figure 15. Amir Chasson. (2011) Ten dimensional tetrahedron. [Oil and 
household paint on canvas]. 
 
 
Figure 16. Amir Chasson. (2010) Green Three Dimensional Topo Map Using 
Fishnet Lines. [Oil, charcoal and household paint on canvas]. 
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Figure 17. (2014) “Homepage – VisualDNA.” VisualDNA.com [Accessed 15 
November]. 
 
 
Figure 18. George Brecht and Robert Filliou. (1965-1968) La Cédille qui 
Sourit. Villefranche-sur-Mer, France: 12 Rue de May. 
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Figure 19. Rafael Lozano-Hemmer. (2013) Zero Noon. [Computer, processing 
software, square HD display, electronics, metal enclosure]. 
 
Figure 20. Lizzie Fitch and Ryan Trecartin. (2013) CENTER JENNY (still). 
[HD video, 53:15 min].  
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Figure 21. Manfred Pernice. (1999) Block F. [Chipboard, paint, Neon lights, 
Ektachrome laminated glass, typewriter and written text on paper]. 
 
 
Figure 22. SWAMP (Studies of Work Atmosphere and Mass Production: Doug 
Easterly, Matt Kenyon). (2003) McService. [Performance/video]. 
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Figure 23. Hasan Elahi. (2005-) Tracking Transience: The Orwell Project. 
www.trackingtransience.net. [Website].  
 
 
Figure 24. Erica Scourti. (2012-2013) Life in AdWords. [Webcam 
performance]. 
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